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 Growing out of recent scholarship on humoral theory and emotions in early 
modern literary texts, this dissertation explores the idea that Shakespearean emotions are 
contagious.  Tears, rage, compassion, fear, affection, horror, and laughter travel invisible 
pathways from character to character in his texts, reinforcing an implicit scheme of 
emotional transmission harkening back to Plato and Aristotle.  Whether generated 
internally or imposed from the outside, these passions have the ability to wreak havoc on 
individuals, communities, and even countries, because passions can, and often do, lead to 
action.  This work examines three of Shakespeare’s tragic works, the poem Rape of 
Lucrece and two plays: Othello and Julius Caesar.    
 In the chapter on Rape of Lucrece, beauty is the root of the violent, contagious 
action driving the tale.  Tarquin himself is ravished by Lucrece’s beauty.  Overwhelmed 
by a “rage of lust,” the prince must exorcise his excess humors through rape to regain 
equilibrium.  Lucrece is infected with his “load of lust” during the rape and then kills 
herself, passing on Tarquin’s beauty-inspired violence to Collatine and the nobles in a 
mutated form—the lust for vengeance. Through her act of self-violence, Lucrece 
transforms the original contagion into a force which purges Rome of the Tarquins’ rule. 
 For Julius Caesar, I trace Shakespeare’s descriptions of environmental vents in 
Julian Rome and how these correspond to the emotional c mplexion of the agents in the 
play.  I identify fear as the main emotional vector in this play and illustrate how the 
imagination takes on a crucial role in the misregulation of the humors, a situation that, in 
turn, creates the ideal environment for violent action.   
 The chapter dedicated to Othello examines the false transmission of emotion 
perpetrated by Iago to destroy Othello.  Iago develops false emotional paradigms, 
reframing his hatred for the general with trappings of love; successfully communicating 
the degree of his passion without the content, Iagois able to fool Othello into believing 
Desdemona is false.  Despite his demand for “ocular proof,” the Moor becomes 
overwhelmed by the force of Iago’s emotions and becomes an instrument of “honest” 










“PASSION IS CATCHING”: EMOTIONAL CONTAGION AND AFFECTIVE 
ACTION  
IN SELECT WORKS BY SHAKESPEARE   
By 
Angelique Marie Wheelock 
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
2011 
Advisory Committee: 
Professor Kent Cartwright, Chair 
Professor Maynard Mack 
Professor Gerard Passannante 
Professor Sangeeta Ray 
Professor Mary Ann Hoffman 
© Copyright by 




















 There are many people that I wish to thank for their lp and support during the 
writing of this dissertation.  First, Kent Cartwright and Maynard Mack, both of whom 
went above and beyond, provided me with insightful feedback, constructive criticism, 
and the encouragement I desperately needed to finally bring this project to completion.  I 
also wish to thank Gerard Passannante, Mary Ann Hoffman, and Sangeeta Ray, the other 
dedicated members of my final committee.  And, I would be remiss not to acknowledge 
the stellar support given to me by the University of Maryland Libraries’ Interlibrary Loan 
staff—through all the twists, turns, and changes in my research, this amazing team 
always provided me with the resources I needed. 
 
 I am blessed with many friends, all of whom have supported me in a variety of 
ways over the long (and often cranky) years of dissertating.  Ellen Weene, Julie Westfall 
Gettings, Lauren Martey, Laura Wells Betz, Elena Brown Richardson, Kelly Richardson, 
Yvonne Roth Wiser, Marcia Sue Brown, Sauni Johnson, and Regina Steagall each made 
it possible for me to make the final push to finish this project.  They stuck by me and 
provided me with unconditional friendship and endless support.  Walter Donaldson and 
Carlton Einsel, friends as much as employers, gave me the generous gift of time, a gift 
that enabled me to finally put this project to rest, and for that I will be eternally grateful. 
 
 My wonderful parents—Willard and Sharon Wheelock—taught me to explore the 
world with a sense of wonder and curiosity and to never back down in the face of 
adversity.  I cannot thank them enough for always believing in me and showing me love 
when I needed it most.  And my sister, Susannah Wheelock, who has suffered amiably 
the highs and lows of living with me while I was going through the dissertation process, 
deserves a lot of credit for her unwavering belief that I could—and would—finish what I 
started.  During those times that I doubted myself, my friends and family provided an 
amazing support system that nourished me and helped to r -energize my scholarship.  
Thank you, one and all. 
 
 Last, and ultimately, I dedicate this volume to my husband, Leonard Kilburn. 
Without his belief in me, and occasional demonstrations of “tough love,” I never could 
have finished what sometimes seemed to be an interminable project with insurmountable 






Table of Contents 
 
 
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ii 
 
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii 
 
Chapter 1: “Perturbations of the Mind”: Affects in the Early Modern Period . . . . . . .1 
 
Chapter 2: “Greedy Eyeballs” and “Thievish Ears”: Beauty’s Sensual Assault in  
  Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
 
Chapter 3: “Transformed with Their Fear”: Dread, Contagion, and Violence in  
  Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84 
 
Chapter 4: “Eaten Up with Passion”: Deliberate Contagion and the Failure of  
  Reason in Othello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 
 
Chapter 5: “O Bloody Period!”: Conclusions about Tragedy and the  
  Transmission of Affect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .190 
 




List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 – The Humors and Their Relationships with other Early Modern Categories 
 
Figure 2 – Mutating Affects during Transmission in The Rape of Lucrece 
 





“Perturbations of the Mind”: Affects in the Early M odern Period 
 
In Henry Crosse’s 1603 treatise Virtues Common-wealth, the author exhorts his 
audience to use temperance to “keep desire under the yoke of reason.”  One of many 
early modern pamphlets warning against the dangers of unbridled passions, Crosse’s 
identifies the source of these endangering passions as external: 
Of the lineaments of [Temperance’s] perfection, the w ole world doth subsist and 
abide, even from the lowest to the highest, without whom our lusts would 
overthrow our understanding, and the body rebel against ll good order, and the 
habit of reason wholly suppressed: for she tempereth and keepeth in frame the 
whole body of man, without whose aid many enemies would creep in, and infect 
our best parts, and utterly ruinate and cast down the bulwark of reason, and walls 
of understanding …1 
Likening them to transmitters of common disease, Crosse characterizes destructive lusts 
as “enemies” which overcome the weak human body, undermining the “good order” 
normally maintained by reason.  These enemy lusts “creep in” to the “body” of man, 
implying they are not necessarily already present in the mind and body of the sufferer.  
By linking inordinate emotion with external sources, Crosse builds on the rich tradition of 
Galenic humoral theory, the most commonly held medical theory of his time, which 
stresses that the human body is essentially porous and open to the influence of outside 
forces including the elements, meteorological phenomena, and the humors of other 
people.   
 This porosity is the cornerstone of my argument: Shakespearean emotions are 




pathways from character to character in his texts, reinforcing an implicit scheme of 
emotional transmission harkening back to Plato and Aristotle.  Whether generated 
internally or imposed from the outside, these passions have the ability to wreak havoc on 
individuals, communities, and even countries, because passion can, and often does, lead 
to action.  In this context, the dangers of inordinate passion explicated by Crosse and 
others make sense: emotions produce motive for action, even when the actions are not 
supported by reason.  Compounded with the fact that passions can invade an individual 
from the outside, the danger takes on an element of horror—if an individual cannot 
control his emotions, and it is his emotions that spur him to act, then what, or who, 
controls his actions?2  The Christian equation of emotions with the seven d adly sins 
during the Middle Ages—sins thought to originate with the Devil, an outside source—
and the Neo-Stoic doctrine of emotional suppression that follows in the Renaissance can 
be traced straight to this dilemma.3   
 For this study, I have selected Shakespearean texts that well illustrate the 
mechanisms of emotional contagion and subsequent affective action:  The Rape of 
Lucrece, Julius Caesar, and Othello.  Although each of these works ends in tragedy and 
contains similar violent acts including murder, assassination, rape, and suicide, each text 
proffers a unique window into how Shakespeare and his contemporaries conceptualized 
the transmission of affect and its consequences.  By showing the literality of humoral and 
corporal language permeating these works, I will trace the eruptions of emotions from the 
moment of infection through to the last action clearly linked to the original emotion or 





Emotions in the Shakespearean Age 
For there are not so manie sortes of windes, whirlewindes, or tempestes in the Sea, as there is varietie of motions 
that come from the affections in our heartes. ~ Pierre de la Primaudaye, The Second Part of the French 
Academie (1594) 
 
The first difficulty scholars of early modern emotions encounter is the word 
emotion itself.  For the purposes of this study, I use emotion, passion, and affect 
interchangeably; however, I want to clarify that the early modern usage of these terms 
does not exactly correspond to the meanings we have for them today.4  Although emotion 
entered the English language in 1579, it initially meant “a political or social agitation.”  
Later, in 1603, it was used to mean “a moving out, migration, transference from one 
place to another.”  It is not until 1660—a half century after Shakespeare wrote the works 
under consideration here—that emotion came to have the meaning we recognize today: 
an “agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion” (OED).  Instead, Shakespeare and 
his contemporaries use the terms passion and affection to describe the phenomena that we 
now refer to as emotions.  To further complicate matters, passion has a much wider 
meaning in early modern texts that it does today.  Louise Bishop links the diffuse nature 
of the word with the medieval and early modern humoral theory of the physical universe: 
[B]ecause the universe is matter-ful, passion can refer to food properties of eggs, 
to qualities of the air such as storms, to external agency or force—suffering 
inflicted from the outside—and to an internal state of mind.  It is also used to refer 
to illness . . . . The word’s [early modern] meaning s far removed from its 
modern usage as “uncontrollable and immediate emotion.”5 
Bishop points out that medieval and early modern “emotions are matter” (emphasis 
added) and subject to the laws of the physical universe in ways that the more recent 




individual, or can be imposed on man from the outside ince he, too, is a physical being 
composed of the same elements and humors as the res of the universe.7  
 But Shakespearean passions are not solely physical manifestations.  Dyan Elliott 
explains that the early modern passions take on a hybridity that their classical 
counterparts lacked.  Philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages began to view the 
Aristotelian “perturbations” of the soul as complicated by overlapping mental and 
physical states; psychology, physiology, and spiritual y all had a place in the complexity 
of human emotional experience.8  Carol Thomas Neely, using the example of the passion 
melancholy, offers an excellent example of both the c allenges and rewards inherent in 
the multivalent emotional discourse of Shakespeare’s time: 
 Because the term [melancholy] refers to a material fluid, an emotional state, and a 
 temperament, it acquires a host of meanings beyond its medical ones, ranging 
 from depression to brilliance, and generates productive thinking about the 
 constituents of the human.9 
In the Renaissance, this general consensus that mind, body, and spirit are all 
interdependent identifies emotions as a mechanism for the balance—or imbalance—of 
these three key aspects of the human condition.  This early modern identification of 
passions as catalysts for human weal or woe is one explanation for  the veritable 
explosion of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century texts dedicated to debating every aspect 
of emotional experience: where they come from, what t ey do, how they should be 





 This increased attention to the role and control of passions in early modern texts 
stems mainly from the notion that all disease—mental, physical, and even spiritual—can 
trace its roots back to body.  Yvette Marie Marchand emphasizes that a holistic view of 
health needs to be considered by scholars working wth early modern texts because 
descriptions of physical ailments often take on a corresponding mental and spiritual 
context.  She cites evidence that many early moderns co sulted both medical 
practitioners and spiritual healers when they contracted corporal diseases.  Ill individuals 
would therefore  
 be examined and analysed only as a complex physical, emotional and spiritual 
 whole in which any physical disorder would denote a r lative spiritual disorder—
 or at least a spiritual cause—no physical disorder could be healed except through 
 a spiritual cure, and all spiritual disorders could not but have a physical, visible 
 impact on the body.11 
Consequently, both mental illness and physical infirmity became a stigma of spiritual 
corruption.12  And the mechanism of corruption was often identified as emotional. 
 Early modern theories of the passions contain several k y ideas: passions straddle 
several categories of being (sensual/rational/spiritual), they alter the composition and/or 
balance of the bodily humors, they promote good or bad actions, and they can be 
generated internally or imposed by external sources.  In The Passions of the Mind in 
General (1603), the English Jesuit Thomas Wright explores th  first three of these core 
beliefs.  First, he explains that early modern passion , as emanations of the soul, fulfill 




Three sorts of actions proceed from men’s souls:  there are internal and 
immaterial, as the acts of our wits and wills; others be more external and material, 
as the acts of our senses (seeing, hearing, moving, etc.); others stand betwixt these 
two extremes and border upon them both. . . .Those actions then . . . we call 
Passions and Affections, or perturbations, of the mind. . . . 13 
Wright’s emphasis on the ability of emotions to bridge the gap between the internal and 
external realms of human consciousness anticipates rec nt findings in the fields of 
neuroscience and human behavior.14  Passions can act as agents of communication within 
the body; for example, an individual experiences feelings of happiness and contentment, 
letting him know that his plans are going well.  Externally, emotions convey meaning to 
other people through physical manifestations, or, as emphasized in this paper, by 
contaminating them with the emotions themselves. 
Another cornerstone of Renaissance emotional doctrine, and subsequently my 
theory of early modern emotional contagion, is the understanding that passions can 
modify the humors of the body, in turn altering thebody itself.  Wright makes this 
relationship between the emotions, the mind, and the body explicit: 
[W]hen these affections are stirring in our minds they alter the humours of our 
bodies, causing some passion or alteration in them.15 
This distillation of early modern emotional theory asserts that the “affection,” or emotion, 
induces an agitated state of mind, a condition that, in turn, transforms the humors.  Then 
this change in the humors results in corresponding modifications of the body itself.  And, 
because all of the systems are interconnected, the original agitation can provoke a series 




or reversed if corrective humoral regulation is implemented.  To complicate matters 
further, passions themselves are not always seen as the root cause of a “perturbation”—
many Renaissance theories blame poor diet, bad air, and even demons for the ultimate 
cause of humoral imbalance and the resulting bodily disease.  All possible corrupting 
factors must be considered when dealing with early modern descriptions of physical or 
psychological imbalance.  
 In many early modern texts, emotions are depicted as corrupting judgment, 
motivating sin, and undermining reason.  Wright addresses this issue in his Passions of 
the Mind: 
They are called perturbations for that (as afterward shall be declared) they trouble 
wonderfully the soul, corrupting the judgement and se ucing the will, inducing, 
for the most part, to vice, and commonly withdrawing from virtue;  and therefore 
some call them maladies or sores of the soul.16   
In the guise of “sores of the soul,” emotions gain a particularly poor reputation among 
philosophers and preachers of a Neo-stoical bent.17  The link between sin and excessive 
emotion first promoted in the medieval period still has a voice in the Renaissance.  
Whether a passion is labeled sinful or destructive is often based on degree and result; 
“perturbations” only exist where they do damage to the body or soul through the actions 
they provoke.  Thomas Elyot, in his Castell of Health (1595), supports this idea by 
linking the “immoderate” “passions of the mind” with forces that “annoy the body and 
shorten the life.”  Elyot’s look at inordinate emotion focuses on results: passions have the 




 On the other hand, Renaissance humanist texts, in recognition of how positive 
emotions like compassion, loyalty, and charity can elevate the human condition, draw 
attention to the ways affections lead people towards virtue.    In The Passions of the Soul 
(1538), referred to as the “the richest anthology of common places on emotions ever 
published in the Renaissance,”19 author Juan Luis Vives illustrates why God created 
emotions: 
  God, our admirable Creator, provided all animals with affections as incentives to 
 move souls destined to inhabit bodies, to prevent these souls from being downcast 
 and oppressed under the burden of the body like a lazy donkey, forever languid 
 and asleep, oblivious of their real good, negligent in doing what was required for 
 their welfare.   Emotions are spurs to move the soul this or that way, reins to 
 restrain it from running into the harmful.20  
Four hundred years later, Antonio R. Damasio’s scientif c exploration of the biology of 
emotions has yielded analogous conclusions about the usefulness of emotions.  In his 
studies, the ability of emotions to communicate intr ally within an organism—what 
Vives refers to as “incentives to move souls”—is a m jor part of their purpose: 
 All emotions have some kind of regulatory role to play, leading in one way or 
 another to the creation of circumstances advantageous to the organism exhibiting 
 the phenomenon; emotions are about the life of the organism, its body to be 
 precise, and their role is to assist the organism in aintaining life.21 
Similarly, early modern passions in their beneficial guise aid their subjects in making 
sound decisions.  Wright identifies these positive emotions as “affections” because “the 




some ill.”22  How the love of God helps good Christians avoid sin is one of the most 
common examples from the period.  
Early modern passions are also, as George L. Dillon reminds us, often depicted as 
“virtually autonomous forces to which a person may become subject or may suffer.”23  
When a person fails to command his emotions, passion can even be seen as “a tragic or 
fatal force” with the ability to alter the actions of that individual and anyone under his 
influence.24  Dillon is referring to the most extreme examples of emotional stimulation—
the same extremes this dissertation examines in Shakespeare’s writing—but the 
Renaissance philosophical debates on the subject did acknowledge that the true 
difference between helpful and harmful emotions wasone of degree.  Juan Luis Vives 
describes this emotional spectrum: 
The disturbances of the soul are like those of the sea. Some are soft as a breeze, 
some are more intense, others finally are as violent as the gusty squalls that churn 
up the depths of the oceans whirling together sand and fish. Emotions can be as 
light as the onset of a rising wave; others are stronger, while others are powerful 
enough to shake up the soul and dethrone it from the seat of rational judgment by 
rendering it truly disturbed and impotent, deprived of self-control, subject to 
strange powers and totally blind, unable to see anythi g.25 
It is this last idea Vives describes, that of a human being enthralled to forces beyond his 
control, which drives much of the early modern uneasiness regarding emotions.  If a 
passion has the ability to overtake the senses, rende ing people incapable of rational 
action, then they are constantly vulnerable to attack from disease, sin, and additional 




internal.  Michael G. Schoenfeldt describes the early modern affections as “physiological 
double agents,” operating on both the inner and outer realms of the self, perpetuating a 
“continual cold war” where a person must guard against being “overrun” by unrestrained 
passion.26 
Humoral Theory and the Emotions 
In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for 
dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return. King James Bible, “Genesis,” 3:19  
 
 It is not the purpose of this study to survey the abundance of classical and 
medieval influences on early modern humoral theory, but I believe it is necessary to 
touch on the major ideas that served as the backbone of Renaissance conceptions of the 
passions.  According to E. Ann Matter, the widespread appeal of Galenic medical theory 
in medieval and early modern England is its inclusiveness: “human existence [is] linked 
to an enormous, cosmic series of interrelated phenom a: the stars, the cardinal 
directions, the essential elements of all creation, and the essential humors of the human 
body.”27  Galen’s practical approach to curing all ills coupled with the emphasis on the 
interconnectivity of microcosm and macrocosm, won humoral theory more influential 
supporters than detractors until well into the lateseventeenth century.28  Yet, even among 
its supporters, the specifics of humoral theory still met with contention.  As Stephanie 
Moss and Kaara L. Peterson caution, “Renaissance medical discourse forms a messy 
heteroglossia that cannot be oversimplified.”29   
 Despite the plethora of conflicting medical theoris n circulation during the 
Renaissance, we can scan the most influential textsof the period and come up with a list 
of commonly held ideas about the humors.  Within what Caroline Bynum calls a 




operate or how passions are generated, certain tenets of humoral theory are still generally 
agreed upon in the majority of philosophical, medical, and literary works that have 
survived the centuries: 
• Four humors exist in the human body: Blood, Phlegm, Melancholy (black 
bile), and Choler (red and yellow bile). 
• The humors are intrinsically linked to the elements; Bartholomew calls 
them the “children of the elements.”31  
• The human body’s health is directly dependent on humoral balance. 
• A disruption or imbalance of the humors not only provokes physical 
disease—psychological and spiritual disorders can also be attributed to the 
overabundance of certain humors.   
• Emotions can change the humoral makeup of the body even as emotions 
are represented as humors themselves.     
These five characteristics of Galenic humoral theory are the foundation of not only the 
early modern physician’s understanding of physic, but also the philosopher’s approach to 
human behavior and the cleric’s method for examining spiritual distemper.  The mental, 
spiritual, and physical realms are all intertwined in Galen’s theory and are not torn 
asunder until Descartes. 
 For a modern reader, this implied interaction between the external world and our 
internal milieu may seem strange.  Even though we still retain leftover phrases such as 
“under the weather,” “feeling melancholy,” or “in a ill humor,” the Western mechanistic 
view that rules our current medical and scientific discourses tends to dismiss the 




thrive on recognizing correspondences in seemingly unrelated things, the universality 
offered by humoral theory reinforces understanding of the human condition.  I believe 
Louise M. Bishop explains Galenism’s inclusiveness be t: 
In its fullest understanding, Galenism—a theory shared between learned and lay, 
a powerful and eminently satisfying representational system—links character with 
health, body with thought, material temperament with material cosmos, reader 
with text.  Emotions—joy, sorrow, fear, and wrath—rely on, affect, and even are 
the humors, and thus are not understood as something separate from bodily 
composition.  Rather, humoral theory ties together  emotions and the body, 
including its senses, in the same way it ties together body and cosmos: all, even 
the emotions, participate in the material nature of health.32 
Figure 1 illustrates several of the ways that this “eminently satisfying representational 
system” conveyed relationships between emotional state , the seasons, the senses, and 
even the constellations.  The fact that this system was available to both “learned and lay” 
only reinforced its popularity during the early modern period.  
 For modern readers, the correspondence between humoral fluids like phlegm and 
actual mucus may seem to be a given.  But we must remember that Renaissance readers 
would not see it as a one to one correspondence.  Th  humors themselves, though related 
to the visible fluids that circulate through the biological body, are, in Galenic medicine, 
fundamentally invisible.  Noha Arikha explains: 
 These humours were not themselves visible, althoug they were based on visible 
 substances.  Everyone had seen blood; phlegm was app rent in the form of a 




 Figure 1 – The Humors and Their Relationships with other Early Modern Categories33 
  
 understand to be pus, or within vomit.  As for black bile, it might have been 
 inferred from the observation of clotted blood, excr ment, and dark vomit [. . . .]  




 imagination, and to provide a credible, at times effective physiological account of 
 the unseen operations within the body.34 
In early modern medicine, it was necessary to observe and analyze all the symptoms of 
the body, mind, and spirit to truly understand the diseased condition of the patient.  
Certain visible humoral signs could be taken into account, but the physician, knowing 
that humoral imbalance did not always manifest itself in corporal ways, would need to 
assess the patient's behavior, emotions, and even actio s to determine the root cause of 
his distemper. 
Early Modern Emotional Contagion 
 By giving emotions the ability to impose themselves on individuals from the 
outside,35 the early modern theory of passions does two surprising things: first, it 
postulates a unity of the individual with his environment that countermands the popular 
modern idea of autonomous selfhood, and second, it complicates the relationship between 
free will and a brand of environmental pre-determinism.  The former, as Katharine Craik 
points out, is more of a problem for present day scholars than it is for the early moderns 
themselves: 
Scholars have until recently tended to regard early modern bodies and selves as 
internally regulated and essentially separate from the world they inhabited.  The 
body in particular has often appeared as an enclosed container, more readily 
defined by its internal fluctuations of temperature, d nsity and viscosity than by 
the environment outside.  We are now starting to understand the ways in which 




that the early modern subject was not only comprised of hidden, inward 
phenomena but also formed in relation to its surroundings.36 
Inhabiting a pre-Cartesian world, Shakespeare and his contemporaries were not 
indoctrinated into the mechanistic view of the world that pervades our own discourses.  
Instead, magic and science, spirituality and physicality existed side by side, and, in some 
cases, overlapped with impunity.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the mobile, 
invisible, multivalent emotions represented in early modern texts, emotions that are given 
a concrete basis even as they simultaneously exert influence on the spiritual and mental 
planes. 
The basic concept that the physical world in the form f emotions can invade an 
individual and cause a change in his behavior, healt , or personality is not necessarily 
what disturbed Renaissance thinkers; rather many were repelled by the potential spiritual 
consequences of this activity.  In Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, Nancy G. 
Siraisi cites this as the prevalent criticism of Galen’s humoral theory: 
Christian, Muslim, and Jewish critics all took Galen to task for psychological 
materialism; they believed that the theory […] implied that material causes (the 
elements) determined the nature of the human soul and moral qualities, and they 
objected on philosophical or religious grounds.37 
Writing in the second century, Galen himself would not have agreed with these 
objections because he synthesized his humoral system from the philosophical writings of 
Plato, Aristotle and Hippocrates, and did not assign piritual judgment to humoral 
imbalances in his patients. Instead, he took the stance that through diet, medicine, and 




physical influences acting upon the body.38 Subsequent defenders of his theory utilize 
this regulatory aspect of humoral medicine to demonstrate that human beings have the 
ability through free will to control their passions and hence the aspects of health that 
depend on those passions.  Lisa Perfetti claims that the Christian emphasis on free will 
helped critics of Galen’s humoral theory overcome the materialistic objections by 
stressing that “although the bodily passions [come] from outer forces, they were not […] 
fixed, predetermined, or beyond control.”39  The humors may pressure and even invade 
man from the outside, but he has the God-given ability to resist and expel contaminating 
humors by following medical prescriptions for diet, xercise, and purgation. 
The idea of passion as a communicable disease, capable of moving from person to 
person without the receiver’s permission, is implicit in early modern conduct manuals 
which almost unanimously warn their readers to avoid the company of immoral men and 
women, or those prone to excesses of all types, becaus  of the danger of unconsciously 
acquiring the same ill traits.40  For example, Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier 
makes explicit this link between disease, passion, and contagion: 
For truly vertue purchased and gotten by practise, is of no lesse power against all 
contagion of wickednes, than preseruatiues well compounded are of force in a 
plague time to preserue in good helth the inhabitants of a countrie, and as 
heeretofore that famous physicion Hippocrates preseru d his citie of Coos from a 
mortalitie that was ge∣nerall throughout all Grecia, by counselling his countrymen 
to kindle many fires in all publike places, to the end thereby to purifie the aire: 




brightnes and power of vertue, he shal escape the dangers of corruption, and 
eschew all contagion of euill maners.41 
For Castiglione, the courtier “well armed” with “virtue” can bolster his “hart” and 
“soule”—the Renaissance equivalent of fortifying one’s immune system—and thereby 
resist this passionate contagion embodied in “euill manners.”  Thomas Walkington, in his 
Optick Glass of the Humours (1621), likens the exposure to others’ bad humors to 
bathing in “the muddy streame of their luxury.”  And, since the bathers inhabit a porous 
body, the contagious consequences of participating in this “riot” are dire: habitation of 
“the very suburbs of death!” 42
 Yet early modern writers did not always see these communicable passions in a 
negative light; certain emotions were viewed favorably and even cultivated by writers of 
conduct manuals and theologians committed to the bett rment of human kind.  Donald R. 
Wehrs further explains that Renaissance humanism baes its defense of the passions on a 
“moral physiology” where “reason and emotion presuppose and enrich one another,” 
“habitual practices modify states of being,” and “moral deliberation hinges upon 
cultivated, continuous interplay of right feeling and right thinking, an interplay that 
depends upon concrete images or patterns of excellen , prototypes, that impress and 
reinforce themselves upon us through experience” (68).  On the one hand, emotions can 
motivate people to contribute to the greater good and, in turn, their examples of bravery 
and compassion can inspire others to commit similar admirable acts.  Conversely, the 
human being exposed to bad habits, false images of appropriate behavior, and/or immoral 




In Shakespeare’s day, emotional enquiry was a vital source of material for 
philosophers, physicians and fiction writers alike.  Pre-modern and early modern 
thinkers, operating within a paradigm of the physical world very different from our own, 
accepted emotional contagion as a fact.  The porous, humoral body of the early moderns 
was open to outside influences like winds, flowing water, as well as affective states; if 
one could become melancholy due to a change in winddirection, why couldn’t a person 
become choleric when exposed to another person suffering from the same “disease”?  
Evidence from period writings suggests early modern individuals perceived themselves 
as physically integrated with nature as well as all mankind.  For example, Donne’s point 
in Meditation XVII may be to unite all Christians by emphasizing their 
interconnectedness through the Church, but his words also suggest that humanity is 
intimately linked through shared physical and biological elements: 
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part 
of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a 
promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were: any 
man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in ma kind. . .43 
The physical elements creating both “every man” and the “main” are the four elements of 
Galenic medical theory, elements shared by all animte and inanimate features of planet 
Earth. 
 According to humoral theory, then, the world and evironment can invade a 
person, corrupting his humors and changing his emotional makeup. Anglicus 
Bartholomaeus, an early English author known for compiling facts and anecdotes about a 




of outside forces, especially winds, on the humoral composition and balance of those 
subject to their effects; for example, in Of winde orientall, and Subsolane, he lists the 
Southern wind as particularly noxious: 
And this Southerne winde is hot and moyst and maketh lightning and grose aire 
and thick, and norisheth myst with heate, & be openeth pores, and multiplieth and 
bringeth forth much raine with his moisture, as Isid. aith•• he bréedeth tempest in 
ye sea. for he bloweth vpwarde, as Beda saith. Alsohe peneth the pores of 
bodyes, and letteth vertue of feelyng, and maketh hauinesse of bodie, as Ipocras 
sayth. Southerne windes (he saith) gréeue the hearing, & be dim, and they greeue 
heads, & be slow, and also vnbinding. For Southerne wi ds vnbind humours, & 
moue them out of the inner parts outwarde, & they cause heuinesse of wits & of 
feeling: they corrupt and destroye, they heat, and maketh men fall into sicknesse. 
And they bréed the gout, the falling euill, itch, and the ague.44 
According to Bartholomaeus, these winds not only affect the natural environment as a 
whole—rain and tempests—but also influence the human inhabitants in its wake.  For my 
argument, the idea that these winds can “unbind the humours” and move them around in 
the body leads to the notion that the natural world can, in fact, produce a measurable, 
bodily change that then may lead to emotional change.  The fluidity of the humors and 
their ability to bridge all aspects of the human codition—mental, physical, and spiritual 
—logically leads us to believe that what influences the humors, also influences the whole 
of human experience. 
 The most common external influence, however, is the input from a person's own 




sensory perception to both reason and emotion.  He demonstrates that although "Galenic 
medicine made thinking absolutely dependent on seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and 
smelling," reason itself has a hard time controlling emotions because the passions 
themselves are also directly influenced by these senses.45  The eyes and ears are the most 
common sites of emotional contagion, being subject to sensory input of an invasive 
nature.  Whereas a person has virtually complete control over what he or she touches, 
tastes, and smells, noxious sights and sounds impinge o  a person's senses without direct 
invitation.   
Context and Procedure 
 My work on emotional contagion in Shakespeare has grown out of relatively 
recent scholarship on humoral theory and emotions in early modern literary texts as well 
as extant scientific findings in the fields of psychology and neurology.  The four books 
that provided the most abiding influence on this project are Gail Kern Paster’s 
groundbreaking volume The Body Embarrassed (1993) and its successor Humoring the 
Body (2004), Michael Schoenfeldt’s Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England (1999), 
and Teresa Brennan’s The Transmission of Affect (2004).  Paster’s work, with its insights 
into early modern psychophysiology, has inspired a surge of interest among literary 
historians for what she calls “the lived practices of early modern cosmology.”46  Like 
Paster, I argue that effective analysis of early modern representations of emotions have to 
take into account the “intellectual dominance of Renaissance psychological 
materialism.”47  However, where she builds a new approach to Galenic theory through 
the lens of philosophers like Bakhtin, Deleuze, andGuattari, my secondary inspiration 




bases much of her first book on the idea of humoral leakage, she does not explore the 
idea that humors, and hence passions, can be contagi us. 
 Michael Schoenfeldt’s Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England, though 
indebted to Paster’s spotlight on the individual’s humoral experience in Renaissance 
literary texts, diverges from her work in significant ways.  Schoenfeldt sees the humoral 
paradigm as a source of empowerment for the early moderns rather than one of necessary 
embarrassment.  Looking at early modern medical prescriptions, he analyzes humoral 
fluctuations in terms of self-control and self-improvement, concluding that “the Galenic 
body achieves health not by shutting itself off from the world around it but by carefully 
monitoring and manipulating the inevitable and literal influences of the outside world, 
primarily through therapies of ingestion and excretion.”48  I, too, explore methods of 
regulation and balance in the humors, but I am also focused on the humoral influence an 
individual can exert on the external world.  My interest lies in the ebb and flow of humors 
in and out of the early modern body and its surroundings.  
Teresa Brennan’s The Transmission of Affect, an eclectic exploration of how 
emotions travel from one person to another, triggered my interest in how the early 
moderns perceived emotions.  Brennan’s book, althoug  not a comprehensive discussion 
of what sociologists are now commonly referring to as “emotional contagion,” is an 
important starting point for current scholars working n emotional theory.  Blending 
accounts from history, psychoanalysis, philosophy, and literature, Brennan’s work 
identifies Cartesian dualism as the reason the transmission of affect is not a widely 
recognized process today.  She claims that the transmission of affect was once “common 




contained,”49 ideas that my work on humoral theory and emotional contagion support.  
Although Brennan does not address the early modern period or Galenic theory in 
particular, the early modern humoral system, with its emphasis on the porosity of the 
body and potential invasive nature of passions, reflects all of the key components of her 
transmission theory.  I build on her ideas that emotions can be either generated internally 
by an individual or subsumed into the body from an external source and that the 
transmission of affect is “a process that is social in origin but biological and physical in 
effect.”50   
 While the attention in this book is firmly on literature, I would be remiss not to 
acknowledge the inspiration and insight I have gleaned from reports outside of the 
humanities. Although the transmission of emotion seems to occur almost instantaneously 
through mechanisms which still elude modern science, recent work in biology, 
psychology, and sociology has begun the fascinating process of deciphering how people 
feel others’ emotions.  In fact, neurologists such as Antonio R. Damasio51, clinical 
therapists like Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cocioppo, and Richard L. Rapson52, and 
sociology researchers from MIT & Harvard53 all are coming to the startling conclusion 
that the early modern emphasis on soul/mind/body integration may have been correct all 
along.  Plus, the role of emotions—especially the communication of emotions—appears 
to be key to understanding just how these three aspct  of the human condition work in 
tandem.  Donald R. Wehrs, in his exploration of what he calls early modern moral 
physiology, asserts that “Shakespeare allows us to see the remarkable degree to which 
pre-Cartesian notions of embodied subjectivity are consistent with neuroscience’s 




for emotional manifestations and communications helps the modern scholar to not only 
understand Renaissance theories of personhood, but can actually offer insight on modern 
states of being as well. 
 In my next chapter, “‘Greedy Eyeballs’ and ‘Thievish Ears’: Beauty’s Sensual 
Assault in Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece,” I argue that beauty is the root of the violent, 
contagious action driving the tale.  Tarquin himself is ravished by Lucrece’s beauty, first 
aurally when her husband Collatine “publishes” her p rfection to Tarquin, and then 
visually when he sees her in person.  His senses are overwhelmed by a “rage of lust,” a 
condition he finds impossible to rationally control.  In early modern humoral theory, 
Tarquin’s “inflamed” condition can be described as a urfeit of blood created by an 
overheated brain due to his exposure to Lucrece’s “peerless” beauty; in order for him to 
regain humoral equilibrium, the prince must exorcise his excess blood.  Unfortunately for 
Lucrece, Tarquin’s choice of purgation is rape.  When Tarquin leaves his “load of lust” in 
her body, Lucrece is infected with the beauty-induced poison that drove the prince to 
violence and her eyes and ears are opened to a world of corruption.  Determined to 
transform her story of shame into one of honor, Lucrece plans her own blood-letting.  
Gathering her husband and his “knights,” she passes Tarquin’s beauty-inspired violence 
on to them in a mutated form—the lust for vengeance.  Using both aural (her story) and 
visual (the spectacle of her suicide) persuasion, the “true wife” reveals her humoral 
contamination even as she proves the purity of her mind.  Through her act of self-
violence, Lucrece transforms the original contagion into a force which purges Rome of 
the Tarquins’ rule. 




in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar," I trace Shakespeare’s descriptions of environmental 
events in Julian Rome and how these correspond to the emotional complexion of the 
agents in the play. Building on Antony’s claim that “passion is catching” (3.1.283), this 
chapter goes beyond the aural and visual modes of contagion to include the other senses 
in an experiential whole.  Unlike the blatant exchange of bodily fluids in Lucrece, the 
humoral contagion in Julius Caesar is more subtle and diffuse.  I argue that the violent 
actions in the play result from multiple humoral inf uences, both microcosmic—“Brutus, 
with himself at war” (1.2.46)—and macrocosmic—“The avens themselves blaze forth 
the deaths of princes” (2.2.31).  I identify fear as the main emotional vector in this play 
and illustrate how the imagination takes on a crucial role in the misregulation of the 
humors, a situation that, in turn, creates the ideal environment for violent action.   
 My fourth chapter, “‘Eaten Up with Passion’: Deliberate Contagion and the 
Failure of Reason in Othello,” examines the false transmission of emotion perpetrat d by 
Iago to destroy Othello.  Though we have seen charaters like Cassius use an emotion for 
their own ends, here Iago actually develops false emotional paradigms, reframing his 
hatred for the general with trappings of love; successfully communicating the degree of 
his passion without the content, Iago is able to fool Othello into believing Desdemona is 
false.  Building on Thomas Wright’s warnings against trusting a false friend—for 
example, a person who “such divers things they will relate, by their own malice invented 
. . . forged to catch the seely simple soul”55 —I explore how Iago uses Othello’s powerful 
imagination against him by poisoning his ears with false information.  Despite his 
demand for “ocular proof,” the Moor becomes overwhelmed by the force of Iago’s 




 Each of these selected works offers a window into early modern Galenic theory 
and the transference of its unique species of passion.  Building on modern literary 
criticism grounded in humoral bodies, a range of current psychological and philosophical 
works about emotions, and early modern primary sources dealing with the same, I hope 
to open a virtually unexplored avenue in affect theory.  The basic principles of humoral 
emotional transmission explored here can then be applied to other authors and texts so we 
can develop a comprehensive understanding of emotional contagion in the Renaissance 
world. 
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“Greedy Eyeballs” and “Thievish Ears”: Beauty’s Sensual Assault 
in Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece 
Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece thoroughly demonstrates the destructive and 
mutative powers of the transmission of affect; violent passions travel from rapist to 
victim to revengers, morphing into different strains of emotion and leaving a trail of 
blood and broken lives (Figure 1).  The main sites of contagion in this poem are the eyes 
and ears, sensual organs traditionally seen as vulnerable to corrupting influences during 
the Renaissance. Passionate fluid – both visible and invisible in the humoral scheme – 
transmits the degree of imbalance to the recipient, not necessarily a duplicate imbalance.  
Kelly Oliver explains:  
Unwanted affects are not so much projected onto another person but transferred 
onto or injected into another person such that the recipient’s own affects are 
transformed.1 
To restore humoral balance, each recipient of passion must rid himself or herself of the 
foreign affects. 
Tarquin – Patient Zero in this humoral drama – is himself ravished by Lucrece’s 
beauty, first aurally when her husband Collatine “publishes” (33) her perfection to 
Tarquin, and then visually when the prince sees her in person.  His senses are 
overwhelmed by a “rage of lust” (424), a condition he finds impossible to rationally 
control.  In early modern humoral theory, Tarquin’s “inflamed” (‘Argument” 17) 
condition can be described as a surfeit of blood created by an overheated brain when 
exposed to first the idea of Lucrece’s wifely perfection and then her “peerless” (21) 
beauty.  The metonymy here reflects what the Dutch physician Johan van Beverwijck 
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(1594 – 1647) wrote about the harmful retention of semen and the necessity to "eject" it if 
it reaches a plethoric state: 
As, when it is in abundance in its vessels, it is necessary to discharge it regularly,  
 or otherwise it will decompose and take on a venomous nature, even in those who 
 are healthy and fresh of body, warm and moist of complexion, if they have an 
 abundance of blood, which is the humour of semen. In those who do not eject the 
 semen regularly, many awkward and deadly accidentes will come forth[.]2 
In order for him to regain humoral equilibrium, the prince must exorcise his excess blood.  
Unfortunately for Lucrece, Tarquin’s choice of purgation is rape.   
Lucrece, victimized by her own beauty and her husband’s wayward tongue, does 
not have the means to protect herself from her guest’s in idious attack.  Her “fair face” 
(72) unknowingly incites Tarquin’s “brainsick” (175) desires which lead to her rape, an 
act that pollutes her physically and emotionally, utimately driving her to suicide. Prior to 
the rape, Lucrece’s chaste eyes and ears are “weakly fortressed” (28) against danger; she 
cannot recognize the prince’s foul intent, “for unstained thoughts do seldom dream on 
evil” (87).  Tarquin forces his “load of lust” (734) into her body, infecting Lucrece with 
the beauty-induced poison that drove him to brutality, opening her eyes and ears to a 
world of violence and corruption.   
Guilt, rather than lust, plagues Lucrece in the aftrmath of the rape.  Determined 
to transform her story of shame into one of honor, Lucrece plans her own blood-letting.  
Gathering her husband and his “knights” (1694) she passes Tarquin’s beauty-inspired 
passion on to them in a mutated form – the lust for vengeance. Using both aural (her 
story) and visual (the spectacle of her suicide) persuasion, the “true wife” (1841) reveals 
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her humoral contamination even as she proves the purity of her mind.  Through her act of 
self-violence, Lucrece transforms the original contagion into a force which purges Rome 
of the Tarquins’ rule. 
Tarquin's "Rage of Lust" 
The senses of our body are so deceivable, that they beguile many times also the judgment of the mind.   
~ Castiglione Second Book of the Courtier 
 
 One of the difficulties that plagues modern readers of Shakespeare’s Lucrece is 
the seeming lack of motive for Tarquin’s assault.  When looking at the circumstances  
 





through a lens of rationality, the effort the prince has to make to obtain his “froth of 
fleeting joy” (212) coupled with the long term costs of his transitory pleasure makes the 
whole premise of the rape seem completely unbelievabl .  Even the text disingenuously 
suggests several possible motives for Tarquin's assault of Collatine's wife: Lucrece's 
"sov'reignty" (36), "envy" (39), or some "untimely thought" (43) are all offered as 
possibilities.  Tarquin himself concludes that he has no rational reason to rape Lucrece: 
 'Had Collatinus killed my son or sire, 
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 Or lain in ambush to betray my life, 
 Or were he not my dear friend, this desire 
 Might have excuse to work upon his wife, 
 As in revenge or quittal of such strife; 
      But as he is my kinsman, my dear friend, 
      The shame and fault finds no excuse nor end. (232-8) 
In other words, Collatine has done nothing to inspire enmity in Tarquin; he does not 
deserve the dishonor of a raped wife.  There is neither "excuse" nor "end" in the form of a 
reason for Tarquin to commit rape on the wife of "his dear friend"; neither will there be 
an "excuse," as in pardon, for the shameful deed, nor will Tarquin's shame have a 
terminal point ("end") once he commits this grievous fault.  Both the narrator and 
Lucrece argue the same point in subsequent stages of the poem.3 
 Rather than being a flaw, this lack of rational justification is the heart of what 
Shakespeare conveys in all of his texts – human beings are provoked into action by their 
emotions.  And Tarquin is a textbook study of a man overcome by his passions.  Robert 
Burton’s description of humanity in a state of imbalance brings Tarquin to mind: 
Lust harrows us on the one side; envy, anger, ambition on the other.  We are 
torn in pieces by our passions, as so many wild horses, one in disposition, another 
in habit.4 
Here Burton draws attention to the two components of Tarquin’s – and in many ways, 
every man’s – struggle with emotions:  the natural disposition of an individual (referred 
to as complexion during the early modern period) and the individual’s usual way of doing 
things.  In Tarquin’s case, his reputation as a member of a tyrannical family suggests a 
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choleric nature, a complexion reinforced throughout the poem.5  For habit, we only have 
the circumstances inscribed in the poem itself, but the condensed series of mental 
advances and retreats prior to the actual assault sugge ts a man regularly “tossed between 
desire and dread” (171).  Unlike Brutus in Julius Caesar who does not hesitate in his 
course of action once he is committed, Tarquin wars ith himself until the very moment 
of irrevocable action.  So, by nature and by habit, Tarquin is a man unable to exercise 
strong control over his emotions, making him extremely susceptible to the humoral 
pollution that ultimately destroys both himself and Lucrece. 
 Shakespeare, utilizing the paradigms of Galenic medical belief, justifies  the 
assault on Lucrece as a result of humoral imbalance.  In fact, he identifies this motive in 
the very first stanza of the poem:  "Tarquin . . . bears the lightless fire" (3-4).  Later 
referred to as the “coal which in his liver glows” (47), this black burning is an entwined 
mass of anger and lust, anger against Collatine for having something that he himself 
desires and lust as the manifestation of that specific desire.6  According to Robert Burton, 
“In hot choleric bodies, nothing so soon causeth madness, as this passion of anger.”7  
Shakespeare’s intended audience, familiar with bothhumoral theory and choleric literary 
stereotypes, likely would have recognized Tarquin’s disorder quickly: he is literally in the 
grips of a “rage of lust” (424), a madness induced by a superabundance of choler which 
can only be overcome if the excess is purged.8  Stephen Pender, in his discussion of 
Thomas Elyot’s Castel of Helth (1541), outlines how anger was thought to induce this 
state as well as its symptoms: 
 If the patient’s complexion is predominantly hot, the parts and members are over-
 heated  [when exposed to the additional heat of anger.]  This perturbation 
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 occasions fever and  apoplexy, frenzy and palsy, indigestion and  insomnia, 
 [sweating] and blasphemy, the loss of obedience, duty, charity, and friendship.9 
Tarquin, “madly tossed” (171) in a state of “hot burning will" (247) and showing signs of 
the majority of the symptoms above, loses all control over his rational self as he 
succumbs to this emotional disease.  
 Tarquin's very essence is captured in terms of the physical manifestation of 
emotion; the "[l]ust-breathèd" (3) Roman prince harbors a "keen appetite" (9), 
"ador[ing]" (85) Lucrece even as he "pine[s]" (98) for lustful gratification.  Governed by 
passion, Tarquin resembles a “rough beast” (545) without reason.10  As the Italian 
humanist Thommaso Buoni asserts, human reason is depen nt on the input from the 
corporal senses, intimately linking both rationality and sensuality in a fixed union: 
 [B]ecause the reasonable soule, for the time is tyed, and united to the body, 
 dependeth upon it, as upon her organe, or instrument to exercise her natural 
 powers:  for the inward discerning faculties, in their operations, depend upon the 
 outward discerning powers, which do carry the sensible kindes to the inward 
 senses:  whereby it cometh to passe, that the body eing martyred, and 
 consequently the senses altered, which in that masse of the  body are conteyned, 
 they present those corporall kindes or species very imperfectly to the inward 
 powers:  and therefore remaine likewise confused, an  impotent, whereby 
 followeth that griefe, and heavinesse of heart, and ffection of the minde, which 
 every man findeth in himself by the passions, and sufferings of the body.  (227-8) 
Because reason is housed in a corporal body, bodily dysfunction necessarily impacts the 
rational faculties.  Imperfect sensory input equals imperfect rational output.  In Tarquin’s 
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case, base desire overwhelms his ability to "command [his] rebel will" (625) – emotion 
rules his intellect.  Tarquin claims that "affection is [his] captain" (271); nothing, not 
even "respect and reason" (275), can dissuade him fro  his course of action.  
“Affection,” defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “a powerful or controlling 
emotion, as passion, lust,” results from Tarquin’s surfeit of humor.  The “lightless fire” 
(4) completely possesses him. 
In "Burdens of Guilty Minds: Rape and Suicide in Shakespeare's Lucrece," 
Andrew Weiner goes so far as to suggest that Tarquin is as much a victim as Lucrece.  
The Prince bears full knowledge of the consequences of his actions, yet finds himself 
unable to resist passion.  Weiner sees this as Tarquin’s lack of “free will” which 
culminates in his pseudo-suicide, a foreshadowing of Lucrece’s self-purgation at the end 
of the poem.11  In terms of Galenic medical theory, the prince’s problem is not so much a 
lack of free will as an inability to overcome an overabundance of passion through rational 
means.  The conduct books and sermons of the early modern period emphasize that 
extremities of passion can be controlled through will power and habit, a fact that 
undermines the basis for Weiner's lack of free willargument.  Books like Thomas 
Wright's The Passions of the Mind in General instructed that by understanding one's 
complexion, a person was able to remove himself from p tentially inflaming situations 
and to develop methods of venting ill passions before they could damage the his physical 
and mental health, social standing, and/or spiritual life.12   Lucrece calls on Tarquin's 
dormant rational faculties as she tries to prevent h r rape: 
"Hast thou command?  By him that gave it thee, 
From a pure heart command thy rebel will.  (624-5) 
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Tarquin's want of "command" is a product of the overabundance of humors coursing 
through his system as well as his lack of preparation for dealing with such plethora.13  
Even though Lucrece hopes that Tarquin can "prison false desire" (642) with his 
"majesty" (640)  or reason, so labeled for its location in the head as well as its position 
as sovereign over the rest of the body's faculties  the prince's rational mind has been 
"exiled" (640) by lust.  Despite having no purpose, or "end," to commit the brutal act of 
rape, and knowing full well that the result will be"shame" without "end" (in the sense of 
termination), the "lustful lord" (169) lets his will have its way.   
 Significantly, Tarquin’s lust is not purely a product of his internal weaknesses.  
Although both his complexion and disposition show a tendency towards unregulated 
emotion, the catalyst for his “brainsick rude desir” (175) is external.  The prince first 
experiences humoral trauma in the poem when Collatine “unwisely” (10) tells stories of 
his wife’s incomparable beauty and chastity.  Both of these extremities of perfection 
drive Tarquin to lustful distraction: the idea of the unobtainable chaste object of desire 
torments his ears even before the visual evidence of Lucrece’s beauty ravishes his eyes.  
As Shakespeare’s narrator asserts, “by our ears our hearts oft tainted be” (38), reflecting 
at once the Renaissance commonplace that what is spoken can be distorted through 
rhetoric, the ever-present awareness of the dangers of rumor, and the humoral 
vulnerability of the heart to outside influences.14  Because Galenic medicine predicates 
that rational and emotional equilibrium depends on the quality of the sensory input 
entering the body, any inflaming sights or sounds have the potential to affect change in a 
person's faculties of reason, imagination, and feeling, which ultimately leads to humoral 
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changes.15  In Tarquin’s case, his ears are the site of the initial assault on his humoral 
equilibrium.16 
 The disclosure of Lucrece’s “sov’reignty” (36) occurs in Tarquin’s tent as he 
hosts Collatine and other nobles during their siege of Ardea: 
 For he the night before, in Tarquin’s tent, 
 Unlocked the treasure of his happy state: 
 What priceless wealth the heavens had him lent 
 In the possession of his beauteous mate; 
 Reck’ning his fortune at such proud rate 
      That kings might be espoused to more fame, 
      But king nor peer to such a peerless dame. (15-21) 
This revelation during this Roman boasting contest is explicitly linked to the events that 
follow by the poem’s narrator: the “treasure” and “wealth” that Collatine exposes to 
“thievish ears” (35) can only provoke “envy of so rich a thing” (39) in someone of 
Tarquin’s ilk.  As a “proud” (37) prince, Tarquin finds Collatine’s flaunting of his “rich 
jewel” (34) intolerable.  Envy, explained in the humoral system as a species of 
melancholy, insidiously takes over Tarquin’s grip on rationality and opens his vulnerable 
heart to what Robert Burton calls the “saws of the soul” – jealousy, malice, hatred, and 
revenge.17   
Nancy Vickers, in her thorough study of the rhetorical use of blazon in Lucrece, 
cites the problematic “publish[ing]” of Lucrece’s beauty and virtue by her husband as the 
motivational force behind the whole poem.18  Although Tarquin claims that Collatine’s 
“shallow tongue” (78) is unable to convey the essence of Lucrece’s true beauty, the 
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“boast” (36) provokes the prince’s desire nonetheless.  Vickers explains that “any 
indulgence in false or proud comparison in the presence of a third person dangerously 
flirts with the theft; it is a foolish miscalculation.”  Moreover, such publication of the 
beloved’s attributes “converts [the beloved] into an object, albeit precious, of 
exchange.”19  It is this exchange that Tarquin embraces, even though it is secretive and 
illegitimate.  Lucrece’s chaste status, her unattainability, provokes covetousness and 
greed in Tarquin.  He knows that he cannot win her love through seduction since Lucrece 
“is not her own,” (241) but essentially a belonging, a “rich jewel” (34) only meant to be 
displayed for Collantine.20  Envy, not love as he later claims, sends the Prince posting 
from Ardea with possession on his mind. 
 Tarquin obviously desires Lucrece physically – his “ ot burning will” (247) will 
attest to that – but the fact that she is forbidden to him spurs him on.21  For example, 
when Tarquin first gazes upon Lucrece slumbering unaware in her bed, her bare breasts 
are described as “maiden worlds” (408) who have known no touch save that of her 
husband, and their very purity compounds Tarquin’s lust: 
These worlds in Tarquin new ambition bred, 
     Who like a foul usurper went about 
     From this fair throne to heave the owner out.   (411-13) 
He wants to possess “[t]hat golden hap” (42) that Collantine enjoys, and will be just as 
satisfied to destroy it at the same time.  Ultimately, rational justifications do not enter into 
Tarquin's motivation for raping Lucrece; his judgment is completely compromised by the 




 [T]he understanding is so tied to and captivated by his inferior senses, that 
 without their help he cannot exercise his functions, and the will, being weakened, 
 hath but a small power to restrain those outward pts, but suffers herself to be 
 overruled by them; that I must needs conclude withLemnius, spiritus et humores 
 maximum nocumentum obtinent, spirits and humours do most harm in troubling 
 the soul.  How should a man choose but be choleric and angry, that hath his body 
 so clogged with abundance of gross humours?  or melancholy, that is so inwardly 
 disposed?22 
Neither honor nor reason can subdue Tarquin's unruly “rage of lust” (424) because his 
"understanding" is captivated by the seductive input of both ear and eye.   
Tarquin's Uncontrollable Gaze 
Those other senses, hearing, touching, may much penetrate and affect, but none so much, none so 
forcible as sight.   ~ Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, The Third Partition 
 
When Tarquin arrives at Collatium, he finds that Lucrece’s beauty “inflame[s]” 
him even further.23  Lust to obtain the unobtainable becomes conflated with physical, 
carnal desire.  Tarquin’s aural contamination through Collatine’s unwise boasts becomes 
fused to the overwhelming visual excitement he is subjected to in her presence.  The 
narrator's description of Lucrece as she first greets the prince foregrounds the crucial 
point that Lucrece embodies both beauty and chastity:  
Well was he welcomed by the Roman dame, 
Within whose face Beauty and Virtue strivéd 
Which of them both should underprop her fame. 
When Virtue bragged, Beauty would blush for shame; 
   When Beauty boasted blushes, in despite 
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   Virtue would stain that o'er with silver white.    (51-56) 
Lucrece’s chastity, the fame of which first pricked Tarquin’s interest, is melded with a 
dazzling beauty that ignites his carnal lust.  Throughout his internal debate prior to 
ravishing her, he returns to the overwhelming nature of her attractiveness repeatedly.  
Attempting to rationalize the crime he is about to commit, Tarquin adheres to the idea 
that "[b]eauty itself doth of itself persuade" (29), laying blame for his uncontrollable 
passion on Lucrece's physical attractiveness.  For the prince, Lucrece's overwhelming 
physical perfection inspires "Affection" to become his "captain" (271) and "Desire" to be 
his "pilot" (279).  Her beauty needs no justification or advertisement to inspire him; it is 
sufficient in itself.  In Renaissance humoral terms, this would have been a valid 
argument.  Lee A. Ritscher, in The Semiotics of Rape in Renaissance English Literature, 
states that the early modern “epistemology of desire considers the sight of a beautiful 
woman to be one that causes a separation of a man’s libido from his rational self.”24  
Tarquin, already humorally imbalanced, does not stand a chance of regaining rational 
control over his choleric lust when faced with the vision of Lucrece’s physical perfection. 
Shakespeare emphasizes the prince’s roving “eye” fiv  times in the first thirty-
two lines (73-105) of his initial meeting with Lucrece; Tarquin simply cannot stop staring 
at her.  The prince's ocular incontinence, exhibited in the "too much wonder of his eye" 
(95), also has a basis in a humoral imbalance caused by outside forces, namely Lucrece's 
beauty.  Robert Burton, in his exploration of beauty as a cause of what he terms "Love-
Melancholy," cites a Renaissance commonplace about the destructive power of beauty 
through the eyes: 
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[The eyes] as two sluices let in the influence of that divine, powerful, soul-
 ravishing, and  captivating beauty, which, as [Achilles Tatius] saith, "is sharper 
 than any dart or needle, wounds deeper into the heart; and opens a gap through 
 our ears to that lovely wound, that pierceth the soul itself."25 
Tarquin's "eager eyes" (254), "once corrupted" (294) by the beauty Lucrece chastely 
wields, declare all rational arguments against the rap  "dumb when beauty pleadeth" 
(268).  As a "captive" of her beauty, Tarquin's obsessive "doting" (105) is evidence for 
this soul "wound" that he believes can only be healed by sexually possessing Collatine's 
perfect wife. 
 Faye Tudor, providing a segue from Thommaso Buoni’s assertion that reason is 
dependent on the sensual faculties to operate, and expanding on the notion that sight 
takes precedence over all the other senses,26 outlines the relationship between faulty sight 
and failed reason:  
 Reason takes precedence over all other faculties and it is most affected by the  
 sins of the individual. Reason, given the sense of sight, finds its vision darkened 
 by sin and it becomes damaged and weakened, subject to the dangers  
 of the passions.27 
For Shakespeare’s audience, humoral imbalance could, and often did, start with 
something a person experienced with his or her eyes.28  With a direct line to the soul and 
a partnership with the will, the eyes Tarquin employs to experience the world are already 
corrupted by that sin of "covet"ness (134), making it impossible for his rational self to 
break free from his lustful obsession with Lucrece.  He himself recognizes the problem: 
        Will is deaf, and hears no heedful friends; 
43 
 
      Only he hath an eye to gaze on beauty, 
      And dotes on what he looks, 'gainst law or duty.  (495-7) 
The prince's will is corrupted and reason can no loger hear, or see, the truth of the 
depravity he is about to commit.29  His heart and eye are in league30 and his will follows 
his heart, ergo, his physical desire to possess Lucrece cannot be dissuaded by fear, 
remorse, respect, or reason (269-75).  His "will," with all of the implied meanings, is 
skewed by humoral imbalance.31   
 To understand clearly the way Tarquin is humorally tered by the sight of 
Lucrece, let us look more closely at the two prevalnt early modern doctrines of vision to 
explain how ocular contamination was believed to affect the humors; both theories 
involve ocular rays – invisible substances that travel from object to viewer, or from 
viewer to object.32  The theory of intramission, whose roots can be traced back to 
Aristotle, serves as the basis for our modern understanding of passive vision: the eye 
receives light and forms an image which is converted to electrical impulses and then 
ferried to the brain for analysis.  The contending Platonic view of vision – labeled the 
extramission theory of vision – claims that the eyemits ocular rays that move out into 
the world, transforming the invisible air into an “extension of the eye.”33   In Timaeus, 
Plato champions the idea that the act of viewing affects both the object viewed as well as 
the viewer, similar to the way the sense of touch can affect both the item touched and the 
person doing the touching:  
 And the whole stream of vision, being similarly affected in virtue of similarity, 
 diffuses the motions of what it touches or what touches it over the whole body, 
 until they reach the soul, causing the perception which we call sight.34   
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Under this theory, Tarquin’s gaze leaves his eyes and touches Lucrece’s beauty, a beauty 
that then “affects” (or we could say, infects) his stream of vision so that when the 
“stream” returns to him, even his soul is affected by what he “touches” with his eyes. 
Contamination is literal and only a look away.35 
 The visual contamination does not travel in a singular direction, however.  The 
narrator describes, in great detail, Tarquin's act of pulling aside the bed clothes and 
perusing Lucrece's nakedness with "lewd unhallowed eyes" (370-392).  Shakespeare 
endows Tarquin's eyes with startling power: 
      And holy-thoughted Lucrece to their sight 
      Must sell her joy, her life, her world's delight.  (384-5) 
The physical culmination of the prince's attack may provide Lucrece with a more 
concrete humoral poison, but these lines strongly suggest that Lucrece's exposure to 
Tarquin's lascivious gaze has already contaminated her.  Thijs Weststeijn, explaining the 
basics of humoral transfer during the act of seeing, reinforces this idea when he explains 
that because “ocular ‘spirits’ stem directly from the viewer’s mind, looking at someone 
may ‘infect’ that other person with one’s own passion .”36  One of Weststeijn’s main 
historic sources is Gregorio Comanini’s Il Figino (1591).  Comanini, an ardent supporter 
of the Platonic extramission theory of vision, reports that the ocular rays are not alone 
when they travel out into the world: 
 [A] spiritual vapour issues with these rays, and that blood issues with this vapour 
 [. . .] [T]his bloody vapour [. . .] issuing from the heart of the beloved and passing 
 through the heart of the lover as if in its own resid nce and dwelling, wounds the 
 heart and, finally coming to rest in the hardest par of it, returns to blood.  This 
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 blood, because it is in some ways foreign to the place, contaminates all the rest 
 with its poison.37  
In Comanini’s view, even under the auspices of love, th  fluid that emanates from the 
eyes during active gazing acts upon the recipient of the gaze as a pollutant.   
 Weststeijn's work stresses that eyes are not only the agent of these rays but, as one 
of the more vulnerable parts of the human body, also the receptacle of rays from other 
eyes: 
 Just like the spirit leaves the body through the ey s, so spirits from outside find an 
 easy entrance through this most ‘transparent’ part of man. (151) 
In response to this notion, some early modern philosophers merge the two theories of 
vision into one where ocular rays can travel outward from one person’s eyes and then 
enter the recipient of his gaze through his or her ey s.  Baldasare Castiglione, John 
Donne, Agrippa von Nettesheim, and Shakespeare himself all invoke a blended version 
of ocular theory by reconciling extramission and intramission.38  Donne, for example, 
sees reciprocity in gazes, recording a mutual influence rather than a singular line of 
travel.39  Castiglione seems to have also embraced this view in his Book of the Courtier: 
 as soone as he is at hande, the eyes shoote, and like sorcerers, beewitch, and 
 especiallie whan by a right line they sende their glisteringe beames into ye eies of 
 the wight beloued at the time whan they do the lik, bicause the spirites meete 
 together, and in that sweete encounter the one taketh the others nature and 
 qualitye: as it is seene in a sore eye, that beehoulding steadily a sound one, giueth 
 him his disease.40 
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Here, the female lover sends out flames that enter the eyes of her beloved, altering his 
heart by mingling her spirit with his not metaphorically, but concretely through an 
exchange of humors.41   
  Although Lucrece’s “chastity” prevents her from being the active lover as 
described by Comanini or Castiglione, Tarquin stillappropriates this fused argument to 
explain away his actions.  In his humoral world, his ability to rationally think is 
subjugated to the vision that she presents to his eye: “That eye which looks on her 
confounds his wits” (290).  Though her sensual assault on the prince is unintentional, 
Tarquin’s argument that Lucrece’s beauty has sparked his uncontrollable lust is supported 
by early modern humoral theory in general and contemporary optical theory in particular.  
For example, when Lucrece asks Tarquin "[u]nder what colour" (476) he assails her,42  
the prince uses a version of the extramission theory of vision to shift the blame to her 
beauty: 
   'The colour in thy face, 
 That even for anger makes the lily pale 
 And the red rose blush at her own disgrace, 
 Shall plead for me and tell my loving tale. 
 Under that colour am I come to scale 
      Thy never-conquered fort.  The fault is thine, 
      For those thine eyes betray thee unto mine.  (477-83)43 
Shirking any moral responsibility for what he is about to do, Tarquin reinforces the idea 
that both of them are victims of her beauty.  Like Donne’s idea of mutual visual 
exchange, Tarquin’s explanation of Lucrece’s downfall revolves around her eyes 
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“betray[ing]" her to his eyes.  Originally protected by her inability to read Tarquin’s 
“parling looks” (100), her eyes are literally opened to the possibility of lewdness by the 
advent of the prince in her bed chamber. The humoral exchange takes place regardless of 
Lucrece’s conscious participation or her willingness.    
 In this speech, Tarquin also usurps the metaphor of the "silent war of lilies and of 
roses" (71) originally used to illustrate Lucrece's status as a paragon of both beauty and 
chastity.  He asserts that these two virtues will unite to explain his "loving tale" and 
provide justification for his assault, using the immediate example of how her present 
anger colors her face with beauty (the red) even in the midst of his attack.  This fulfills 
the prediction in the original explication of Lucree's facial heraldry which states that 
"[w]hen shame assailed, the red should fence the white" (63), where "fence" means "a 
protective barrier," not "swordplay."  Unfortunately, it is beauty itself that leads to the 
circumstances of shame and its efforts to protect hr c astity only serve to spur the prince 
ever towards his goal.  Tarquin, unmoved by her pleas to "wipe the dim mist from [his] 
doting eyne" (643) so he can see both her and himself truly, resolves to finish what he 
started.   
 In Tarquin's world view, beauty implies wantonness, even if its possessor does 
not deliberately instigate unchaste behavior; beauty itself is the provocateur.  Lee A. 
Ritscher cites the narrator’s reinforcement of thisidea:  
 The display of Lucrece’s body in the blazon, in a m nner similar to Collatine’s 
 publication of Lucrece’s chastity, serves to sell the reader, presumably male, on 
 the idea that because of Lucrece’s beauty the rape is in vitable.44 
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As foreign and distasteful as this idea may be for a modern audience, actually early 
modern medical tracts could be used to support Tarquin’s claim that Lucrece’s rape is her 
own fault – her "beauty hath ensnared [her]" (485).  Similarly, Burton writes that, 
"without doubt, there is some secret loadstone in a beautiful woman, a magnetic power, a 
natural inbred affection, which moves [men's] concupiscence."45  We need to look no 
further than the modern aphorism – “She asked for it!” – to know that this misogynistic 
blaming of the victim is not unique to this poem, nor an unusual way to label the rapist as 
much a victim as the woman herself.  “Affection” (271) and “Desire” (279) are 
represented as autonomous forces driving Tarquin’s will and both are motivated by 
Lucrece’s “heavenly image” (288).  Believing his “heart” – and therefore his will – “shall 
never countermand [his] eye” (276), the prince refutes all of Lucrece’s rational pleas to 
be spared: nothing can sway his “will” “by [her] bright beauty [. . .] newly bred” (490). 
The prince’s “rage of lust” (424) eclipses all other considerations in Tarquin’s 
obsessed state: 
 [W]ith swift intent he goes 
 To quench the coal which in his liver glows. 
 O rash false heat, wrapped in repentant cold   (46-8) 
These three lines connect the physical and emotional motivations for Tarquin’s villainy, 
emphasize the idea of contagion and its transmission from rapist to victim, and initiate 
the metaphor of blackness that carries through the rest of the poem. Shakespeare's poetic 
license allows the narrator to conflate two seemingly separate imbalances – excess of 
"cold" choler, or anger, and excess of hot blood, or lust – in these lines, a convention his 
audience would recognize.46  This overabundance of embodied essences is characterized 
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as both physical (the humor) and mental (the corresponding emotion).  The “coal” burns 
blackly – the color of the “deed” (226) the prince undertakes, the shade of sin, and the 
hue of Lucrece’s “stained” (1743) blood. Even in early modern times the liver is 
associated with the production and purification of bl od.  Lucrece revisits this medical 
imagery when she claims the only "remedy" for her condition is to "let forth [her] foul 
defilèd blood" (1028-9). The ebony spot burning Tarquin's liver and inciting him to rape 
travels from rapist to victim, appearing again when Lucrece clears her "pollution" (1157) 
through self-murder, letting her "black blood" (1745) flow out for all to see.  Both 
Tarquin’s choleric anger and resentment of Collantine’s superior “wealth” (17) as well as 
the sexual desire prompted by Lucrece’s extraordinay beauty incite him to carry out “so 
black a deed” (226), a “black payment” (576) for heospitality. 
Rape and Emotional Contagion 
 And in a swough she lay and wex so deed, 
 Men mighte smyten of her arm or heed; 
 She feleth no-thing, neither foul ne fair.    ~ Geoffrey Chaucer, Legend of Good Women 
 
 Collatine’s wife – exposed by her husband’s “unwise” (10) boast – cannot protect 
herself from Tarquin’s emotional contagion.  “Weakly fortressed from a world of harms” 
(28), Lucrece is physically and emotionally vulnerable.  Prior to the rape, she dwells in a 
state of innocence that prevents her from recognizing the malice that Tarquin represents; 
she cannot sense the "baits" or "hooks" (103) that he might employ to batter away her 
chastity.  Lucrece’s state of chastity goes far beyond physical purity.  In addition to her 
body, her mind is artless, open, and “guiltless” (89).  Regrettably, the innocence and lack 
of suspicion exhibited by Lucrece preceding her ravishment can be directly linked to her 
downfall.  Fulfilling the idiom that it takes a thief to catch a thief, Lucrece’s lack of 
experience is a liability in her dealings with the prince. 
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 To return to Robert Burton’s idea that a person’s pa sions are made up by both 
nature and habit, Lucrece, by habit, is all that a modest, model wife should be. She is “So 
guiltless she securely gives good cheer / And reverend welcome to her princely guest” 
(89-90).47  Her security seems to stem from her knowledge of etiquette and household 
governance.  Her world’s parameters have sheltered her to the extent that she cannot 
distinguish the presence of evil intention in her midst and she is totally unprepared to 
survive “in a wilderness where are no laws” (544).  Because “unstained thoughts do 
seldom dream on evil” (87), Lucrece is unable to recognize the emotions that do make it 
through the “bold stern looks” (1252) covering Tarquin’s intentions.  Her more worldly 
“princely guest” (90) actively tries to conceal hisemotions, and mostly succeeds, so that 
his “inward ill no outward harm expressed” (91).  Additionally, the potential warning 
signs that do show through – the “too much wonder of his eye” (95) and “subtle shining 
secrecies / Writ in the glassy margents” (100-1)48  – cannot be read by Lucrece since she 
has no prior experience with such dishonorable passion .  
 As a model Roman wife, Lucrece is competent with her domestic tasks, such as 
“spinning amongst her maids” (“Argument” 14), but she has no means with which to 
fortify herself or her chastity beyond her own constrains of modesty.  Her habits, 
however, do not include the ability to guard herself or the household against invaders – 
that falls to Collatine, who fails his domestic duty by advertising what “treasure” (16) he 
has stored in his home and then not being present to pro ect it.  In her post-rape imaginary 
musings with her husband, Lucrece eloquently illustrates this problem with the domestic 
image of a bee hive: 
 In thy weak hive a wand’ring wasp hath crept, 
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 And sucked the honey which thy chaste bee kept.  (839-40) 
The hive is “weak,” completely at the mercy of the much stronger and larger “wasp” that 
infiltrates the home and steals the “honey,” the treasure being tended to by virtuous, but 
slight, bee.  Descriptions like “heartless” (470), “harmless” (510), “like to a new killed 
bird” (457), “a white hind” (543), and “weak mouse” (555) all reinforce the image of a 
meek woman, unable to protect herself from a “rough beast that knows no gentle right / 
Nor aught obeys but his foul appetite” (545).  All of the qualities that Lucrece has been 
praised for – beauty, virtue, chastity, modesty – are the very qualities that lead to her 
destruction and make her ill-prepared to defend herself, physically or emotionally.   
 When we look at the other aspect of her passionate composition – complexion – 
Lucrece does not project an inherent coldness or austerity, two characteristics often 
associated with chastity; instead, warmth and beauty r diate from this “earthly saint” 
(85).49  Tarquin himself points to her wide emotional spectrum when he recalls how she 
reacts to his arrival: 
  'She took me kindly by the hand, 
 And gazed for tidings in my eager eyes, 
 Fearing some hard news from the warlike band, 
 Where her belovèd Collatinus lies. 
 O how her fear did make her colour rise! 
      First red as roses that on lawn we lay, 
      Then white as lawn, the roses took away. 
 ‘And how her hand, in my hand being locked 
 Forced it to tremble with her loyal fear! 
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 Which struck her sad, and then it faster rocked, 
 Until her husband's welfare she did hear; 
 Whereat she smilèd with so sweet a cheer (253-64) 
Kindness, fear, sadness, and cheerfulness all rush across Lucrece’s humoral boundaries in 
the matter of minutes, affecting both her actions (trembling, a “heaved-up hand” (111)) 
and coloring her physical complexion.  This latter evidence is recounted elsewhere in the 
“silent war of lilies and roses” (71), where we observe in her cheeks the humoral turmoil 
just below the surface.  Although beauty and chastity are both positive qualities, the civil 
war located on Lucrece’s face shows the inherent incompatibility of the two 
characteristics.  As E. L. Risden notes, Shakespeare stresses “battle imagery” when he 
writes of the two iconic colors, showing “the war between the factions they represent 
creates violence ultimately self-destructive, even d adly.”50  Both qualities may inspire 
admiration, but in different veins.  The violence implied under Lucrece’s skin is a 
precursor to the actual violence she experiences at the hands of Tarquin – beauty begets 
hot lust and the destruction of chastity; cold chastity requires nothing short of the 
sacrifice of blood and life itself.   
Regardless of the internal conflict between her two prized attributes, Lucrece 
inhabits a realm of controlled reason before the rap , where sensual input has been 
carefully regulated and controlled.    Her “locked-up eyes” (446), which cannot read 
Tarquin’s “wanton sight” (104) at the beginning of the story, are forcibly opened and 
then violated as he storms her chamber.  When the prince rudely grabs her breast, 
awakening Lucrece from deep sleep, her newly opened y s are “by his flaming torch 
dimmed and controlled” (448).  This literally means she is temporarily blinded by the 
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light Tarquin has carried to her bed chamber, but it also points to the link between 
Tarquin’s “hot burning will” (247) and the flames of the torch, a connection made 
explicit by Shakespeare: 
The wind wars with his torch to make him stay, 
And blows the smoke of it into his face, 
Extinguishing his conduct in this case; 
But his hot heart, which fond desire doth scorch, 
Puffs forth another wind that fires the torch  (311-5) 
Just as the prince becomes enthralled through his eyes to her beauty, Lucrece is stunned 
into initial compliance by the sight of Tarquin’s “grim aspect” (452) and the twin 
blinding lights of his torch and lust.51  Finding herself "dreadfully beset" (444), she 
attempts to block out the sight before her by “winking” (458) her eyes closed again, 
consequently rejecting the assault and retaining her c aste vision while imagining that the 
whole incident is a bad dream, an imaginary vision of “some ghostly sprite,” a “dreadful 
fancy” (450-1).  This stubborn denial of the reality of the attack only enrages the prince, 
spurring his assault on Lucrece further.52   
 Lucrece finds that she cannot remain inactive while “his hand [. . .] remains upon 
her breast” (462).  Using the only weapon she can think of, Lucrece tries to reason with 
Tarquin, begging him to explain why he is molesting her.  Initially he refuses to respond 
to her prayers and questions, adopting a “dumb demeanor” (474) and continuing to paw 
at her.  Her “modest eloquence” (563), as she attempts to dissuade Tarquin from his foul 
course of action, has the opposite of her desired eff ct: the prince, further incensed by her 
rhetorical attempts at barricading his action, warns Lucrece that his “uncontrolled tide / 
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Turns not, but swells the higher by this let” (645-6).53  Lucrece’s approximate hundred 
lines of pleading for mercy (563-644, 652-667) make it into the prince’s ears, but they 
only “harden” his lust (558-560).  She does not comprehend that Tarquin has already 
debated with himself all of the points she raises.54  She recognizes that the prince is 
consumed with passion, but believes he can still “wpe the dim mist from [his] doting 
eyne” (643).  Unfortunately, things are not that simple.  Rational argument cannot sway 
the prince since the impetus for the rape rests solely n the power of his appetite—it is 
“Affection” (271) that compells Tarquin to commit rape, not Tarquin himself.  He and 
Lucrece are both victims of Love: "nothing" can halt the motivating desire or direction of 
"Affection," including pleas from either of "his" victims.  Lucrece, still possessing mental 
control despite her terror, recognizes the “rashness” (48, 706) of his “loving tale” (480), 
but fails to convince Tarquin of his “false desire” (642) or to move him to a spirit of true 
love—charity and compassion—because his humoral imbalance is so extreme, his 
capacity for rational thought has been compromised.  His "inflamed" brain cannot 
"countermand" (276) his wanton sight. 
 Lucrece's status as victim, defined by Tarquin's actions as well as her own 
seeming inaction, crystallizes in the eleven lines leading up to "prone lust" staining the 
"chaste [. . . ] bed": 
             [H]e sets his foot upon the light, 
  For light and lust are deadly enemies; 
  Shame folded up in blind concealing night, 
  When most unseen, then most doth tyrannise. 
  The wolf hath seized his prey, the poor lamb cries, 
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       Till with her own white fleece her voice controlled 
       Entombs her outcry in her lips' sweet fold. 
  For with her nightly linen that she wears 
  He pens her piteous clamours in her head, 
  Cooling his hot face in the chastest tears 
 That ever modest eyes with sorrow shed.   (673-83) 
For all intents and purposes, the prince blinds, binds, and silences Lucrece, leaving her 
with only the ability to weep.  Like Othello who must extinguish the lantern before he 
extinguishes his wife, Tarquin has two reasons to stamp out the light: so that he cannot 
recognize his own shame while committing the deed, an  to "tyrannise" his victim all the 
more thoroughly.  Like a lamb in a wolf's ravening jaws, Lucrece is "seize[d]" with no 
hope of escape. Arguably the most poignant lines in the entire poem, the description of 
the silencing of Lucrece's "piteous clamours" – her only possibility for protest – is 
constructed as a surrogate rape: Tarquin stuffs her mouth full of her own night clothes, 
filling her above as he fills her below. Shakespeare reinforces this image by presenting it 
twice, once as the image of a lamb being choked by its own "white fleece" which 
"Entombs her outcry in her lips' sweet fold" (678-9), and then with the picture of 
Lucrece's cries stifled with her bed linen. Tarquin's method for subduing Lucrece only 
adds insult to her injury, reinforcing the idea that er own attributes are the cause and 
accomplice to her downfall.  The beauty that ravishes is senses and incites his humors to 
riot leads to her pollution. 
 Shakespeare pens only one line to describe the actual moment of physical 
penetration: "O that prone lust should stain so pure a bed!" (684).  The two agents 
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involved are eclipsed by the emotional forces prompting the violation.  Neither party is 
identified by name – Tarquin becomes "prone lust" and Lucrece the "pure [. . . ] bed," 
their two essences distilled into symbols of transce dental violation.  Shakespeare's use 
of metonymy at once distances the persons involved in the rape from their individual 
identities and simultaneously distills them into their core essences.  Tarquin, controlled 
by his carnal desires, becomes lust incarnate; Lucrece, the epitome of wifely chastity, 
becomes Collatine's marriage bed.  By transforming Lucrece into the domestic symbol of 
marital fidelity, the narrator ensures Collatine's vicarious participation in his wife's 
ravishment.  Tarquin, the “foul usurper” (412), sati fies his envious lust by symbolically  
“heav[ing] the owner out” (413) of his own bed.  The shame and dishonor visited on 
Lucrece becomes her husband's through the medium of the stained bed.55  When Tarquin 
rapes Lucrece, he violates not only her body but also her marital unity with Collatine; by 
polluting her, he corrupts her husband on a symbolic level. However, Lucrece's 
contamination is grossly literal:  Tarquin's seed enters her body and transforms her blood 
into a stained humoral record of the rape.  The humoral exchange of semen and blood 
takes place regardless of Lucrece’s conscious participa on or her willingness.56  Disease 
– whether it be humoral, emotional, or biological – does not recognize mental barriers. 
During the “forcèd league” (689), the humors, as well as the future fates, of both 
Lucrece and Tarquin are forcibly entangled.57  The vigorous interaction between the 
victim and the rapist seethes with emotion, creating a  environment ripe for the 
transmission of affect.  Teresa Brennan explains the transmission of affect as the ability 
of "the emotions and affects of one person, and the enhancing or depressing energies 
these affects entail, [to] enter into another" through social interaction and resulting in 
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both physiological and mental effects.58  This schema helps illustrate how, in the 
aftermath of the rape, Shakespeare stresses the similarity of the experience for both rapist 
and his victim.  Tarquin's soul is figured as a feminized city whose walls have been 
beaten down by the "foul insurrection" (722) of herown subjects.59  This "spotted 
princess" (721) parallels Lucrece's own characterization as her attacker, though not her 
subject, enters her home under codes of hospitality and honor.  Also, the "will" that 
wreaks havoc with Tarquin and his soul is the same “will” that perpetrates the attack on 
Lucrece;  “Affection” (271), an external controlling force that has penetrated and 
destroyed them both, travels humoral paths, wreaking havoc in its wake.60  This 
passionate poison prompts Tarquin to lose his reputation, his means to support himself 
and his family, and all his power.  Graver still, the poem implies that the prince’s soul is 
now condemned “to living death and pain perpetual” (726); he has killed that which was 
immortal through his “black lust” (654).  Tarquin, his soul "disgracèd," "defacèd," and 
"spotted" (718-21), mirrors his victim in her shame.  Lucrece, who has "lost a dearer 
thing than life" (687), now bears the “load” of this contagion, a diseased humor she must 
purge to restore her own “good name” (820). 
 
Lucrece’s Stain 
 But no perfection is so absolute 
 That some impurity doth not pollute.      ~ Shakespeare, The Rape of Lucrece (853-4) 
 
Lucrece, “deep drenchèd in a sea of care” (1100), experiences an internal self-
division between her former chaste self and the stained woman she becomes as a result of 
the rape.  Lucrece "bears" more than the physical "lo d of lust" (734) Tarquin foists on 
her; the contagion is both a humoral, and subsequently, a  emotional one.  She wavers 
between sorrow and anger at the way her hospitality has been abused and “Holds 
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disputation with each thing she views, / And to herself all sorrow doth compare" (1101-
2).  The formerly chaste and pure matron begins to adopt murderous thoughts and a 
despairing self-contention similar in scale to Tarquin’s when his ultimately weak power 
of reason attempts to dissuade him from the attack (127-294).  Lucrece is irrevocably 
transformed at the moment of her rape, her entire emotional self rewritten through 
violence.  The change is as abrupt and as complete as “one in dead of night / From forth 
dull sleep by dreadful fancy waking” (449-50).  Although the description refers to 
Lucrece’s actual awakening from sleep to find herself attacked, it is also a metaphor for 
her state of self: before the rape, Lucrece lives in a “dull sleep” of an existence, “secure” 
(89) in her sheltered place as Collatine’s wife, chastely “spinning amongst her maids” 
(“Argument” 14).  She who “touched no unknown baits, nor feared no hooks” (103) 
seems “fortressed from a world of harms” (28) and lives accordingly until her “dreadful [. 
. . ] waking” (450) at the rapacious hands of Tarquin.  Her state of chastity is transformed 
not into a mirror of Tarquin's evil, but into a tortuous divided sense of self: guilt for what 
she has become wars with her image of her previous perfection. 
Lucrece's importance to this point in the poem has been as the stylized victim, the 
object of Tarquin's desire, and a symbol of chastity, purity, and modesty.  Until the rape, 
Lucrece operates as a target for Tarquin's destructive lust and as an idealized version of 
Roman womanhood. The real transformation in Lucrece occurs when she ceases to be 
just Collatine's "treasure" (16) and Tarquin's "spoil" (733), and instead begins to have 
dialogue with herself. She comes to see herself not only as a construction of the 
patriarchal ideals forced upon her, but also as a split entity, both chaste and unchaste, 
traitor and true, right and wrong.  She feels severd f om her original self both 
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psychologically and physically; the rape's pollution puts her at odds with herself as much 
as with the prince.  Just as Tarquin “for himself himself he must forsake” (157), so must 
Lucrece let go of her former incarnation to become a new Lucrece.  The emotional 
contagion introduced into her humoral system serves as the catalyst for this 
metamorphosis. The "helpless shame" (756) she feels – twin to Tarquin's after-rape 
burden – transforms Lucrece from a chaste subject to an avenging agent. 
The prince not only plants his seed in Lucrece's physical body, his "burden of a 
guilty mind" (735) leaks through her porous psyche to lodge firmly in her own rational 
faculties.  Initially, she tries to assuage her guilt by presenting the circumstance of the 
rape in terms of the domestic habits she has been so familiar with; addressing the 
imaginary image of her husband, she explains: 
 'Yet am I guilty of thy honour's wrack; 
 Yet for thy honour did I entertain him; 
 Coming from thee, I could not put him back, 
 For it had been dishonour to disdain him: 
 Besides, of weariness he did complain him, 
 And talk'd of virtue: O unlook'd-for evil, 
 When virtue is profaned in such a devil!  (841-7) 
Under the auspices of being a good hostess, and briging honor to husband through her 
excellent performance of those household duties, she inadvertently lets “the worm intrude 
the maiden bud” (848).  She sees herself as "defilè" (1029), "shame[d]" (1031), 
"defame[d]" (1033), and "rifled" (1050), all adjectives that imply victimization.  Yet 
Lucrece also embraces complicity with Tarquin, seeing herself through judgmental eyes, 
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essentially becoming her own judge, jury, and ultima ely, executioner.  Lucrece, though 
she accepts this burden of guilt for her “loathsome trespass” (812), she also places blame 
on others for her fall, chiefly Tarquin, the instrument of her destruction.61  In her initial 
spasms of woe, she spins her complex rhetorical complaint against Opportunity, Time, 
and Night, but none of these rants mitigate what she sees as her own complicity.  This 
"helpless smoke of words" (1027) does nothing to ease her guilt or her pain, nor does it 
give her a way to purge the humoral pathogen lodged in her "poisoned closet" (1659).   
 Coppelia Kahn believes that in order to understand Lucrece’s self-condemnation, 
we have to look at first look at Lucrece’s understanding of herself as the guardian of 
Collatine’s domestic honor.  Regardless of her “senseless reputation” (820), glossed by 
John Roe as "being without sensual (or lustful) inclination," Lucrece still bears the stain 
of sexual intercourse outside marriage.62  Kahn elaborates: 
 [Lucrece has a] conception of herself as a woman in a patriarchal society, a 
 conception which renders irrelevant for her the qustions of moral responsibility 
 and guilt in rape.  Though Lucrece uses moral terms such as sin and guilt, she 
 actually condemns herself according to primitive, non-moral standards of 
 pollution and uncleanness, in which only the materi l circumstances of an act 
 determine its goodness or evil.63 
The material pollution – Tarquin’s seed – cannot be ignored or simply washed away.  Her 
“attaint” (825) is literal and pervasive, staining even her blood.  Catherine Belling asserts 
that The Rape of Lucrece “actually traces the clinical stages of disease as it spreads:  
Lucrece’s blood is contaminated by Tarquin’s, whose body carries the swollen pride of 
Rome’s pathogenic ruling family, and her infection s the crisis that provokes drastic 
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measures, at once murderous and curative.”64  Although Belling's concentration is on the 
analogy between social disease and rape and the role of purgation in both the health of 
the individual and the political state, she acknowledges that early modern humoral theory 
allows these correspondences to be read literally.  When considering Lucrece’s insistence 
that she has been the victim of moral contagion, Kahn grees with Belling that “the 
extreme literalism of Lucrece’s moral self analysis seemed quite plausible to 
Shakespeare’s audience, to whom magic and medicine wer  hardly distinct.”65  The 
“stain” (1655) lamented by Lucrece is not just a figurative one; it is an infection, “a 
material and medically pathologized moral stain” that she can only get rid of through 
purgation.66  
Secondary Emotional Contagion 
 
 Dwelling on her newly fallen status, Lucrece realizes that there will be no easy 
way to relieve herself of the "load" Tarquin has left behind.  Although Lucrece describes 
her stain as an "unseen shame," an "invisible disgrace," an "unfelt sore," and a "private 
scar" (827-8), her greatest fear is that her "blemish" (536) will be published for all to see: 
 [. . .] my true eyes have never practised how 
 To cloak offences with a cunning brow. 
 'They think not but that every eye can see 
 The same disgrace which they themselves behold; 
 And therefore would they still in darkness be, 
 To have their unseen sin remain untold; 
 For they their guilt with weeping will unfold, 
 And grave, like water that doth eat in steel, 
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 Upon my cheeks what helpless shame I feel.'  (748-56) 
The emotion of "guilt" – the foundation for this outward display – transforms Lucrece in 
the same way lust alters Tarquin.  Now that her eyes as well as her body have been 
opened to the humoral taint of Tarquin's unbalanced self, she is aware of how easily 
others are affected by what they see.  She has no experi nce hiding her thoughts and 
emotions from people, so she believes that her "sin" will be marked clearly in her face for 
all to read.  As Shakespeare's Lancelot says, the "truth will out," and Lucrece needs to 
find a way to transform the truth into a story she can accept.67   
 As illustrated by the "war of lilies and roses" (71), Lucrece's interior is 
promulgated to the world through the medium of her face, where the tools of emotion 
carve out meaning for others to read.  The narrator genders this ability as feminine where 
“men can cover crimes with bold stern looks, / [p]oor women’s faces are their own fault 
books” (1252-3).  After her ravishment, Lucrece laments this characteristic and, in her 
distressed state, she has the paranoid feeling that everyone “will quote [her] loathsome 
trespass in [her] looks” (812).  The abused lady manot be far from the mark – the 
narrator describes her face as "that map which deepimpression bears / Of hard 
misfortune, carved in it with tears" (1712-3).  Guilt may not be specifically what her 
observers read in her visage, but certainly they can recognize violent negative emotions 
such as "sorrow" (1221), "discontent" (1601), and "grief" (1603). 
Sorrow wars with guilt for the upper hand in Lucrece's humoral-emotional 
makeup after the attack.  Her woe is published for others to see, a point emphasized by 
Shakespeare no less than five times in twelve lines(1218-30), and to feel, as we read the 
maid’s reaction to her mistress’ “cheeks over-washed with woe” (1225).  Here, emotion 
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transmits affect from one person to another by means of empathy, needing “No cause but 
company” (1236).  This is not a modern psychological interpretation of what occurs, but 
Shakespeare’s representation of how emotion elicits similar feelings in persons 
sympathetic to the original emotional subject: 
Even so the maid with swelling drops ‘gan wet 
Her circled eyne, enforced by sympathy 
Of those fair suns set in her mistress’ sky        (1228-30) 
Lucrece’s maid has no inkling of what actually occurred to cause her mistress distress, so 
her reaction is not an emotional response to events.  Rather, seeing and feeling the 
emotions emanating from her lady evoke similar affects in the maid.68  The tears 
expressed are a "conduit" (1234) between the women, carrying, if not the same emotion, 
then a species of the same "sympathy." 
 The encounter with the maid augments Lucrece's burgeoning knowledge of 
emotional contagion.  Weighing this incident with the affective burden of guilt and shame 
from her violent encounter with Tarquin, Lucrece becomes aware of how easily emotion 
travels, compounding her fear that others will recognize the sorrow and guilt she feels.  
The interlude with her maid reinforces the permeability of the emotional boundaries 
between persons, and intensifies her fear  that she will be unable to contain the 
knowledge of her stain.  However, as with language, emotional transmission does not 
guarantee understanding, and contagion, biological and emotional, often mutates: in this 
humoral drama, Collatine's pride becomes Tarquin's lust, which in turn manifests as 
shame in Lucrece.  And sometimes the emotion that is sparked in these encounters is only 
one of degree and the ensuing effects on reason and the body are virtually unrelated.  For 
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instance, the “silly groom” (1345) that Lucrece employs to deliver her letter to Collatine 
blushes when he enters her presence.  The narrator stresses that this messenger is an 
uncultivated, “homely” peasant (1338) who is full of true “respect” (1347), but Lucrece 
misinterprets his “bashful innocence” (1341) as accusatory looks.  She believes that this 
“vassal” (1360) knows something of her “blemish” (1358) and she flushes in response, 
prompting a brief duel of blushes between the two, each darker color in the one 
prompting an even duskier hue in the other (1352-8).  Convinced that her "story of sweet 
chastity's decay" (808) will always be "charactered in [her] brow" (807), Lucrece seizes 
upon a way to make her telling face an asset in her restorative revenge. 
The transmissions of affect she experiences up to this juncture provide Lucrece 
with a blueprint for redemptive action.  After debating the pros and cons of killing herself 
to expunge her shame, Lucrece concludes that her "blood shall wash the slander of [her] 
ill" (1207).  But rather than rashly killing herself and leaving a suicide note to explain her 
action, she bides her time and sends for Collatine so she can use the spectacle of her 
death to convince him of her innocence.69  She is taking no chances "Lest he should hold 
it her own gross abuse, / Ere she with blood had stined her stained excuse" (1315-6).  
Unlike Tarquin whose rational control fails to overcome his passion, Lucrece uses reason 
to funnel the emotions of rage and sorrow into the force behind her action of choice: 
Besides the life and feeling of her passion 
She hoards, to spend when he is by to hear her; 
When sighs and groans and tears may grace the fashion 
Of her disgrace, the better to clear her 
From that suspicion which the world might bear her.  (1317-21) 
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Lucrece understands that she must direct her emotions o her audience in a way that gains 
their empathy so she can, in turn, manipulate the emotions of those capable of carrying 
out her wishes.  She channels her emotions to bringabout a personal transformation and 
redemption. 
  
Bloodletting and the Restoration of Balance 
My tongue shall utter all; mine eyes, like sluices, 
As from a mountain-spring that feeds a dale, 
Shall gush pure streams to purge my impure tale.  
     ~ Shakespeare, The Rape of Lucrece (1076-8) 
 
When Tarquin becomes inflamed with a surfeit of humoral passion, he seeks to 
ameliorate his condition by purging his lust through rape.  Although early modern 
medical texts would have supported the biological outc me – removal of excess sperm 
and blood to restore his system to balance – the fallout from the act itself only creates 
further problems for the unstable prince as well as his dependents.70  Lucrece, however, 
forms a plan to both restore her system to equilibrium and to create a chain of 
consequences in her family's best interests.  After much deliberation, she reaches the 
conclusion that to remove the stain polluting both her body and reputation, she must play 
both physician and executioner: 
The remedy indeed to do me good 
Is to let forth my foul defilèd blood.  (1028-9) 
Before the rape, Lucrece feared to die under the slanders Tarquin threatens her with just 
as much as she may have feared actual physical death.71  After her ravishment, however, 
she finds that “that is gone for which [she] sought to live / And now [she] need not fear to 




 To clear this spot by death, at least I give 
 A badge of fame to slander's livery, 
 A dying life to living infamy (1053-5) 
Lucrece cannot, will not, keep her disgrace a secret from Collatine as Tarquin suggests in 
his attempt to gain her willing participation prior t  the rape.  Her moral code does not 
allow her to “flatter” her husband with “an infringèd oath” (1061), nor permit the 
possibility of Tarquin's seed to mature thus “pollut[ing]” Collatine's “stock” (1063).  
Rather, Lucrece vows that her “tongue shall utter all” (1076) before she purges her 
contaminated blood.  She will have her fame even at the cost of her own life.72 
 Lucrece’s adoption of self-murder as her physic – the cure that kills – does not 
meet with universal endorsement.  For example, Brutus criticizes her suicide as a product 
of a person with a “weak mind” (1825) who “mistook the matter so / To slay herself, that 
should have slain her foe” (1126-7).  Additionally, from the Christian external audience’s 
standpoint, there is a potential moral flaw in Lucrece’s attempt to re-establish her chastity 
by way of suicide: pride.  As Augustine argues in The City of God, Andrew Weiner sees 
Lucrece’s desire to regain her reputation for purity as a type of hubris and killing herself 
to achieve that aim as murder, another sin.  Weiner believes she has an alternative: 
 Lucrece can live only if she is willing to give upher spotless reputation, to 
 become like the rest of humanity, spotted, an embl now not of chastity but of 
 frailty, not of her own innocence but of Tarquin’s guilt.73 
Weiner’s criticism that Lucrece “refuses to live as a fallen human being in a fallen 
world”74 seems counter-intuitive in light of his earlier argument that Tarquin has no “free 
will” and is compelled to rape Lucrece.75  Each character struggles under the burden of 
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the passions – physical, mental, and emotional – that dominate his or her life experience.  
Tarquin needs a way to expel his excess and this motivates the rape.  Lucrece struggles to 
overcome the pestilent humors literally coursing through her blood stream and concludes 
that the only way she can become healthy again is to purge the bad blood.  Both 
characters should be judged by the same standards set forth by Shakespeare in the poem. 
 To better understand Lucrece’s insistence on killing herself to exorcise the 
corruption in her body, we must read Shakespeare’s descriptions of humoral states 
literally.  The connection between the black “coal” (47) in Tarquin’s liver, the “black 
blood” (1745) contaminating Lucrece, and their indivi ual humoral frameworks is a 
metonymical one rather than a being metaphorical.76  Catherine Belling confirms that: 
 The red, white, and black of [The Rape of Lucrece] may seem like symbolic moral 
 abstractions, but they are rooted in a discourse ba d on precise clinical 
 observation of living, bleeding bodies.  In making a society a macrocosm 
 materially and literally continuous with the microosm of the human body, 
 humoral theory infused the sociopolitical with a discourse of medical pathology 
 and normalization.77 
Similarly, Robin L. Bott, in her work on Chaucer’s Physician’s Tale and Shakespeare’s 
Titus Andronicus, suggests that Lucrece's desire to prevent her literal "stain" from 
spreading to Collatine and the rest of her family would have been a recognizable motive 
for suicide.78  Bott believes the early modern association of rape with disease not only 
promotes, but requires that the rape victim be sacrificed to stem the tidof infection: 
[E]nemies attack fathers through their rapable daughters to expose these fathers 
 and their patriarchal society to potential contagion that is abated only by the 
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 destruction of the woman.  Such destruction of the female body reveals an attitude 
 towards these raped women analogous to attitudes towards disease or diseased 
 tissue – the damaged body part must be excised in order to prevent further harm 
 to the whole.  In this formulation, the female subject is reduced to the status of a 
 mutilated body part or some dangerously contaminated flesh that may infect the 
 father, making the destruction of the raped woman not only permissible, but also 
 highly  desirable.79 
Although Bott’s focus is on “fathers” since the women she discusses are unmarried 
virgins, the same applies for husbands of chaste wiv s l ke Lucrece; Tarquin’s attack on 
Lucrece is also a direct assault on Collatine.80  In this vein, the key components of 
Lucrece’s pro-suicide argument stem from the belief that her body is a “blemished fort” 
(1175) which contains her “troubled soul” (1176) and that she will “poison” her family 
with her “attaint” (1072) if she remains among the living.  Restoring herself to a state of 
purity and protecting her family from contamination requires her to shed her corrupt 
corporeal form.   
Imagining herself as a new Philomel who, in the guise of a nightingale, pricks her 
breast with a thorn to spur onward her sad song of ravishment, Lucrece procures a “sharp 
knife” (1138) which will “make some hole / Through which [she] may convey [her] 
troubled soul” (1175-6).  Her plan for restorative revenge requires three things: the 
purgation of the literal humoral contagion Tarquin foists on her, the erasure of the 
“stain”ed reputation of herself and her family, and the punishment of Tarquin for his 
“black payment” (576).  Lucrece herself summarizes the strategy thus: 
My soul and body to the skies and ground; 
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My resolution, husband, do thou take; 
Mine honour be the knife's that makes my wound; 
My shame be his that did my fame confound; 
     And all my fame that lives disbursèd be 
     To those that live and think no shame of me  (1199-1204) 
As if in a metaphysical butcher shop, she slices her elf into those parts needing 
recognition.  All the "cuts" she leaves, save one, ar  positive or neutral attributes.  The 
one exception, her "shame," is declared Tarquin's, a mirror transference of emotion akin 
to the "load of lust" (734) he bestows on her in the aftermath of the rape.  She loathes the 
essence he has left behind so she will pitch it back to him in death.  As a physical 
manifestation of that shame, her "stainèd blood to Tarquin [she'll] bequeath, / Which by 
him tainted shall for him be spent" (1181-2); her gift of blood implicitly implicates him in 
her self-murder. 
 Lucrece, resplendent in black mourning clothes, sets the stage to move her 
audience towards her dual goal – revenge and redemption.  For a person whose innocence 
and openness were lauded as her most recognizable features, Collatine's wife quickly 
learns about manipulation.  Fearful of "that suspicion which the world might bear her" 
(1321), she tells her husband just enough in her letter to summon him home.  She decides 
the details cannot be trusted to ink and "action [will] become them better" (1323).  Her 
own theory of the transmission of affect reinforces the importance of controlling the 
spectacle in order to elicit the desired response: 
 To see sad sights moves more than hear them told, 
 For then the eye interprets the ear 
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The heavy motion that it doth behold 
When every part a part of woe doth bear.  (1324-7) 
With this in mind, she sets the stage of her demise car fully.  When the messenger returns 
with her husband and his friends, they all find Lucrece "clad in mourning black" (1585) 
with her "lively colour killed with deadly cares" (1593).  Her audience stands "Amazed" 
(1591) at the sight of her woeful "face, that map which deep impression bears / Of hard 
misfortune, carved in it with tears" (1712-3).  With the consummate skill of a veteran 
actress, Lucrece increases the curiosity of the men gathered around her by not speaking at 
first and allowing them to be moved by the "sad sight" (1324) of her "attired in 
discontent" (1601).  When she does try to speak, she sighs three times before she can 
bring herself to start the horrible story.  With each sigh, she increases her witnesses' 
desire to know the cause of her anguish.  
 Once she does begin to speak, Lucrece employs three ve y effective methods of 
persuasion.  First, she gets to the point quickly.  Having built the sympathetic emotions of 
the men to a crescendo, she tells them of the rape with impressive succinctness, using the 
abruptness of the revelation as a bludgeon to shock and impress them with the violence of 
what she has suffered.  Lucrece’s unveiling of her discontent seems to have the desired 
effect on her husband’s companions who “long [. . .] to hear the hateful foe bewrayed” 
(1698), but Collatine, the “oversee[r]” of her “will” (1205), becomes locked in an 
unproductive cycle of grief.  In fact, her husband is so astounded by her sad revelation 
that his “shallow tongue” (78) – which opens Lucrece to the rape in the first place – is 
significantly “stop”ped (1664): 
 The deep vexation of his inward soul 
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 Hath seemed a dumb arrest upon his tongue  (1779-80) 
Instead of the furious and vengeful humor she expects to incite in him, she only gets a 
silent, circulating despair as a response.  Seeing his “untimely frenzy” (1675) as a 
detriment to her plans for redemption and revenge, Lucrece chides her husband for his 
“speechless woe” (1674): 
 'Dear lord, thy sorrow to my sorrow lendeth 
 Another power; no flood by raining slaketh. 
 My woe too sensible thy passion maketh 
 More feeling-painful.  Let it then suffice 
 To drown one woe, one pair of weeping eyes.  (1676-80) 
Telling him to stifle the crying since it only augments her own considerable sorrow, she 
spells out her expectation for him and his “knights” (1694): revenge. 
Lucrece’s second method of persuasion is that she does not excuse herself from 
guilt – there can be no argument that she "protests oo much."  Rather, by heaping the 
guilt and complicity upon her own head, Lucrece places the men in a position to defend 
her from herself.  She does qualify her guilt to be a r sult of the humoral contamination 
thrust upon her by Tarquin, deliberately separating her rational mind from her body to 
demonstrate that she was never mentally complicit with Tarquin’s demands:  
Though my gross blood be stained with this abuse, 
Immaculate and spotless is my mind; 
That was not forced, that was never inclined 
     To accessary yieldings, but still pure 
     Doth in her poisoned closet yet endure.’  (1655-9) 
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Again, she emphasizes the medical necessity for her annihilation: both her soul and her 
mind are trapped in a “polluted prison” (1726) and death is the only way out.  She knows 
that she needs to make this rationale for self-murder clear to the audience lest they 
misconstrue her motive as despair.81  The "lordly crew" (1731), when she unfolds the 
details of her ravishment, actually proposes that se has nothing to be ashamed of 
because "her body's stain her mind untainted clears" (1710).  Lucrece’s response to their 
attempts to pacify her clearly denies that it has any sway over her thinking: 
 ‘No, no’, quoth she, ‘no dame hereafter living 
 By my excuse shall claim excuse’s giving.’ (1714-5) 
By voluntarily executing the harshest possible penalty on herself, Lucrece attempts to 
establish her fame and her chastity beyond reproach, as well as setting the bar for all 
wives “hereafter.”  She emphasizes that her rational mind is "immaculate and spotless" 
(1656)  as well as "pure" (1704), contrasting it with her "stained" (1655) body.  By 
purging that stained part of herself, and consequently killing it, she believes that she can 
resurrect her reputation as a chaste and dutiful wife.  She is convinced that her body 
cannot be cleansed except through the deadly bloodletting, and equally certain that "the 
immortal part of [herself]" (Othello, 2.3.259-60), her reputation, will be preserved an
reinforced by her sacrificial suicide.  In the world of the poem, this approach appears to 
work splendidly, and "Collatine and his consorted lords" (1609) both "promise aid" 
(1696) in bringing her rapist to justice, eventually using her bloodied body as a talisman 
to unite all Romans against the Tarquins. 
Finally, using her body as a blackboard, she instructs the courtiers in her 
expectations of retribution.  Stabbing herself, she constructs her suicide as a murder in 
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which Tarquin “guides [her] hand to give [the] wound” (1722).  Illustrating the deadly 
consequences of the prince’s “black [. . . ] deed” (226), Lucrece implores the gathered 
company to “Be suddenly revengèd on [her] foe” (1683).82  The spectacle of her suicide 
provides additional evidence to support Lucrece’s commitment to the separation of body 
and soul/mind. As her audience stands “Stone-still, astonished with [her] deadly deed” 
(1730), several visual clues appear reinforcing Lucrece’s assertion that the “remedy” 
(1028) for her disgrace “Is to let forth [her] foul defilèd blood” (1029).  First, as she stabs 
herself, the narrator describes her soul as being “u sheathed” (1724) from its “polluted 
prison” (1726).  Although it is not clear from the narrator’s words whether the witnesses 
see “her wingèd sprite” (1728) ascending to the heavens, he states her soul’s movement 
towards the sky as if it were fact.  Next, as Brutus draws the knife from her breast, her 
blood bubbles out, separating into two distinct streams: 
In two slow rivers, that crimson blood 
Circles her body in on every side, 
Who like a late-sacked island vastly stood 
Bare and unpeopled in this fearful flood. 
     Some of her blood still pure and red remained, 
     And some looked black, and that false Tarquin stained.  (1738-43) 
Her spirit fled, her body is “unpeopled,” and, picking up the “blemished fort” (1175) 
image, her corpse appears as a pillaged isle surrounded by gore.  The fact that her blood 
shows clear evidence of pollution – “black” and “stained” – justifies Lucrece’s medical 




 The first part of Lucrece’s goal in committing suicide seems fulfilled before her 
body is even cold.  Her desire for redemption, the ne d to re-establish her honor, seems 
complete as Brutus extols the lords to carry out revenge on behalf of Lucrece, that “true 
wife” (1841); she has regained her name at the cost of her life.  Additionally, she has set a 
precedent for future wives, placing herself in historical and legendary record.  Lucrece’s 
second goal – vicarious revenge – is a bit more problematic in the aftermath of her 
suicide.  Although she has the men pledge “With swift pursuit to venge [her] wrong” 
(1691), thus legally binding them to take action on her behalf, she is well aware that there 
are several obstacles that must be overcome.  Prior to her death, she chastises her 
husband for his “untimely frenzy” (1675) of grief, for that is not the emotion she is trying 
to evoke in him.  She needs him, and all of his lordly friends, enraged and full of bloody-
mindedness, not weeping.  So, getting the right pitch of emotion out of her audience is a 
challenge that she negotiates with limited success.  Another problem lies in the identity of 
her attacker; Tarquin, as prince of the ruling family, demands the respect and loyalty of 
the men she is relying on to punish him.  Cannily, she withholds the name of her rapist 
until after the men swear oaths to her. 
 Lucrece does her best to funnel the emotions of her audience towards her second 
goal of revenge and recognizes there may be some slippage along the way, but she could 
not predict the continuation of her woeful spectacle through the machinations of her 
husband and father.  Her corpse, without her voice to guide the affects of its observers, 
becomes a totem for her family to fight over.  As a precursor to Hamlet’s and Laertes’ 
brawl over Ophelia’s corpse, Tarquin and Lucrece’s father, Lucretius, lose themselves in 
a maudlin debate about which one of them has more right to mourn: 
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 Then son and father weep with equal strife 
 Who should weep most, for daughter or for wife.  (1791-2) 
Just as the derailment of Lucrece’s posthumous revenge seems complete, Brutus steps in.  
Although he does not agree with Lucrece’s decision to “slay herself” (1827), he 
recognizes her sacrifice as an opportunity to incite Romans against the tyrannical 
Tarquins.  He chastises Collatine’s and Lucretius’ “childish humour” (1825), calling on 
them instead to vow revenge for “the death of this true wife” (1841).  The knife, which 
Lucrece bequeathed all her honor (1184), becomes a talisman by which Brutus incites not 
only the witnesses to her death, but all of Rome.  Kissing the blade to seal his own vow, 
he passes it to the others who repeat their oaths to revenge her untimely death.  To gain 
support for their cause, the men bear Lucrece’s bloody body through the streets of Rome, 
publishing both her disgrace and her redemption.  Though this exposure was probably not 
part of Lucrece’s original agenda, it helps achieve her ends.  Tarquin is banished for his 
“foul offense” (1852) and Lucrece’s legend of chastity grows.  
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action, physical or mental; volition, 5/ Intention, i tent, purpose, determination, 6/ The power or capa ity of 
willing; that faculty or function which is directed to conscious and intentional action; power of choie in 
regard to action.   Additionally, the bawdy meaning of phallus is implied. 
 
32 Like early modern medical theory in general, the sp cifics of ocular operation were under constant 
debate.  
 
33 Thijs Weststeijn, “Seeing and the transfer of spirits n early modern art theory.”  Renaissance Theories of 
Vision. Eds. John Hendrix and Charles H. Carman,  Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010, 149-69) 
151. 
 
34 Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. Benjamin Jowett, (Lawrence, Kansas: Digireads.com Publishing, 
2009) 27. 
 
35 The ocular rays are composed of spirits that are produced by the blood and retain the basic characteristics 
of the blood that ferments them; in other words, the ocular rays of a choleric individual like Tarquin will be 
sharp, bitter, hot, and dry.  See Weststeijn, 151. 
 
36 Ibid, 151. 
 
37Gregorio Comanini, Il Figino (1591), quoted in Weststeijn, 150. 
 
38 For a review of the various contending sub-theories of vision see David C. Lindberg’s Theories of Vision 
from  
Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1976) and Nicholas J. Wade’s A Natural History of Vision 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998). 
 
39 Weststeijn, 160. 
 
40 Found in the “Third Book” of Baldassare Castiglione’s The courtyer of Count Baldessar Castilio diuided 
into foure bookes. Very necessary and profitable for yonge gentilmen and gentilwomen abiding in court, 
palaice or place, done into English by Thomas Hoby. Imprinted at London : By wyllyam Seres at the signe 
of the Hedghogge, 1561.  Early English Books Online, accessed March 28, 2011. 
 
41 Weststeijn (155) points to Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis for a poetic rendition of the same idea: 
“Thine eye darts forth the fire that burneth me” (196) see John Roe’s edition of The Poems [of 
Shakespeare] (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 2000) 90.  
 
42John Roe glosses "colour" as "pretext" (167). 
 
43Emphasis mine.  
 
44 Ritscher, 58. 
 




                                                                                                                                                                             
46F. David Hoeniger in Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1992), notes that early modern writers did not always adhere strictly to the medical 




48This refers to Tarquin’s eyes as windows into his soul and hence his intent. 
 
49 This is yet another paradox Shakespeare uses to juxtapose her beauty (earthly) and chastity (saintly). 
 
50 See E. L. Risden, "Red and White and the Wars of the Roses: Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis and the 
Rape of Lucrece." (Publications of the Medieval Association of the Midwest 10 (2003): 143-153) 145. 
 
51 Compare this to Tarquin’s reaction when he first sees Lucrece lying in her bed: 
 Look, as the fair and fiery-pointed sun, 
 Rushing from forth a cloud, bereaves our sight; 
 Even so, the curtain drawn, his eyes begun 
 To wink, being blinded with a greater light: 
 Whether it is that she reflects so bright, 
 That dazzleth them, or else some shame supposed; 
 But blind they are, and keep themselves enclosed.  (372-8) 
In his case, his desire overcomes the blinding power of her beauty and he opens his eyes with the intention 
of going forward with the rape despite the consequences. 
 
52Again, Shakespeare seems to have anticipated modern psychological findings when he characterizes 
Tarquin as moved to "more rage and lesser pity" (468) at Lucrece's terrified compliance.  Sharon Marcus 
reports that in a recent survey of rape victims, "passive responses often led to increased violence on the 
rapist's part." See Sharon Marcus, “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape 
Prevention, Feminists Theorize the Political, eds. J. Butler & J.W. Scott. (New York: Routledge,1992) 395-
6.  Marcus also points to modern research that contradicts the common notion that physical resistance to 
rape provokes greater violence from the rapist.   
  
53John Roe glosses “let” as “impediment” or “obstacle,” but it can also mean “outpouring” or "discharge" 
in the sense of allowing a fluid to escape, or the s dding of blood (OED). The latter definition makes 
sense for there is now more room for Tarquin’s passion to swell. For a thorough discussion of this 
antithesis and the multiple meanings of "let" throughout Lucrece, see Joel Fineman, “Shakespeare's Will: 
The Temporality of Rape,” Representations 20 Special Issue: Misogyny, Misandry, and Misanthropy 
(Autumn 1987) 25-76. 
 
54            She conjures him by high almighty Jove, 
By knighthood, gentry, and sweet friendship’s oath,  
By her untimely tears, her husband’s love, 
By holy human law and common troth,  
By heaven and earth, and all the power of both      (568-72) 
 
55 I am indebted to Marshall Grossman for his assistance in working through this idea. 
 
56 In Renaissance medical theory, blood and semen are m d  from the same humor; they are just at 
different stages in the concoction process.  Elaine Hobby writes: 
 [Some] organs had the function of "transmutation," of turning one bodily fluid into another:  for 
 example, special vessels in men's stones (testicles) turned blood into semen, whilst others in 
 women's breasts turned blood into milk.  Such transmutations were believed to take place through 
 a process of "concoction," in which substances were h ated and matured by the body into a new 
 quality or identity. 
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See "Note on Humoral Theory," Jane Sharp, The Midwives Book: Or the Whole Art of Midwivery 
Discovered (Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 1999, xxxiii-xxxv), xx iii. 
 
57 The narrator uses parallelism to stress the resemblance between the two in the ensuing sixty or so lines 
(687-749). 
 
58Theresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect (I haca: Cornell UP, 2004) 3. 
 
59 Marion A. Wells contends that the “feminization of [Tarquin’s] soul (“the spotted princess”) clearly 
indicates that the rape coincides with a fatal identification with the violate Lucrece.” See “’To Find a Face 
where all Distress is Stell’d’: Enargeia, Ekphrasis, and Mourning in The Rape of Lucrece and the Aeneid,”  
(Comparative Literature 54:2 (Spring 2002), 97-126) 109. 
 
60 To reiterate, “affection” means “a powerful or contr lling emotion, as passion, lust” (OED), not “love” or 
“charitable feeling” as we use it today.  
 
61 Significantly, Lucrece rarely, and never overtly, blames Collatine for her disgrace.  In her tirade against 
Opportunity, she states that her husband would haveridd n to her rescue if her were not "stayed" (917) by 
Opportunity's intervention.  One can read the implication that he should have been there to protect her, or at 
least have provided surrogated to protect her if hehimself were unavailable.  At one point she addresses her 
husband in her mind's eye as if to explain her disgrace to him.  In this imaginary confession she state  that 
"[in his] weak hive a wandering wasp has crept, / And sucked the honey which thy chaste bee kept" (839-
40).  The image is of an undefended home easily penetrated by an evil invader. In both Roman and 
Elizabethan times, it is the male head of household's job to protect the weaker members of his family and
those under his employ.  The text does not conclusively support whether this is a simple statement of fact 
or an implied criticism. 
 
62 John Roe, 183, n820. 
 
63 Coppelia Kahn, "The Rape in Shakespeare's Lucrece" (Shakespeare Studies 9 (1976): 45-72) 25. 
 
64 Catherine Belling, "Infectious Rape, Therapeutic Revenge: Bloodletting and the Health of Rome's Body," 
(Disease, Diagnosis, and Cure on the Early Modern Stage.   Eds. Stephanie Moss and Kaara L. Peterson.  
Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2004, 113-132) 114-5. 
 
65 Kahn, 40. 
 
66 Belling, 118. 
 
67 William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, 2.2.70, (The Norton Shakespeare, Ed. Stephen Greenblatt 
et al, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997, 108-1145) 1103.  
 
68Shakespeare goes on to develop this species of sympathy in such characters as Charmian (A tony and 
Cleopatra) and Titinius (Julius Caesar), who willingly follow their leaders to death based on 
overwhelming emotion. 
 
69 In the initial throes of guilt and shame, Lucrece does search for "some happy mean to end a hapless life" 
(1045), but none were to be found in her chamber (1037-1040).  She comes to her senses and realizes she 
has to stage her action carefully if she wants to reestablish her reputation of chastity. 
 
70 As Paster explains in Humoring the Body, blood and semen were only separated by where they were in 
the humoral formative process: “Blood in varying states was considered to be a product of a series of three
progressively refined transformations, or concoctions, of food and drink into bodily nutriment.  The first 
concoction, which turned food into chyle, took place in the stomach. . . .The second concoction, 
sanguification, took place in the liver. . . [and] involved not only the transformation of chyle into bl od and 
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the other humors but the infusion of chyle with ‘natur l spirit’. . . . The final concoction, which further 
refined blood into seed, took place in the spermatical vessels. . . .” Purging either blood or semen, or both, 
would have been the early modern medical remedy for Tarquin's inflamed condition.  Gail Kern Paster,  
Humoring the Body: Emotion and the Shakespearean Stge, (Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 2004) 70-1.   
 
71  'In vain', quoth she, 'I live, and seek in vain 
    Some happy mean to end this hapless life. 
    I feared by Tarquin's falchion to be slain, 
    Yet for the self-same purpose seek a knife. (1044-7) 
 
72 One of the recurring critiques of Lucrece condemns her for her preoccupation with that “badge of fame.”  
In Christian terms, this emphasis on one’s reputation and name smells too much like pride, another of the 
seven mortal sins.  Augustine, in The City of God, illustrates the problem: 
 This matron, with the Roman love of glory in her vins, was seized with a proud dread that, if she 
 continued to live, it would be supposed she willingly did not resent the wrong that had been done  
 to her. She could not exhibit to men her conscience, but she judged that her self-inflicted 
 punishment would testify her state of mind; and she burned with shame at the thought that her 
 patient endurance of the foul affront that another had done her, should be construed into 
 complicity with him. (25) 
Although Shakespeare’s text closely follows this analysis of Lucrece’s motivations for suicide, it does not 
place the same negative connotation on her “Roman love of glory” or her “proud dread.” John Roe notes: 
 Unlike Augustine, Shakespeare does not ignore the cultural imperatives and taboos of an ancient 
 society, in which pollution, even of an utterly innocent family member, brings shame on the 
 family, shame which the victim’s death is believed to cleanse. (Introduction 23) 
Although Shakespeare is writing for a Christian audience in a time where ecclesiastical and civil laws 
forbade self-slaughter, he seems to bank on his reade s’ sympathetic reaction to Lucrece’s plight.  Her 
desire to perpetuate her good name would have resonated with the many of the courtiers who may have 
read the text considering their own reliance on family reputation and honor to gain position in Elizabeth’s 
court. Also, as a historical figure rather than a contemporary, Lucrece’s depiction gains a layer of insulation 
from the condemnatory attitudes of Renaissance morality – the audience does not feel compelled to 
automatically judge her on the same terms as they would one of themselves in similar circumstances.  See
St Augustine of Hippo,  The City of God.  (Trans. Marcus Dods.  New York: The Modern Library, 1993), 
and  John Roe, "Introduction," The Poems (New Cambridge Shakespeare).  (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1992.) 
 
73 Andrew D. Weiner, "Burdens of Guilty Minds: Rape and Suicide in Shakespeare's Lucrece." (Graven 
Images: A Journal of Culture, Law, and the Sacred 2.(1995): 48-63) 57. 
 
74 Ibid., 59. 
 
75 Ibid., 54. 
 
76 William Spates explains this significant if subtle difference in his defense of reading early modern 
humoral descriptions literally: 
 Galenic medicine, in particular, allowed for a complex set of metonyms, rather than metaphors,  
 that were based on the intrinsic relationship betwe n the microcosm and macrocosm.  In semiotic 
 terms, metonymy is indexical in nature because it assumes a direct relationship between signs via 
 their signifiers and/or signifieds.  Early modern readers and writers viewed disease metonymically 
 as a direct result of their understanding of the body-centered episteme and its inherent 
 interrelations between microcosm and macrocosm.  The resulting system of analogies created a 
 complex network of associations that linked  disease, excretion, decay, death, and sin. 
See William Spates, "Shakespeare and the Irony of Early Modern Disease Metaphor and Metonymy," 
Rhetorics of Bodily Disease and Health in Medieval and Early Modern England,  (Ed. Jennifer C. Vaught. 




                                                                                                                                                                             
77 Belling, Catherine. "Infectious Rape, Therapeutic Revenge: Bloodletting and the Health of Rome's 
Body." Disease, Diagnosis, and Cure on the Early Modern Stage.  (Eds. Stephanie Moss and Kaara L. 
Peterson.  Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2004. 113-132) 28. 
 
78 Drew Daniel has a similar view of the situation: 
 [P]atrician Romen women who had been raped or sexually violated were expected to commit 
 suicide out of sexual modesty rather than to continue to live with the enduring shame of their 
 condition. . . . Within the  classical world, suicide constitutes a bid for a curious kind of self-
 preservation; the self at risk of shame can preserv  and uphold personal honor and family 
 reputation through a particularly morbid and aesthticized form of ‘self-fashioning’ in extremis: 
 “self-fashioning” through “self-finishing.” 
See Drew Daniel, "'I Am More an Antique Roman than a Dane': Suicide, Masculinity and National Identity 
in Hamlet," Identity, Otherness and Empire in Shakespeare's Rome, (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2009. 75-
87) 77. 
 
79 Robin L. Bott, "'O, Keep Me from Their Worse than Killing Lust': Ideologies of Rape and Mutilation in 
Chaucers's Physician's Tale and Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus," Representing Rape in Medieval and 
Early Modern Literature.  (Eds. Elizabeth Robertson, Christine Rose, and Christopher Cannon.  New York, 
NY: Palgrave, 2001. 189-211.) 190. 
 
80 Tarquin himself enumerates the many reasons a man might decide to rape someone’s wife: 
 Had Collatinus kill'd my son or sire, 
 Or lain in ambush to betray my life, 
 Or were he not my dear friend, this desire 
 Might have excuse to work upon his wife, 
 As in revenge or quittal of such strife  (232-6) 
 
81 Prior to Augustine's City of God (“Book I” composed c. 413 C.E.), the Christian tradition followed that 
of the Greeks and Romans who generally held that certain circumstances of honor and incurable illness 
warranted suicide; for an excellent summary of the classical treatment of suicide, see Georges Minois, 
History of Suicide: Voluntary Death in Western Culture, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1999). 
 Augustine's treatise changed all of that.  His argument that suicide violated the biblical 
 commandment “Thou shalt not kill,” revolutionized the way the western world viewed self-
 murder.  Augustine repudiated every justification f r self-killing on the following basis: 
 For if it is not lawful to take the law into our own hands, and slay even a guilty person, whose 
 death no public sentence has warranted, then certainly he who kills himself is a homicide, and so 
 much the guiltier  of his own death, as he was more innocent of that offence for which he doomed 
 himself to die. (22) 
His only concession is for certain biblical figures like Samson whom he believes were “prompted by divine 
wisdom, to his act of self-destruction” and several of the saints whom he places in the same category. Still, 
Augustine is quick to point out that what may appear to be divine inspiration could be only the deception of 
“human judgment.”  
 After Augustine, suicide becomes the embodiment of the deadliest of the mortal sins – despair – in 
Christian doctrine.  During the late Medieval and Renaissance, European states set up harsh laws regarding 
suicides, many trying the victim posthumously in court to determine his or her guilt in cases where self-
murder was unclear.  If found guilty, the corpse of the suicide was often desecrated in various ways, denied 
burial in holy ground, and, in England, the moveabl goods of the deceased were often confiscated by the 
government.  For more on the civil and ecclesiasticl punishments meted out against self-murderers in the 
Renaissance, see Michael MacDonald and Terence R. Murphy's Sleepless Souls: Suicide in Early Modern 
England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) which unveils suicide as a common social and psychological 
phenomenon in the early modern period and Alexander Mur ay’s Suicide in the Middle Ages (2 vols.  New 




                                                                                                                                                                             
82 Another way Lucrece attempts to avoid possible criticism of her forthcoming suicide is to shift blame 
from herself to her violator. Although she alone resolves to take her own life, she also identifies Tarquin as 
not only her rapist, but as her murderer.  Though she claims she is "the mistress of [her] fate" (1069), and 
certainly takes steps to purge her own complicity, real or perceived, by embarking on self-murder, she still 
wants the blame to be shared with Tarquin – "he that made [her] stop my breath" (1180).  She names him as 
she does the deed, exclaiming, "He, he, fair lords, 'tis he, / [t]hat guides this hand to give this wound to me" 




"Transformed with Their Fear": Dread, Contagion, an d Violence  
in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar 
 
 In The Rape of Lucrece, Shakespeare demonstrates affect's ability to transfer 
across bodily boundaries, producing humoral imbalances in the agents which further lead 
to actions with far-reaching consequences.  In Julius Caesar, the humoral imbalance 
manifests itself at every level, from the individual, to the state, to the earth and heavens.  
Fear, the prevailing emotion that chains this destructive imbalance together, permeates 
the very atmosphere.   Antony’s observation that “pssion is catching” (3.1.283) indicates 
one way that fear holds such a sweeping influence o Julian Rome—as a humoral 
contagion, fear spreads like wildfire through all but the most rational and balanced 
individuals in the populace, leading to questionable actions that raise further alarm.   
 Unlike the blatant exchange of bodily fluids in Lucrece, the humoral contagion in 
Julius Caesar is more subtle and diffuse.  The foundation for the transmission of affect in 
this work is the environment itself.  Just as human bei gs each have a complexion—a 
natural predilection for a humoral type—the very atmosphere of a place and time has 
humoral characteristics which can actively influenc the actions of those grounded in it.  
For Cassius, Brutus, and Caesar, both the natural environment and the political 
environment exhibit signs of extreme strain from the beginning of the play.  This 
macrocosmic imbalance is then reflected in the microcosms of the individuals, churning 
up their humors and instigating actions that they blieve will lead to the restoration of 
balance.   
 The violent actions in the play result from multiple humoral influences, both 
microcosmic—“Brutus, with himself at war” (1.2.46)—and macrocosmic—“The heavens 




in the misregulation of the humors, a situation that, in turn, creates the ideal environment 
for violent action.  Failure to balance the intellect and the passions results in trauma that 
shakes the very foundation of the Roman Empire withcivil war.  Fear, the motivational 
force behind the action in Julius Caesar, demonstrates the power of affect over intellect 
in even the most rational agents. 
Complexion as a Foundation for Action 
What a piece of work is man - how noble in reason; how infinite in faculties, in form and moving; how 
express and admirable in action; how like an angel in apprehension; how like a god; the beauty of the 
world; the paragon of animals.  And yet to me what is this quintessence of dust?  ~ Shakespeare,  
Hamlet, 2.2.269-74 
  
 Fear, like all emotions, depends on several factors in order to become an incentive 
for action.  Internally, complexion and habit oversee the movement of an individual's 
passions, determining whether or not he has a predilection for that emotion.1  Externally, 
environmental input—both humoral and rational—seeps into the porous body and mind, 
often moving the humoral system into a state of plethora or deficiency.  This state of 
imbalance produces disease in the microcosm of the individual, and in extreme cases, 
even moves back into the surrounding environment and populace, spreading the 
contagious dyskrasia into the macrocosm.2  Each individual's humoral state is directly 
affected by diverse environmental phenomena including et, climate, astrological 
alignment, age, social status, occupation, and gender.  Taken with the person's innate 
constitution and habitual practices, the surrounding world and its upheavals affect change 
in tangible ways that can have far-reaching consequences.  In Lucrece, the plethora of 
lust in one individual ultimately transforms the entire political state.  In Julius Caesar, the 
permeation of fear in both microcosm and macrocosm leads to civil war and the 




 To better understand the actions leading to the assassination of Caesar and the 
ensuing civil war, a brief look at each agent's complexion and his complexion's 
relationship to fear may be useful.  Difficult to change, the complexion is the dominant 
influence on an individual's outward behavior because it guides the way a person 
responds to both inward and outer humoral excitement, or stimulus.  Based upon the 
literal humoral endowments of an individual's body, the complexion is as much an 
hereditary characteristic as one's height, or eye color, or nose size.  Thomas Elyot, in The 
Castell of Health (1595), emphasizes the elemental nature of the complexion: 
 Complexion is a combination of two diuers qualities of the foure elements in one 
 bodie,  as hot and drie of the fire, hot and moist f the aire, cold and moist of the 
 water, cold and drie of the earth. But although all these complexions bee 
 assembled in euery bodie of  man and woman, yet the bodie taketh his 
 denomination of those qualities which abound in him, more than in the other . . . .3 
Complexion is based on the dominant qualities exhibited by an individual, qualities that 
correspond to the elemental paradigm that is the foundation of humoral theory.  Nancy G. 
Siraisi further explains that: 
 each person was endowed with his or her own innate complexion;  this was an 
 essential identifying characteristic acquired at the moment of conception and in 
 some ways persisting throughout life.  In this sense, complexion was a 
 fundamental organizing principle of each individual human organism considered 
 as a whole.  Thus, a particular person might be characterized as having a hot 
 complexion relative to other human beings,  and this c aracterization would apply 




At its most basic, complexion summarizes a person's humoral, and hence emotional, 
tendencies.  If a man is known to be of a choleric complexion, his companions know he is 
easy to anger and are not surprised by behaviors consistent with his humoral type.  
However, if the same man becomes withdrawn and weepy, his friends and family would 
assume he has contracted an illness that has unbalanced his humors, leading to the 
uncharacteristic behaviors.  Complexion also refers to the appearance of a person's face 
(as it does in modern times);  the circulation of the humors produced outward signs of the 
internal state through the medium of the face.5 
 Complexion can vary over time and under changing external circumstances, but 
modifications to a person's complexion normally occur extremely gradually over a 
person's lifetime as to remain barely discernable.  In the play, only one protagonist 
demonstrates the exception to this rule, where the complexion alters in a dramatic fashion 
following a radical event that permanently affects the humoral composition of the 
person's body— Antony's circumstances illustrate how a complexion can be transformed 
when faced with extreme environmental and humoral st es ors.  After the brutal slaughter 
of his friend and leader, Antony is converted into an agent of vengeance, taking on a role 
of leadership in the Triumvirate and leading the charge against the fled conspirators.  
Antony's natural humoral disposition is sanguine, a man who is more apt to love than to 
fight.  According to Burton, persons with a sanguine complexion are "much inclined to 
laughter, witty and merry, conceited in discourse, pl asant, [. . . ] much given to music, 
dancing, and to be in women's company."  They also enj y plays and sports.6  Brutus 
describes Antony as having a "quick spirit" (1.2.29) and "given / To sports, to wildness 




(2.2.116).  As a “masquer and reveller” (5.1.61), the natural Antony is a pleasure seeker 
and commits to things that serve his own needs.   In general, fear seems to have no hold 
over him.  Aside from the reference of Antony "fle[eing] to his house amazed" (3.1.96) 
after Caesar is struck down, terms of fear are not associated with him in deed or 
description.  Cassius alone recognizes the potential for Antony to be a fearless "shrewd 
contriver" (2.1.157).  Cassius seems to know that te blood dominating Antony's 
irresponsible and fun-loving complexion, when roused to excess, also produce leadership 
ability, loyalty, and literal bloody-mindedness—tenacity, courage, and manipulation. 
 Shakespeare develops the idea of complexion as the basis of action by portraying 
the main agents in the play as having dominant aspect  of specific humoral types (Figure 
2); although none of them come across as stark stereotyp s of each temperament, the 
early modern audience would have readily recognized th  humoral foundations of the top 
characters.  For example, Cassius is choleric;  Burton's description of that type fits 
Shakespeare's description of the conspiracy's instigator extremely well: 
 [Cholerics] are bold and impudent, and of a more hairbrain disposition, apt to 
 quarrel and think of such things, battles, combats, and their manhood; furious, 
 impatient in discourse, stiff, irrefragable and prodigious in their tenents; and if 
 they be moved, most violent, outrageous, ready to disgrace, provoke any, to kill 
 themselves and others.7 
Caesar calls him a "great observer" who looks for hidden motives and machinations in 
the men he meets (1.2.201-2).  Known for his “hasty spark” (4.3.111), Cassius' penchant 
for violence is amply demonstrated in the play.  Like the dog that bites when it is afraid,   




five separate occasions, exhibiting his willingness not only to murder his enemies but 
also to kill himself.8  Cassius is Antony's opposite, for he "loves no plays" and "hears no 
music" and only smiles to "mock" (1.2.202-5).  He appears "lean," "hungry" (1.2.193) 
and "spare" (1.2.200).  Caesar believes Cassius's choleric nature is dangerous: 
 Let me have men about me that are fat; 
 Sleek-headed men and such as sleep o' nights: 
 Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look; 
 He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.  (1.2.191-4)9 
Caesar, himself a keen observer, labels Cassius' nature rightly:  "Such men as he be never 
at heart's ease / Whiles they behold a greater than themselves" (1.2.207-8).  Fear of being 
the lesser man provokes him into a state of humoral imbalance. 
 Figure 3 – Dominant Complexions of Main Characters in Julius Caesar  











































 A man of “rash humour” (4.3.119), Cassius’ emotions, especially fear, drive him 
forward with little regard for reason.  Unlike Brutus, who is often “with himself at war” 
(1.2.46) over choosing the best course of action, Cassius commits himself wholly to 
enterprises based on his gut instinct, allowing ration l explanations—if there are any—to 
reveal themselves along the way.  Brutus chides him for being “yoked with a lamb / That 
carries anger” (4.3.109-110), a bizarre image that  ironically illustrates Cassius’ 
mutability, a "hairbrain disposition."  Though he dmonstrates a rapid ability to change 
his mind—especially where Brutus’ council is concerned10—he wastes no time on 
second-guessing his actions;  he simply adapts to the new course.  Cassius, a practical 
man, and Brutus, an intellectual idealist, are often at odds due to the inherent 
incompatibility of their two complexions. 
 Brutus does not follow the text book outline of a melancholic put forth by Robert 
Burton, but his overall complexion tends to fall in that category.  He leans towards the 
"sad and solitary," is "suspicious" and "fearful," and labors under "corrupt 
imaginations."11  He himself states that he is not "gamesome" (1.2.28) or "quick 
spirit[ed]" (1.2.29) like Antony, but tends to lower "sad brows" (2.1.307).  Like a typical 
melancholic who prefers solitude, Brutus attempts to leave Cassius' company without 
even finishing their initial conversation about theroublesome state of Caesar's increasing 
power (1.2.31).  He is impatient with Cassius' Machi vellian asides and just wants him to 
get to the point: 
 But wherefore do you hold me here so long? 




Naturally cold natured and sober, Brutus finds Cassius' excitable and aggressive 
tendencies to be irritating when he himself is already troubled.  He reveals his disquiet 
with the political atmosphere by becoming more and more introspective, another typical 
characteristic of the melancholic.  Like Othello's jealousy, Brutus' fear is augmented by 
his overactive imagination.  Whereas Cassius sees prsonal slights impinging on his 
honor at every turn, Brutus worries about the state of Rome and the sanctity of the 
republican ideal. 
 Brutus' preoccupation with matters of state causes him to retreat from "the world" 
(1.2.306) to analyze the problems rationally and soberly.  He sequesters himself from 
others by "veil[ing] his look" (1.2.37), even from his friends: 
    Vexed I am 
 Of late with passions of some difference, 
 Conceptions only proper to myself, 
 Which give some soil perhaps to my behaviors; 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
      poor Brutus, with himself at war, 
 Forgets the shows of love to other men.  (1.2.39-42, 46-7) 
Here he explicitly identifies his state of humoral imbalance.  The internal struggle 
between his "love" (1.2.82) for Caesar and his "fear  (1.2.79) of Caesar becoming king 
changes his normally loving behavior to his friends such as Cassius.  The "war" he 
alludes to is similar to Othello's initial struggle with jealousy: just as the Moor believes 
that his wife is honest and yet she may not be, so Brutus feels Caesar is a good leader but 




(1.2.166) the "war" from the plains of Brutus' mind i to the open forum of the senate.  
 Embodying the unsociable aspect of the melancholic, Brutus also forgets to show 
signs of affection to his wife, Portia.  Noting her husband's "impatience" (2.1.247), Portia 
diagnoses her husband's condition as a "sick offence within [his] mind" (2.1.267) rather 
than a simple "effect of humour" (2.1.249), alluding to the seriousness of his imbalance.  
Brutus' natural inclination towards the melancholic has been augmented by 
environmental factors—Caesar's potential coronation, Cassius' burgeoning conspiracy, 
and even the "civil strife of heaven" (1.3.11) —throwing him into a state of plethora 
characterized by his inability to "eat," "sleep," or "talk" (2.1.251).12  In fact, he is so 
transformed by his advancing melancholy, Portia claims she barely recognizes him as her 
husband (2.1.252-4).  Fearful of what may come if Caesar is crowned, Brutus is driven to 
act by both his humoral imbalance and the circumstances that augment that fear. 
 Cassius, too, knows that Brutus lives too much in is mind.  He admonishes his 
co-conspirator to moderate his ruminations to include only that which is helpful: 
 Of your philosophy you make no use 
 If you give place to accidental evils. (4.3.143-4) 
As a scholar, Brutus would naturally have a melancholi  disposition.13  Burton describes 
those of scholarly bent to be particularly susceptible to the deleterious effects of over-
contemplation, a condition that "dries the brain and extinguishes the natural heat" of the 
body.14  Already cold-natured, someone of a melancholic complexion is vulnerable to 




  whilst the spirits are intent to meditation above in the head, the stomach and liver 
 are left destitute, and thence come black blood and crudities by defect of 
 concoction, and for want of exercise the superfluous vapours cannot exhale[.]15 
Brutus, unable to eat, sleep, or vent his emotions, e ds up with a humoral system thrown 
into disarray.  He recognizes his own problem when  blames his sleeplessness on the 
"hideous dream" (2.1.65) that his life has become now that he has decided to join the 
conspiracy to murder Caesar.  Likening his body to that of the "kingdom" (2.1.68), 
Brutus labels the conflict between his soul, the "gnius" (66), and his humoral body and 
embodied mind ("the mortal instruments" (2.1.66)) as akin to an "insurrection" (2.1.69).  
He concludes that the only way to re-establish order in both his internal humoral state and 
the external political one is to purge the plethoric excess created by Caesar's ambition.  
Taking on the role of phlebotomist, Brutus prescribes a purgation for Caesar who "must 
bleed" (2.1.170) to restore the political state, and consequently Brutus' health, to 
balance.16 
 Mutability characterizes not only the commoners introduced in the very first 
scene of the play—whose "basest mettle be [easily] moved" (1.1.61)—but Brutus, 
Cassius, and the other conspirators as well.  Meanwhile, Caesar’s grandiose proclamation 
that he is as “constant as the northern star,” “true-fixed” in his course of action, not to be 
“moved” (3.1.58-61) by prayers or flattery, confirms his arrogance but also sets him as a 
foil for the rest of the agents in the play.  Shakespeare gives many examples of people 
being swayed from their original courses of action by emotional contagion which often 
enters the ear through well-placed pathetic appeals.  Caesar, who does not allow “his 




humorally balanced person in the story.  His temperam nt varies according to the 
appropriate response to external factors:  sanguine with his friends and wife when all is 
perceived to be well, choleric when he rejects those he believes to be enemies, and 
melancholic when considering possible treachery or failure.  Rather than mutability, this 
adaptability speaks to the complex nature of Caesar's complexion, one containing a 
balance of the humors and the positive qualities associated with them.  This is not to say 
that Caesar has no weaknesses, it only means that he does not exhibit the humoral 
extremism of Cassius, Brutus, or even Antony. 
 Caesar's relationship to fear is the one place his humoral balance fails him.  
Seeing fear only in terms of vulnerability, Caesar rejects that emotion completely.  Gail 
Kern Paster says that Caesar, "except for the physical reports of his frailty, is vulnerable 
neither physically nor emotionally."  She sees Cassius' rhetorical attacks on Caesar as the 
"attempt to make Caesar seem more womanly in order to assume a greater manliness in 
himself and the other conspirators."17   Paster has honed in one of the ways Cassius and 
the other conspirators like Caska try to verbally demean Caesar prior to the assassination 
by telling stories of his real and imagined vulnerabilities.  But, physically, Caesar is 
vulnerable:  he has epilepsy, "the falling sickness" (1.2.253), and is deaf in his left ear 
(1.2.212).18  His wife is "barren" (1.2.8) and with no direct heir, he cannot ensure a 
succession based on his blood.  A healthy dose of far, as a means of self-preservation, 
would serve this Caesar better than the blind courage he affects. 
 Emotionally, Caesar is as subject to passion as everyone else; his humoral balance 
does not negate the natural flow of feelings prompted by events.  The "angry spot dost 




and his subsequent epileptic fit (1.2.220-252).   He is so overcome by disgust at the 
heckling of the crowd, that he entertains a choleric pisode: 
 When he perceived the 
 common herd was glad he refused the crown, he 
 plucked me ope his doublet and offered them his 
 throat to cut . . .  (1.2.262-5) 
Caesar differs from the other agents in that he always returns to a place of balance.  For 
example, Cassius’ choleric output continues to grow throughout the play; he never 
reaches a place of humoral stability.  In contrast, Caesar may be briefly inflamed with an 
emotion, only to shrug it off through rational contemplation.  Ironically, it is Caesar's 
rationality that leads to his downfall; unable to place faith in augurers, soothsayers, or 
dreams, he makes the fatal mistake of attending the senate on the Ides of March.  His 
intellectual rejection of the trappings of fear—even as he incongruously seems most 
afraid of appearing afraid—helps lead to his destruction. 
Environmental Influences on Humoral Balance 
This body therefore, which indeede is but the Sepulchre of that God at first created, [. . .] is it but infirme 
and weakely  defended [. . . ]for to death and disea s we lie open on euery side. The world is a Sea, 
the accidents and diuers occurrents in it are waues, wherein this small Bark is tossed and beaten vp and 
downe, and there is betwixt vs and our dissolution, not an inch boord, but a tender skinne, which the 
slenderest violence euen the cold aire is able to slice through.      
      ~ Helkiah Crooke,  Mikrokosmographia (1615) 
 
 When Cassius embraces the "tempest dropping fire" (1.3.10), it is because he 
interprets the environmental chaos as the natural world's endorsement of his plan to 
murder Caesar: 
          For now this fearful night 




 And the complexion of the element 
 In favour's like the work we have in hand, 
 Most bloody, fiery and most terrible.    (1.3.126-30) 
Perhaps this sounds far-fetched to a modern reader, but an early modern audience 
immersed in a culture reliant on Galenic humoral theory would understand that the 
natural porosity of an individual's humoral system makes it subject to external 
environmental factors.  Whereas the complexion is inate and specific to each person, 
environmental phenomena can have widespread influence o  both microcosmic and 
macrocosmic levels.  Anything from the change of seasons to the advent of a new 
weather pattern can produce humoral change in the surrounding populace.  On a smaller 
scale, a single person's living space or occupation can have a profound effect on his 
humoral balance.  Gail Kern Paster writes that early modern passions were “fully 
embedded in the order of nature and were part of material being itself.”19  The human 
body, as a microcosm of the larger world, suffers from buffets and chills and warmth and 
growth just like the rest of the natural world.  The passions are the vehicle for this 
experiential phenomenon;  Paster further explains: 
 The passions operated upon the body very much as strong movements of wind 
 and water operate upon the natural world: they were the body’s internal climate of 
 mood and temper, inward motions carried to the sentient flesh by the animal 
 spirits.20 
In fact, wind and water are not just metaphors in humoral macrocosmic relations—both 
of these natural processes have a direct influence o  the human body by impacting the 




 Henry Cornelius Agrippa, a sixteenth century naturl philosopher writes that a 
person's humors vary even 
 according to the course of time and season of the yer , according to the quality of 
 ye ayre enclosing vs, accordinge to ye condition of the place where we dwel, and 
 according to the nature of ech age, they are encreased or dimynished.21 
In Julius Caesar, the "nature of [the] age" is a "strange-disposed time" (1.3.33) where the 
"disturbed sky" (1.3.39) roils with signs and portents as well as thunder, lightning, and 
hailstones.  The Paracelsian saying, "as above, so below," summarizes this idea of 
universal correspondence—with no clear beginning or end, the relationship between 
macrocosm and microcosm is one of reciprocal influece.22  The storm itself is at once a 
product of the state of imbalance swirling through Rome and a instigator of further 
turbulent action.  Depending on the natural inclination of the observer, the storm is 
interpreted both ways.  
 In her work on the psychophysiological aspects of Renaissance cursing, Rebecca 
Totaro emphasizes the relationship between human action and cosmic environmental 
forces: 
 Subject to [meteorological] influence, human bodies largely conformed to the 
 rules governing all sublunary bodies.  Their emission , from sighs to curses, were 
 the very meteors of the body [. . . ].23 
Harkening back to Aristotle’s work Meteorology, the Galenic theory of Shakespeare’s 
day accepted that disturbances in the natural realm—storms, earthquakes, lightening, 
comets, tornadoes, etc.—were evidence of disruption to the four elements composing all 




moderns’] own bodies,” many Renaissance thinkers saw a direct correspondence between 
observable alterations in the environment and humoral bodies of people within the 
environment.24  So one explanation for the storm—the one that best suits Cassius—is that 
the "strange impatience of the heavens" (1.3.70) is a product of Caesar's corrupted 
governance: 
 But if you would consider the true cause 
 Why all these fires, why all these gliding ghosts, 
 Why birds and beasts, from quality and kind, 
 Why old men, fools, and children calculate, 
 Why all these things change from their ordinance 
 Their natures and preformed faculties 
 To monstrous quality, why, you shall find 
 That heaven hath infused them with these spirits 
 To make them instruments of fear and warning 
 Unto some monstrous state.   (1.3.62-71) 
The monstrosity that Cassius believes the heavens ar  reflecting is Caesar himself 
"prodigious grown" (1.3.77), a man who "in personal action" (1.3.77) causes his subjects 
to be "fearful" (1.3.78).  Cassius uses the tempest in a motivational way.  His seduction of 
Caska is made even easier when he directs the other man's attention to the hypothetical 
correspondences between Caesar and the power and horror of the storm, predicting that 
the storm is a "pleasing" (1.3.43) development since they are "honest men" (1.3.43).   
 On the other hand, the storm that troubles Rome the night before Caesar's 




combines the extremes of the natural and supernatural realms.  "Horrid sights" (2.2.16) 
including the walking dead, people on fire, and portentous animals add to the already 
monumental tempest that makes the very earth "unfirm" (1.3.4).  Confounded with 
frightening dreams that reinforce her interpretation, Calphurnia reads the storm as a direct 
warning for her husband: 
 When beggars die there are no comets seen; 
 The heavens themselves blaze forth the death of princes.  (2.2.30-1) 
William Spates reinforces the idea that the combinatio  of these environmental 
symptoms as not only a reflection of the political upheaval in Rome, but also as a spark 
that spurs the human agents on: 
 Scholars often note that these meteorological and astrological events foreshadow 
 the human tragedy of the play, but it would be more correct to say that they 
 instigate it.  Calpurnia reads the meteor shower and red rain as symptoms of 
 cosmic disorder that will, in turn, wreak havoc on human lives.25 
Caska, too, believes the storm and all the strange "prodigies" (1.3.28) that he has seen 
that night cannot simply be "natural" (1.3.30);  instead, he sees them as "portentous 
things / Unto the climate that they point upon" (1.3.31-2), though he does not initially 
assign an anti-Caesarean slant to signs in the storm.  Cicero alone resists the desire to 
assign meaning to the storm, cautioning that men often misconstrue things according to 
their own personal "fashion" (1.3.34), rather than reading the true meaning of the events 
or circumstances.  For the rhetorician, the storm is erely a "disturbed sky" (1.3.39), not 




 The storm is not the only environmental factor at work in Julius Caesar, although 
it is certainly the most evident.  Additionally, there are references to the air and its ability 
to effect the health of the individual.  Thomas Walkington, in The Optick Glasse of 
Humors (1607), makes the relationship between individual bodies and the elements 
explicit during his exploration of the affective ability of air: 
  The ayre [. . .] is the beeginning and ending of mans life: for when wee begin to 
 liue, wee are sayd to inspire, when we die, to expir : as the priuation of the aire 
 deprives vs of  our being, and the aire being purged and clensed from his pestilent 
 qualities causeth our well-beeing, so the infection of the aire, as in the 
 extinguishing of some blazing comet, the eructation of noysome vapours from the 
 bosome of the earth, the disastrous constellation or bad aspect of some maleuolent 
 planet, the vamping fumes that the Sun eleuates from boggs and fennish grounds, 
 the inflammation of the ayre by the intense heate of the sunne, [. . . ] this infection 
 causeth our bodyes first to bee badly qualified, an  t inted with a spice of 
 corruption, and so by consequent our very soules to be ill affected.27 
Air, the element and substance that surrounds every li ing being, is itself subject to 
contagion from the surrounding world.  Portia, chiding Brutus for his melancholic 
behavior prior to the assassination, alludes to this type of aerial contagion: 
     is it physical 
 To walk unbraced and suck up the humours 
 Of the dank morning? What, is Brutus sick? 
 And will he steal out of his wholesome bed 




 And tempt the rheumy and unpurged air 
 To add unto his sickness?                         (2.1.260-6) 
Here, the air itself is "sick" with the noxious vapors attributed to the night.  According to 
Renaissance natural philosophy, there are myriad ways for the air to become polluted: 
comets, earthly eruptions, solar heating of swamps, and humidity to name those listed by 
Walkington.  And once the air is tainted, it enters into the porous human body, first 
causing physical distress through humoral alteration, hat in turn "ill affect[s]" a person's 
very soul.  A similar analysis can be done for each of the remaining elements:  polluted 
water, corrupt earth, and unbalanced fire (solar flares, volcanoes, etc.) all have the power 
to influence corporal bodies subject to their affects.28  In Julius Caesar, the protagonists 
ultimately cannot escape the environmental influences that surround them.  Like Caesar 
and Cicero, they may choose rationally to ignore the potential consequences of 
environmental contagion, but they are still susceptible o the elements and, in the case of 
the "unaccustomed terror" (2.1.198) of the storm, the fear that permeates the Roman state. 
Fear's Contagious Affect 
Fear [. . .] is an inconstant Sadness, which has alo arisen from the image of a doubtful thing.   
         ~  Baruch Spinoza 
 
The only thing we have to fear is fear itself . . .  ~  Franklin D. Roosevelt, “First Inaugural Address,” 
1933. 
 
 In Julius Caesar fear is contagious.  It migrates from person to person, 
manifesting itself in different forms, yet it stems from the same source—apprehension 
about an uncertain future.  Fear travels on several diverse paths: direct observation of 
awe-inspiring events, aural excitement through gossip and rumor, and phantasms of the 
imagination.  The fear of what Caesar may do to the Roman republic unites Brutus and 




sure Brutus has the resolve to complete their mission, Brutus fears Cassius will turn the 
"sacrifice" of Caesar into a bloodbath, Calphurnia and Portia both fear for the safety of 
their respective husbands, and the plebeians fear th  consequences of the assassination 
itself.  The play serves as a cautionary tale against rash action in the face of fearful 
motivation for, in each instance, Shakespeare illustrates that action inspired solely by fear 
ultimately ends in tragedy; conversely, Julius Caesar also demonstrates that the absence 
of informed fear is just as destructive: Brutus dismisses Antony as unworthy of fear and 
Caesar rejects all fear, even when it operates as a sy tem of warning.   
 Fear and its close relations, alarm, terror and drea , far outweigh the influence of 
any other emotions described in the play.29  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
fear is the "emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by a sense of impending danger, or by 
the prospect of some possible evil."  Fear relies on the sense, not the certainty, of things 
that may occur, sometime in the future.  Thomas Wright warned about the power of fear 
in his Passions of the Mind in General (1604): 
 To dread something is to anticipate the outcome of a future event and believe it to 
 be horrible or painful.  Fear is a flight of a probable evil imminent; wherefore two 
 things  must be proved and amplified to enforce fear:  first, that the evil is great; 
 secondly, that it is very likely to happen.  The excess of the evil may be gathered 
 out of the precedent discourses;  the likelihood, probability, or certainty we draw 
 from sundry circumstances, as from our adversaries’ malice and hatred against us, 
 their craft and deceit, their former manner of proceeding;  whereupon we may 
 annex the impossibility or extreme difficulties to avoid it, as their might and our 




 implacable hatred against us, knowledge and foresight how to overcome us, 
 power and means to put in execution potent malice nd hatred, what wicked effect 
 may not follow?30 
For the agents in Julian Rome, both of Wright's requirements—immediacy and extremity 
of the threat—are proved not by deed, but through extrapolation.  Envisioning the future, 
Cassius, Brutus, and their fellow conspirators judge that Caesar's coronation is 
"imminent."  Shakespeare's descriptions of what might happen seem deliberately 
ambiguous.  Caesar refuses the mock crown thrice; might he reject the real thing if 
offered by the senate?  Caesar's great "evil" and ambition, redundantly stressed by the 
conspirators, is conspicuously missing when the same ssassins come to collect him and 
he declares they will all "taste some wine" together before leaving for the capital.  And 
when Artemidorus thrusts a letter of warning upon Caesar and stresses that it "touches 
Caesar nearer" (3.1.7) than all the other petitions he is receiving, Caesar declares that 
matters concerning himself personally will have to wait until after state business.   
 Fear, the foundation for action in Julius Caesar, cannot exist without imagination, 
and the imagination has the ability to effect concrete change in bodies and minds, 
especially when it is itself corrupted by noxious humors or malevolent spirits.  
Reservations about the faculty of imagination expressed by early modern philosophers 
and physicians often hinged on its vulnerability to outside forces.  When channeled for 
creative works and solutions to problems, the imagin tion is lauded as a complementary 
faculty of reason, working hand in hand with "common sense" to analyze and respond to 
situations, past, future, and present.31  But when the imaginative faculty becomes 




 are so much affected, that with the very strength of imagination, fear, and the 
 devil's  craft, they pull those misfortunes they suspect, upon their own heads, and 
 that which they fear, shall come upon them.32 
This is exactly what happens to Brutus and Cassius:  the assassination they undertake to 
preserve the republic ultimately brings about the dictatorship they fear.  Because the 
future is indeterminate, the play suggests that menfind it necessary to construct an 
outline of what may come, and it is often their natures to assume the worst.  For example, 
Cassius recommends just this course of action to Brutus before the battle of Philippi: 
 Since the affairs of men rest still incertain, 
 Let’s reason with the worst that may befall. (5.1.95-6) 
Fear is the natural response to perceived calamity and it influences the outcome of events 
even by its presence.  “Mistrust of good success” (5.3.66), a function of the fearful 
imagination, leads Brutus as well as Cassius to their destructions.  As Cassius, Brutus, 
and company grasp for meaning, desperately searching all of the signs, portents, and 
auguries for a way to make sense of their hostile world, fear of what lies ahead spurs their 
actions.  If only, as Brutus so aptly wishes, “a man might know / The end of this day’s 
business ere it come” (5.1.122-3), then the fearful imagination might cease to hold sway.  
 Cassius' primary worry is that he may die an “underling” (1.2.140), complacently 
accepting what Flavius calls “servile fearfulness” (1.1.76).  His fears are not of death, but 
of dishonor and obscurity.  He chafes at the image of himself as “[a] wretched creature 
[who] must bend his body / If Caesar carelessly but nod on him” (1.2.117-8).  For 
Cassius, his fears do seem to have some basis in reality.  Though a "noble Roman, and 




regain his favor.  He knows that Caesar disdains him, avoids him, and astutely finds him 
“dangerous” (1.2.194), leaving him no hope of preferm nt under Julius’ regime.33  This 
leaves him with two choices:  resign himself to his greatest fear—a “dishonourable 
grave” (1.2.137)—or to find the means to “shake” (1.2.321) Caesar from his position of 
power, risking almost certain death in the process.  Knowing his faction will benefit 
greatly from Brutus' support, an endorsement that has t e power to transform their 
perceived offences into "virtue and [. . . ] worthiness" (1.3.160), Cassius sets out to 
seduce him to the conspiracy's cause by reinforcing Brutus' nascent fear of "the hard 
conditions as this time / Is like to lay upon [them]" (1.2.173-4).34  Fear begets more fear 
in a vicious, self-perpetuating cycle. 
 Cassius proves himself an effective orator, spreading the fearful contagion among 
his co-conspirators, innoculating them against Caesar's control by persuading them to be 
more afraid of Caesar's rule than the consequences of murdering him.  Even he seems 
surprised at how far he gets by riling his fellow Romans up with fear.  For example, he is 
astonished that his "weak words" provoke a "show / Of fire from Brutus" (1.2.175-6); 
given his sober and reserved complexion, the "fire" is a product of the fearful excitement 
moving Brutus to humoral excess.  And to convert Caska, Cassius merely has to retool 
the other Roman's perception of the "menac[ing] heavens" (1.3.44);  likening the 
frightening phenomena of the tempest to "instruments of fear and warning / Unto some 
monstrous state" (1.3.70-1), Cassius unfolds his plan to assassinate Caesar, a man "most 
like [that] dreadful night" (1.3.73).  The horror of the "strange eruptions" (1.3.78) in the 
natural world coupled with the deep ambivalence Caska feels for Caesar, easily moves 




 Brutus’ motivational fear stems from his increasing uneasiness with Caesar’s 
escalating power, clearly expressing his reservations during his initial exchange with 
Cassius: “I do fear the people / Choose Caesar for their king" (1.2.79-80).  Yet he finds 
“himself at war” over how to resolve his fear, having conflicting loyalties pulling him in 
disparate directions.  Described variously as “love[d]” by Caesar (Cassius, 1.2.312), 
“well-beloved” and “Caesar’s angel” (Antony, 3.2.174-80), Brutus has some influence 
over matters of state.  As a republican, he also holds sway with the commoners: “he sits 
high in all the people’s hearts” (1.3.157) reports Caska, urging Cassius to finalize his 
membership in their faction.  Further, Brutus belongs to the family of one of Caesar’s 
most outspoken enemies, Marcus Porcius Cato, both through blood (Cato was his uncle) 
and by marrying Portia, his daughter (2.1.294).  Last, Brutus sees Caesar not only as a 
potential tyrant, but as his “best lover” (3.2.45), a man that he loves and honors (3.2.21-
6).  All of these considerations weigh on Brutus’ mind, causing him to be “vexed [. . .] 
with passions of some difference” (1.2.39-40).   
 Although Brutus later credits Cassius with “whet[ting him] against Caesar”  
(2.1.61), he has already considered many of the points in Cassius diatribe, telling his co-
conspirator that he has “thought of this and these tim s” (1.2.163) as part of those 
“passions of some difference” that plague him.  He independently has “some aim” 
(1.2.162) toward preventing Caesar’s coronation, and Cassius delivers him the means.  
The final incentive, that spur prompting Brutus towards action instead of rumination, is 
based on fear of what may happen if Caesar becomes king. Using a combination of 
flattery, imaginative suggestion, and personal anecdote, Cassius paints a bleak political 




temper” (1.2.129) who seeks to “bear the palm alone” (1.2.131) despite his "girl[ish]" 
(1.2.128) weaknesses.  Although Maddalena Pennacchia, citing the popular critical 
understanding that Caesar's vitality has been comprised by "feminine weakness," 
reads Caesar as "old, deaf, and conceited" man "whose R manness is now but a faint 
echo of past greatness," I believe the breadth of te conspiracy suggests a man who still 
wields great power.35  If not, then the fear exhibited by his opposition would be on a 
much smaller scale.   
 Brutus takes great pride in his status as a noble Roman, often referring to himself 
in such terms and addressing his peers in a similar fashion.  Watching Caesar have “new 
honours [. . .] heaped” (1.2.133) upon him repeatedly, Brutus, like Cassius, fears what 
will happen to his own honor.  Although he speaks of his high concern for the republic 
itself, Brutus also has his personal reputation on his mind:  
 Brutus had rather be a villager 
 Than to repute himself a son of Rome 
 Under these hard conditions as this time 
 Is like to lay upon us.  (I.ii.171-4) 
His dedication to his own honor is directly proporti nal to the fear he has of Caesar's 
advancement, for each new honor "heaped on Caesar" levates Caesar another degree 
above Brutus' own estimation.  Despite “lov[ing Caesar] well” (1.2.82), Brutus cannot 
envision the crowning of his friend yielding positive results.  His imagination runs to 
dread and distaste at the thought of further powers for Julius even as he admits he “has no 
personal cause to spurn at him” (2.1.11).  So, unlike Cassius, who clearly has a personal 




must convince himself that Caesar’s removal is for the “general good” (1.2.85) if he is to 
actively join with the anti-Caesarians. 
 Brutus’ reservations about Caesar’s power hinge on what “may” (2.1.17, 27, 28) 
happen when he gains additional authority, on what the “time / Is like to lay” upon the 
country.36  An epitome of “the end justifies the means,” Brutus’ contention begins with 
declaring Caesar’s death and then works through the justifications.  In the bleak “It must 
be by his death” soliloquy, he bases all of his pro-assassination arguments on generalities 
and possibilities, concluding that a pre-emptive strike is necessary if they are to "kill [the 
serpent] in the shell" (2.1.34).  The facts he quotes about Caesar’s previous behavior 
paradoxically undermine his main argument; for example, Brutus admits that the 
conspirators’ “quarrel / Will bear no colour for the thing [Caesar] is” (2.1.28-9).  When 
he argues that power often eclipses compassion and conscience, he cannot fault Julius’ 
present demeanor: 
   To speak truth of Caesar 
 I have not known when his affections swayed 
 More than his reason. (2.1.19-21) 
But is not the present that concerns Brutus, it is the imagined, fearful time to come where 
Caesar may become a tyrannical despot.  Interestingly, Brutus never gives specific details 
about what the "hard conditions" (1.2.173) will be if Caesar is crowned.  Instead, the 
dread of the possibility has eclipsed the elements of he actuality.  So, Brutus commits 
himself to “fashion[ing]” (2.1.30) Caesar’s future in both words and blood. 
 Robert Burton cautions that fear easily takes preced nce over reason and 




danger, hence aiding in the preservation of life and limb, fear is the most potent of the 
passions.  But like any other, a plethora of fear lds to dire consequences.  Burton likens 
extreme fear to demonic possession: 
 Fear makes our imagination conceive what it list, invites the devil to come to us, 
 [. . .]  and tyranniseth over our phantasy more than all other affections.37 
Brutus, committed to the conspirators’ deadly course of action, and arguably even taking 
over leadership from Cassius, describes this internal battle between reason and 
imagination prompted by his own fearful initiative: 
 Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
 And the first motion, all the interim is 
 Like a phantasma or a hideous dream: 
 The genius and the mortal instruments 
 Are then in council, and the state of man, 
 Like to a little kingdom, suffers then 
 The nature of an insurrection.  (II.i.63-9) 
His imagination won’t rest even after he has decided on a course of action.  Haunting him 
in the form of “phantasma[s]” and “dream[s],” his own conscience pricks him with 
questions.  Like Cassius, Brutus is impatient to see th  outcome of their venture.  It is 
unclear which aspect of himself—the immortal, soul-like “genius,” or the “mortal 
instruments” of mind and body—argues against Caesar’s death.  Regardless of the 
scenario, Brutus, in likening his internal wranglin to that of the larger state, predicts the 
civil “insurrection” that will result due to his actions.  By killing Caesar, Brutus ruptures 




the end, fear of Caesar's "high-sighted tyranny" (2.1.117) outweighs honor, love, respect 
and loyalty, perpetrating the downfall of both Caesar and Brutus. 
 Julius Caesar alone seems impervious to the fear permeating his kingdom, yet his 
very lack of anxiety ultimately leads to his downfall.  Arrogance may account for part of 
this absence of fear, but not the entirety.  Rather, is fatalistic philosophy prohibits him to 
be frightened of that which he cannot control.  In the same vein as the Stoics, Caesar is 
not denying death and pain—he simply accepts the inevitability of such things: 
 Cowards die many times before their deaths; 
 The valiant never taste of death but once. 
 Of all the wonders that I yet have heard. 
 It seems to me most strange that men should fear; 
 Seeing that death, a necessary end, 
 Will come when it will come.  (2.2.32-7) 
The polar opposite of both Cassius and Brutus, Caesar channels his imagination away 
from worries of the future into solving problems in the present.  Always aware of his 
reputation as man of "reason" (2.1.21), he dismisses th  soothsayer as a “dreamer” 
(1.2.24) and, even though they are in his employ, he ignores the augurers’ advice to 
remain at home on the Ides of March (2.2.41-4).38  Julius, the man, may know fear, but 
his public persona of Caesar cannot afford to acknowledge that “coward[ly]” emotion.  
His deliberate dismissal of all the warnings reinforces his fatalistic stance that nothing 
“can be avoided / Whose end is purposed by the mighty gods” (2.2.26-7). 
 As a counterpoint to Brutus’ over-reaction to the possibility of negative 




aptitude for failure.  Hamlet's query regarding right action in the face of uncertainty 
illustrates this problem of forced dichotomies: 
 Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer 
 The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune 
 Or to take arms against a sea of troubles 
 And by opposing end them  (Hamlet, 3.1.56-9) 
Shakespeare's tragic heroes seem unable to find the via media, a compromise between the 
extremities of action.  For example, given Caesar's political aspirations and position, a 
degree of caution is logically warranted.  His sweeping disregard for anything that hints 
at fear has fatal consequences.  His political savviness is in direct opposition to his 
complete lack of concern for personal safety.  On the one hand, he reads Cassius’ motives 
perfectly: 
 Such men as he be never at heart's ease 
 Whiles they behold a greater than themselves, 
 And therefore are they very dangerous.  (1.2.207-9) 
Yet after explaining the reasons that one should fear Cassius, Caesar double-backs and 
staunchly denies that he is in any way afraid of Cassius, asserting that he only mentions 
what others “liable to fear” (1.2.198) should avoid.  As Calphurnia diagnoses, his 
“wisdom is consumed in confidence” (2.2.49); he “will not” (2.2.64) back down in the 
face of danger because he perceives his role as Caesar to require him to be “[u]nshaked of 
motion” (3.1.70).  By embracing the larger-than-life aspect of his title, Caesar holds 
himself to a standard that cannot allow prophets, wives, dreams, or priests to dictate his 




 Caesar, despite his denials, does experience a specie  of fear—he is afraid of 
appearing afraid.  His reputation, that "immortal part" (Othello, 2.3.259) of himself, is 
vulnerable to the malicious rumor mill threading its way through the capital.  To bolster 
his image and remain a strong leader, Caesar must control reports regarding his valor by 
never appearing afraid.  It is this fear of fear which pushes him to be "consumed in 
confidence": 
 Caesar should be a beast without a heart, 
 If he should stay at home to-day for fear.   (2.2.42-3) 
Even as he works to eliminate every possible sign of alarm from his actions, he exposes 
himself to a new, insidious fear – perceived failure o  cowardice.  Caesar’s 
“constant[cy]” (3.1.60) shows signs of wavering only when his wife begs, on her knees, 
for him to remain at home (2.2.50-4).  His love for her briefly overcomes his need to 
appear in control and fearless to the senate, but Decius Brutus, a conspirator, reconstructs 
the meaning of Calphurnia’s portentous dream into “a vision, fair and fortunate” (2.2.84), 
making Caesar regret his brief lapse into caution:  
 How foolish do your fears seem now, Calphurnia! 
 I am ashamed I did yield to them. 
 Give me my robe, for I will go.  (2.2.105-7) 
Decius further reinforces Caesar’s change of heart by subtly challenging his masculinity, 
hinting that Senate will mock him for listening to his wife’s dreams and believe that he is 
afraid.  The man that claims to be "more dangerous" than "Danger" (2.2.44-5) itself, 




 Caesar sees everything in terms of the absolute, including his own identity: 
“always I am Caesar” (1.2.211).  He makes no allowances for the middle ground and 
judges others by his own standards, often finding them wanting.  From proffering his 
exposed throat to the mob to spurning the fears of his wife and closest advisers, Caesar 
strives to live up to the fearless image he means to project.  Caesar hubristically 
eliminates any need for caution on his part, arrogantly assuming he can face down any 
enemy that presents himself: 
 Caesar shall forth.  The things that threatened me 
 Ne'er looked but on my back: when they shall see 
 The face of Caesar, they are vanished.  (2.2.10-12) 
And this is a grave mistake: the “things” that threaten him now cannot be dismissed so 
easily and they will not look him in the face as they pull him down.  As Antony later 
relates, Caska strikes Caesar in the neck from behind (V.i.43-4), not giving Caesar the 
chance to face him down, and, as the conspirators all take a stab at him, his “mantle 
muffl[es] up his face” (III.ii.185).  Caesar, literally, never sees it coming.  His 
commitment to candid dealing clouds his judgment of the machinations of other men, 
most especially those of Brutus.  Caesar's stubborn refusal to see caution as a prudent 
measure rather than the admission of fear ultimately leads to his destruction. 
 As the “gamesome” and “quick spirit[ed]” (1.2.28-9) follower of Caesar, Antony 
alone, of all the main protagonists, remains blissfully unaware of the fatal atmosphere 
hovering over Rome until Caesar is brutally assassin ted.  His thoroughly sanguine 
complexion and habits seem to render him immune to the pervasive climate of fear 




Cassius, wrongly assuring him that the conspirator is “not dangerous,” asserting that he is 
a “noble [. . .], well given” Roman (1.2.195-6).  When Cassius campaigns for "Antony 
and Caesar [to] fall together" (2.1.160), Trebonius erroneously characterizes Antony as 
harmless and good only for reveling: 
 There is no fear in him; let him not die; 
 For he will live, and laugh at this hereafter.  (21.189-90) 
The truth of the statement lies in the other meaning of "no fear in him"—Antony only 
uses the word fear twice to refer to his own feelings, and each time t denotes a very 
different state of being from the apprehension exhibited by the conspirators.  After 
Caesar's murder, Antony admits to fear in his letter requesting an audience with the 
faction:  
 Say I love Brutus and I honour him. 
 Say I feared Caesar, honoured him and loved him.  (3.1.128-9) 
By stating that he "feared" Caesar after omitting the same emotion towards Brutus, 
Antony declares that he does not fear Brutus, the faction, or death.  It also imparts a god-
like quality to Caesar, since one ancillary meaning of fear is to hold in awe or high 
regard.39  Antony's other use of fear is ironic: 
 I fear I wrong the honourable men 
 Whose daggers have stabbed Caesar; I do fear it.  (3.2 152-3) 
There truly is "no fear" in Antony here.  He lives on to avenge his friend and leader, and 
his sarcastic approbation of the fear the conspirators use to excuse the murder is merely 
one small step in that direction. 
The Failure of Reason 
O judgment! thou art fled to brutish beasts, 





 As fear dominates the Roman populace, reason deserts.  With the exception of 
Antony and Cicero, all of the dominant protagonists ba e their actions on their 
relationship to fear.  Donald R. Wehrs, citing the inherent problem with passionate 
excess, reminds us that Renaissance humanism stresse  the need for balance between a 
person's emotional and rational beings:  
 [R]eason and emotion presuppose and enrich one another, that habitual practices 
 modify states of being, and that moral deliberation hinges upon a cultivated, 
 continuous interplay of right feeling and right thinking.40 
Without harmony between "right feeling and right thinking," Brutus, Cassius, and Caesar 
are each lost in a tragedy of their own making.  Reason, based on the concept of truth, 
depends on reliable input.  Surrounded by fear-inducing physical, humoral, mental, and 
supernatural stimuli, this tragic trio inevitably sways from a harmonious course.  Fear and 
uncertainty force the characters to make decisions based on truths perceived through 
clouded lenses and faulty ears.41  
 Peter de la Primaudaye, writing in 1594, cites the failure of perception as the 
cause of all imbalance:   
 For all great, violent, and turbulent motions proceede of ignoraunce and 
 inconsideratenesse, or through a false perswasion, which maketh vs to thinke, that 
 the Good or Euill is greater then indeede it is.  And this commeth for want of 
 experience, which beeing as it were a darke cloude an  mist before the eyes of our 
 minde, doe greatly trouble it:  insomuch that we ayme not at that certaine Good, 
 after which wee ought to seeke, but contrariwise we propounde to our selues 




 them, which we change and rechange from houre to houre, very inconstantly, 
 according to places, times and occasions, whereby it is  euident that there is 
 no stayednesse in vs.42 
Brutus suffers this kind of rational failure almost systematically.  He exhibits ignorance 
of human nature and a fatal misjudgment of people's capabilities and motives.  He 
accepts Cassius' "false perswasion" at face value, ugmenting his own fear of Caesar's 
ambition, an evil that may not have been as great as the conspirators portrayed it.  He 
dismisses both Caska and Antony out of hand, but then "inconstantly" changes his mind 
about Caska's importance to their cause (he is given th  first stab at Caesar) while later 
embracing Antony as a friend in the aftermath of the assassination.  Ever the idealist, 
Brutus sees everything through "the eyes of [his] minde" and, since those lenses are 
"mist[y]," he fails to choose the right actions to bring about his rationalized goals. 
 Cassius, although he also has a "dark cloude" obscuring his judgment, his is 
induced by his choleric humoral constitution, not "ignoraunce" or lack of "experience."  
He uses his own personal grievances with Caesar to augment his political bias against 
him, and spinning his version of the truth for other Romans willing to listen.  He quite 
deliberately seduces Brutus to his cause, knowing that his "nob[ility]" (1.2.307) will be 
an asset to the faction once they remove Caesar: 
 Thy honourable metal may be wrought 
 From that it is disposed: therefore it is meet 
 That noble minds keep ever with their likes; 
 For who so firm that cannot be seduced? 




 If I were Brutus now and he were Cassius, 
 He should not humour me.  (1.2.308-14) 
Even Brutus, for all of his virtue, can be "wrought" from his natural inclination if given 
the right impetus.  Cassius observes that although Brutus' membership in the conspiracy 
is particularly good for the faction, it is not wise for Brutus;  if their positions were 
reversed, Cassius would not even entertain, or "humour," Brutus' stories.  Additionally, 
Cassius recognizes one of the most basic tenets of contagion—proximity is directly 
proportional to the likelihood of becoming diseased, or imbalanced.  In his treatise Of
Foolishnes of Men (1582), Johann Rivius concurs with Cassius' observation that "noble 
minds" should "keep ever with their likes."  Rivius identifies bad company as one certain 
way of compounding ignorance: 
 For it is behoouefull to marke what companie one vs th, and who are his dailie 
 companions. For, as by the familiaritie of wicked men, we are infected, as with a 
 certaine contagion: so by dailie acquaintance of the godlie and vertuous, we are in 
 manner corrected and amended.43 
The affects of one's fellow man move like a disease through a group.  Fear begets fear, in 
the case of the conspirators.  By joining with Cassius' group of murders and committing 
to “kill [Caesar] in the shell” (2.1.34), Brutus is contaminated by their contagion and 
allows imagination to eclipse his reason.  Although he attempts to retain his "honesty" 
and "nobility" even during the barbaric assassination, Brutus fails to understand that 
contamination is a two-way street:  just as his "virtue" and "worthiness" (1.3.160) may 




butchery and deplorable behavior of the faction may, in turn, tarnish Brutus' standing 
with those who followed Caesar. 
 The ease with which so many others in the play also misjudge or “misconstrue” 
(5.3.84) circumstances reinforces the vulnerability of rational thought.  Except for 
Caesar, who waxes eloquent on his signature constancy, the other main protagonists are 
characterized by what occurs when reason falters.  This is especially true of Brutus, who 
continues to compound the reasons Caesar had to die, shying away from the possibility 
that he has made a grave mistake.  Brutus believes the rhetoric he “fashion[s]” (2.1.30) to 
justify his actions, and what begins as a strategy o free Rome from the yoke of tyranny, 
becomes a series of errors that brings about his ruin. Susan James sheds some light on 
this trait: 
 Our investment in our existing emotional dispositins is sometimes stronger than 
 our attachment to rationality and more powerful than our ability to change, and 
 when this is the case, our emotional attachments can generate reasons for our 
 beliefs rather than the  other way round . . . .  [O]ur beliefs are submissive to our 
 emotions.44 
For Brutus, the truth manifests itself as Caesar’s ty annical ambition and Rome’s need for 
Brutus to “redress” this wrong as his “ancestors did” when “Tarquin [. . . ] was called a 
king” (2.1.53-4).  But this analogy seems inherently mistaken: Caesar is not ruled by his 
blood as the Tarquins were nor is his leadership as malignant to the welfare of the state.  
And certainly he has not committed a dishonorable rape to spur the kind of public outcry 
that required the exile of the Tarquins.  This lack does not really matter, however, 




admits as much to himself in his attempts to rationalize Caesar’s death: since what Caesar 
is cannot warrant his assassination, it must be “thatw t he is, augmented, / Would run to 
these and these extremities” (II.i.30-1).  The drea possibility of Caesar’s ambition, rather 
than the actuality, spurs Brutus to help murder his “best lover” (3.2.45).  As Patrick 
Hogan states, "Brutus condemns Caesar on what are, in effect, imaginary grounds."45  He 
places stock in the anonymous missives randomly thrus  into his notice because he wants 
to believe their contents.  He ignores the practical concerns that Cassius raises—most 
importantly the danger posed by Antony (2.1.155-188, 3.1.143-146, 3.1.231-243)—
because idealism clouds his judgment, preventing him from accepting anything outside 
the scope of his “honesty” (4.3.67).   
 Cassius, despite his “thick [. . .] sight” (5.3.21), sees the state of the “world” 
(2.1.306) more clearly that his friend Brutus.  A Machiavellian at heart, he establishes 
himself as a “great observer” who “looks / Quite through the deeds of men” (1.2.201-2).  
He wants to “shake” (1.2.321) Caesar, both for personal and political reasons, and 
shrewdly hunts the means to his end.  Cassius rejects the idealism that hampers Brutus, 
opting for practicality: 
 In such a times as this it is not meet 
 That every nice offence should bear his comment.  (4.3.7-8) 
Yet, despite his discernment, his “testy humour” (4.3. 6) often sways him from the path 
of reason.  Except for his initial “seduc[tion]” (1.2.311) of Brutus to the rebel cause, the 
elder Roman always gives ground to Brutus’ ideas, even when he disagrees.  Deferring 




Brutus' lack of adaptability and practicality lead to its downfall.  Even such lauded traits, 
when they are incorrectly applied, can cloud the judgment of men.   
 Sight, a recurring theme in the play, has a direct r lationship to the success or 
failure of reason.  Each of the main protagonists—Brutus, Cassius, Caesar, and Antony—
sees conditions differently leading up to the events of the assassination and into the 
ensuing civil war; there is no consensus, especially when emotional motives and 
supernatural events are involved.  Cicero’s cautionary words about perception illuminate 
the problem: 
         men may construe things after their fashion 
 Clean from the purpose of the things themselves.  (1.3.34-5) 
This "fashion[ing]" is directly related to the power of sight, whether it be through the 
actual physical mechanics of the eye or a product of the "eyes of [the] mindes" mentioned 
by Primaudaye.46  Sergei Lobanov-Rostovsky elaborates on early modern philosophers' 
and physicians' endowment the eye with more than the mechanical capability of sight: 
 The eye stands in for the mind in the perceiving cons iousness, then supplants it, 
 as the act of perception comes to define the self to itself.  Consciousness, 
 manifested as an act of self-conception—idea (from idein, "to see")—begins in 
 the act of visual perception.   Eye becomes "I," the self perched on the edge of the 
 body.47 
The ocular power, by way of metonymy, actually embodies a person's essential capacity 
for reason.  The eye "mediat[es] between world and spirit, flesh and soul," making it the 
essential organ for rational engagement with every level of human experience.48  But, 




disturbances in any of those realms, causing the sight, and consequently the power of 
reason, to wax and wane in efficacy. 
 The fundamentals of sight in Renaissance thought also explained the difficulties 
of knowing oneself.  When Cassius asks Brutus, "Can you see your face?" (1.2.51), he is 
exploring the relationship between self-knowledge and being able to see clearly one's 
own attributes.  Brutus takes him quite literally at first and replies that, "No, [. . .] the eye 
sees not itself, / But by reflection, by some other t ings" (1.2.52-3).  Philip Barrough, a 
Renaissance anatomist, covers this physical problem: 
 But the eye which is wont with curious inspection t  pry into all other things, and 
 to find  out the nature and order of them, hath bin unable to unfold his owne 
 wonderfull constitution, and hath bene alway blind i  judging of it selfe, and in 
 foreseeing the  discommodities which attend upon it, or in curing them, when they 
 have layed hold of it.49 
A corresponding difficulty can be extrapolated to individual powers of reason;  embedded 
in the physical body and subject to humoral, spiritual, and corporal agitations, the "eye" 
of rationality wavers according to each unique individual's experiences.  Additionally, the 
eye is vulnerable to "disease, deception, and the objectifying power of another's gaze."50  
Brutus never seems to recognize the danger of accepting others' visions of his attributes.  
Cassius, however, understands exactly how flattery works: 
 And since you know you cannot see yourself 
 So well as by reflection, I, your glass, 
 Will modestly discover to yourself 




If the eye cannot see itself, it has to rely on external reports of its qualities.  But the 
source of these reports must be reliable.  Like a cracked mirror, Cassius only reports 
splinters of Brutus' reflection. 
 Brutus, confident in his just and "honour[able]" (3.2.15) case against Caesar, 
believes that logos can change optical input if the audience is rationlly prepared.  
Responding to Antony's first sight of Caesar's bloody corpse, he tries to explain, in 
words, that spectacle is deceptive: 
  Though now we must appear bloody and cruel, 
 As by our hands and this our present act 
 You see we do, yet see you but our hands 
 And this the bleeding business they have done: 
 Our hearts you see not.  They are pitiful  (3.1.165-9) 
Brutus reasons that if everyone can "see" what is in the conspirators hearts, then they will 
be satisfied with the necessity of killing Caesar.  Unfortunately for Brutus, what everyone 
sees is a group of murderers "besmear[ing]" (3.1.107) themselves and their weapons with 
the blood of fallen Caesar, an act that seems to rightly represent the murder they had in 
the hearts when they committed the deed.  The emotional consequences of such a horrific 
spectacle cannot be discounted and the conspirators indulgence in the butchery Brutus 
originally warned against (2.1.161-79) is as reckless as it is reprehensible.  But perhaps 
Brutus' most disastrous failure of reason occurs when he declares Antony as "but a limb 
of Caesar" (2.1.165) who "can do no more than Caesar's arm / When Caesar's head is off" 
(2.1.182-3).  Not only can he not see beyond Antony's complexion and habits a “masquer 




Caesar.  Judging the other man's scope of dedication in the same terms as his own, Brutus 
sincerely believes that Antony, as well as rest of the populace, will see necessity of 
Caesar's removal.  Daniel Juan Gil believes this rat on l expectation fails because of its 
very rationality;  Antony's sanguine complexion and naturally "quick spirit" need more 
than a bit of political logic to pacify them: 
 [Antony] refuses to regard the assassination as a political act or a political 
 problem, and  his irrational commitment to loving Caesar produces a crisis (or 
 perhaps a breakthrough) in his experience of himself and others.51   
Wracked by the "savage spectacle" (3.1.323) of Caesar's murder, Antony is transformed 
into a violent avenger ready to accompany the "dogs of war" (3.1.273).  
Fear, Blood, and Mistakes 
  Stoop, Romans, stoop, 
And let us bathe our hands in Caesar's blood   ~ Shakespeare,  Julius Caesar  (3.1.105-6) 
 
 Brutus, aware that the faction’s strike against Caesar may be misinterpreted, 
cautions his co-conspirators against butchery before the murder: 
 Let us be sacrificers, but not butchers, Caius. 
 We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar; 
 And in the spirit of men there is no blood: 
 O, that we then could come by Caesar's spirit, 
 And not dismember Caesar! But, alas, 
 Caesar must bleed for it! And, gentle friends, 
 Let's kill him boldly, but not wrathfully; 
 Let's carve him as a dish fit for the gods, 




Brutus, the idealist, wishes to sanitize the assassin tion, couching it in terms of a godly 
sacrifice necessary for the “good of Rome” (3.2.45).  He recognizes Caesar’s split nature 
—Caesar, the would-be king, and Julius, the man—but thinks that to disable the 
ambitious spirit of the ruler, they must kill the man embodying it.  Unfortunately, neither 
he nor Cassius plan for a possible martyrdom.  For Cassius, the “great observer” 
(1.2.201), this is an inexcusable oversight.  For Brutus, his unshakeable trust in the 
justness of his actions prevents him from dwelling overmuch on the possibility that others 
will find the “sacrifice” abhorrent.  Just as Caesar’  “wisdom is consumed in confidence” 
(2.2.49), so, too, is Brutus’.  He believes that his rational arguments will sway any 
protesters over to their side, including Antony.  Donald R. Wehrs points to the failure of 
Brutus' "rhetorical obfuscation" as symptomatic of his continuing ignorance of  human 
nature:  
 Brutus disastrously underestimates the influence of personal passions an loyalties, 
 as when he imagines the "ingrafted love" Anthony bears to Caesar can be 
 overcome by presenting the conspirators as "purgers, not murderers," because he 
 imagines that  "bath[ing] our hands in Caesar's blood / Up to the elbows"  
 (3.1.106-7) can be viewed symbolically in ways that neutralize the natural 
 repulsion such a sight engenders.52 
The assassination of the would-be monarch is meant to be a grand action that will 
guarantee “Liberty, freedom and enfranchisement” (3.1.81);  instead, it becomes the 





 Cassius and Brutus, aware that the assassination is a historical turning point for 
Rome, arrogantly assume that they are the ones writing the history.  Still failing to attain 
a balanced mixture of "right feeling and right thinking," they wrongly believe that their 
rationale for Caesar's murder will win everyone over.  Always preoccupied with 
controlling the future, their corrupted faculty of imagination leads them to see “states 
unborn and accents unknown” reproducing their story of triumph over tyranny, 
remembering the faction as “men who gave their country liberty” (3.1.113-18).  Likening 
their base butchery to a "lofty scene" (3.1.112), Cassius and Brutus are blind to the 
alternate perceptions of their deed.  In this celebration of what they appear to achieve, 
Brutus and his fellows reach the height of their power, a height seriously undermined by 
the bloody means they use to reach it.53  The moment that Brutus disregards Caesar’s 
corpse signals the onset of their fall: 
 How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport 
 That now on Pompey’s basis lies along, 
 No worthier than the dust?  (3.1.114-16) 
Caught in a web of self-righteous justification, Brutus has emotionally removed himself 
from the scene.  Not only can he stand over the body of his “best lover” and look on it as 
just a carcass, so much “dust,” he goes so far as to joke with Caska that they have done 
Caesar a great service by abridging his days of “fearing death” (3.1.105).  Brutus' balance 
between emotion and rationality tips towards cold, unfeeling  facts, leaving him 
vulnerable to the unexpected emotional responses of others.  Antony, in contrast, allows 
his emotions to flow free, openly mourning the death of his friend even as he “flatter[s]” 




importance of Caesar’s body and the story it tells, and is willing to be “meek and gentle 
with [Caesar’s] butchers” (3.1.255) if it means he can win the right to speak “the order of 
his funeral” (3.1.230). 
 Brutus discovers the disparity between logos and pathos the hard way. The 
commoners he wishes to protect from Caesar’s supposed tyranny are fickle and do not 
subscribe to the same idealism that characterizes his “virtue” (1.3.160).  “[A]rmed so 
strong in honesty” (4.3.67), Brutus presents but one reason for Caesar’s removal – 
ambition.  He asks the public to believe him for his “honour” and their “respect of” that 
honor, but produces no hard evidence to support his thesis, just like he produces no clear 
vision of what disasters Caesar's coronation would have brought onto the state.  Brutus’ 
self-assurance that even “the son of Caesar [. . .]should be satisfied” (3.1.225-6) that the 
conspirators’ actions are just leads him into a false sense of security.  He believes so 
strongly in the cause himself that he never question  his ability to pacify the plebeians: 
 Only be patient till we have appeased 
 The multitude, beside themselves with fear, 
 And then we will deliver you the cause, 
 Why I, that did love Caesar when I struck him, 
 Have thus proceeded.   (III.i.179-83) 
Brutus' claim of love rings hollow to Antony whose own love for Caesar inspires his 
leadership of the counter-insurgency.  Just as Antony professes love to Brutus and the 
others when he pretends to join with the faction (3.1.128, 133, 189, 220), Brutus' vows of 




deliberately deceives the conspirators in order to exact his revenge; Brutus, however, 
only deceives himself. 
 Antony's naturally sanguine complexion mutates under the influx of rage, horror, 
and sorrow following the bloody murder of his friend.  No longer just a “masquer and 
reveller” (5.1.61) to be summarily dismissed, Antony transforms into an instrument of 
“Caesar’s spirit, ranging for revenge” (3.1.270).  What he lacks in the way of profound 
philosophical insight and high rhetorical training, he makes up for in emotional 
intelligence, tenacity, and calculation.  After theCaesarian supporters flee “amazed” 
(3.1.96) from the capital,  Antony alone returns to the murder scene to demand answers 
from the faction, desiring to know “Who else must be let blood” (3.1.152) and “reasons / 
Why and wherein Caesar was dangerous” (3.1.221-2).  Like Brutus who is prepared to 
die at his country’s request, Antony expresses his willingness to die by Caesar’s side: 
 I do beseech ye, if you do bear me hard, 
 Now, whilst your purple hands do reek and smoke, 
 Fulfil your pleasure.  Live a thousand years, 
 I shall not find myself so apt to die. 
 No place shall please me so, no mean of death, 
 As here by Caesar, and by you cut off     (3.1.157-62) 
His approach shows both bravery and shrewdness; like Cassius who offers his dagger to 
Brutus so he can cut out his heart (4.3.99-104), Antony places himself at the conspirators’ 
mercy in expectation that Brutus, at least, will not slaughter him.  His gamble pays off, 
and he cunningly establishes himself as a “coward or a flatterer” (3.1.93) in the minds of 




gravely underestimate both his power and his dedication to their downfall, a mistake each 
of them will pay for with his life. 
 Brutus loses control over the symbolic value of Caesar’s death, and ultimately his 
spirit, in the literal blood bath on the Ides of March.  In the heat of the moment, careful 
planning gives way to carnage:  not only do the conspirators hack and “hew” his corpse, 
they “bathe [their] hands in Caesar’s blood” (3.1.106), fulfilling Calphurnia’s 
premonition while denying Brutus’ vision of a sanitized purgation.  René Girard sees the 
conspirators' bathing in Caesar's blood, an action suggested by Brutus no less, as a 
turning point: 
 [The] blood spattered conspirators do not make a favorable impression, but they 
 make a very strong one and they provide the already unstable populace with a 
 potent mimetic model, a model which many citizens will imitate . . . . The crowd 
 becomes a mirror in which the murderers contemplate the truth of their action.54 
The mob, and the ease with which it is manipulated, figures heavily in the action after 
Caesar’s death.55  As Cicero warns, people will see events from their own perspective, 
regardless of the actual meaning of the events.  In Revolt and Revolution in Early Modern 
Europe, Yves Marie Bercé details how little it takes to spark a riot when the pervasive 
atmosphere is ripe with contention: 
 The spark corresponded to a vague state of fear that was always apt to reawaken, 
 or to a  collective obsession rendered all the more immediate by a number of 
 previous indications.  People heard that the grain would be in short supply, that 




 out not far away, that policies had been decided upon which would be a heavy 
 burden on people . . . 56 
The atmosphere after Caesar's murder is ripe for rev lt:  "Men, wives and children stare, 
cry out and run, / As it were doomsday." (3.1.96-7).  Rather than a "vague state of fear," 
Rome is thrown into chaos where the people "fear there will a worse come in [Caesar's] 
place" (3.2.112).  Brutus' funeral speech fails to persuade because he does nothing to 
address this aspect of environment.  Even though he "sits high in all the people's hearts" 
(1.3.157), Brutus and his stoic, high-minded rhetoric cannot compete with the piteous 
spectacle of Caesar's mangled body. 
 The dismissal of Caesar’s broken body will prove a drastic error in judgment for 
the conspirators.  Antony alone sees the value of the corpse in the aftermath of the bloody 
coup; in fact, he addresses it directly: 
 O, pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth, 
 That I am meek and gentle with these butchers! 
 Thou art the ruins of the noblest man 
 That ever lived in the tide of times. 
 Woe to the hand that shed this costly blood!  (3.1.254-8) 
The body may no longer house the spirit of Caesar, but it is a residue of his greatness.  
Knowing that “[p]assion is catching” (3.1.283), Anto y uses the bloody mutilation of 
Caesar’s body to rewrite the story of Caesar’s end,deliberately moving the people of 
Rome against the conspirators.57  He unleashes Caesar’s spirit from the confines of the 
faction’s logical explanations of tyranny and ambition, revealing new facts, such as 




grief.  Gail Kern Paster believes "[Antony's oration] takes up and redirects the political 
valences of the conspirator's own rhetoric of blood an  bodily conduct, denying the 
conspirators exclusive rights to the Roman body politic."58  Antony, in effect, uses their 
own bloody tools against them.  Although death has taken away Caesar’s volition, the 
telling of his death, sculpted by Antony, invigorates those that would carry on in his 
spirit.  The “ruins of the noblest man that ever lived” becomes the rallying point for the 
counter-coup against Brutus and Cassius’ faction.   
 Emotion, not reason, again rules the actions of men as Antony in his sorrow 
moves his countrymen to “a sudden flood of mutiny” (3.2.204).59  Just as rage and horror 
increase his own choleric humors, he uses a series of oral and aural pathetic appeals to 
incite a choleric response in the crowd.  Jean-François Senault, the early modern 
Augustinian philosopher, discusses the contagious aspect of this affect: 
 Choler is a Contagion which spreads itself through a whole Town in a moment; 
 one Oration hath made a whole Nation take up Arms, and Men, Women, and 
 Children, agitated with this Passion, have been se confusedly to kill their own 
 Citizens, or declare war against their enemies; Subjects have revolted against their 
 Princes, Souldiers have conspired against their Commanders; the common people 
 have bandied against the Nobility, Children have ris n up against their Parents, 
 and all the rights of Nature have been violated at the solicitation of Choler.60  
Antony depends on this "solicitation['s]" effect onthe plebeians attending his oration.61  
Although his initial rebuttal of the faction’s logical analysis of why Caesar had to die 
barely moves them, he eventually wins the crowd through spectacle, visually appealing to 




recreating the murder before their eyes.  The coup de grâce is the revelation of Caesar’s 
mutilated corpse: “Look you here, / Here is himself, marred as you see with traitors” 
(3.2.194-5).  Donald R. Wehrs cites Antony's insistence on foregrounding the visual 
evidence of the murderers' brutality as the factor that turns the tide against the 
conspirators: 
 Whereas Brutus's oration renders Caesar into a succe sion of abstractions, 
 Antony's incessantly calls attention to the body: 'Look, in this place ran Cassius' 
 dagger through; / See, what rent the envious Casca made' (3.2.172-3).62 
Caesar speaks again through these wounds as Antony pr phesies:  
 Show you sweet Caesar's wounds, poor poor dumb mouths, 
 And bid them speak for me.   
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
          ruffle up your spirits and put a tongue 
 In every wound of Caesar that should move 
 The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny.  (3.2.218-9, 21-23) 
The crowd “see[s]” the “piteous spectacle” (3.2.196) and, Caesar’s “spirit, ranging for 
revenge” (3.1.270), finds the plebeians to be willing tools for that end.  Crying, 
“Revenge! About! Seek! Burn! Fire! Kill! Slay!” (3.2 199) the choleric mob departs, 
carrying "mighty" Caesar’s corpse with them as a talisman on their way to drive the 
conspirators out of Rome.63  The cycle of violence begun with the murder of Caesar 
blooms into civil war.   
Death and the Restoration of Order  
He that iudgeth of the life of a man, must looke how he carried himselfe at his death; for the end 
crowneth the worke, and a good death honoureth a mans whole life, as an euill defameth and 
dishonoureth it.   





 Unlike the stability alluded to after Collatine and Junius Brutus drive the Tarquins 
from Rome, the double-coup perpetuates even greater discord and violence.  The fears of 
Cassius, Brutus, and the other conspirators are realized in the formation of the 
Triumvirate.  Now exiled and divided from one another, the negative consequences of 
"shak[ing]" (1.2.321) Caesar from power manifest themselves.  Intent on securing their 
future, the faction instead brings on the "worse days" (1.2.321) that they feared under 
Caesar.  Cassius, distempered at the bad turn of events, is full of a "rash humour" which 
plagues him with a short temper and impulsive behavior (4.3.119).  Brutus, worn down 
under the pressures of exile and distraught over Portia's suicide, admits to "ill-temper" 
(4.3.115) as well, but only after he has lambasted th  other man for his plethora of ire.  
Quarrelling over Cassius' supposed denial of aid, Brutus mocks Cassius' choleric 
excesses: 
 Must I give way and room to your rash choler? 
  Shall I be frighted when a madman stares? 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   [F]ret till your proud heart break. 
 Go show your slaves how choleric you are, 
 And make your bondmen tremble. Must I budge? 
 Must I observe you? Must I stand and crouch 
  Under your testy humour? By the gods, 
  You shall digest the venom of your spleen, 




With images of corporal breaking and splitting, Brutus rightly predicts that Cassius' 
splenetic humor will, in fact, destroy him.   
 Brutus receives premonitions of his own demise in the form of Caesar's ghost.  
Unlike the specter in Hamlet which is observed by multiple people, no one else sees the 
"ill spirit" (4.3.286) that warns Brutus of impendig doom on the battle fields of Philippi.  
Brutus is preoccupied briefly with finding out if anyone else observed the ghost because 
he is afraid that he may have constructed the entire th ng with his imagination.  One 
symptom of extreme humoral imbalance is to see and hear things that are not present, a 
fact that Brutus seems to know: "I think it is a weakness of mine eyes that shapes this 
monstrous apparition" (4.3.274-5).  In this case, w are never quite sure if the ghost is 
real or not, but Brutus reports its presence at Philippi just before he kills himself, stating 
that it is the portent that lets him "know [his] hour [of death] is come" (5.5.20). 
 In the Rome of the Caesars, an honorable death punctuates the positive aspects of 
what has come before as well as redeeming the person thr ugh the action of his death.  
As Lucrece rewrites her chastity in blood, so Cassius and Brutus wish to ensure their 
status as “noble” Romans, erasing the blot of “traito ” from their reputations by 
embracing a "Roman's part" (5.3.89); they believe that what has come before matters less 
than how they meet their end.  Yet the emotion of fear still haunts their actions, whether 
those actions are considered honorable or not.  Aware th t there is a good possibility they 
will lose the Battle of Philippi, Brutus and Cassius discuss suicide as the honorable exit 
for martial failure as they are leaving for the final battle.64  Brutus recommends 
“patience” (5.1.105) before self-murder, regarding the practice as “cowardly and vile” 




shocked that Brutus may, by his “rule of philosophy” (5.1.100) forego an honorable death 
and allow himself “to be led in triumph / Through the streets of Rome” (5.1.108-9).  
Brutus fears dishonor more that he fears death (1.2.88-89) and his co-conspirator’s stark 
reminder of his fate should he be captured sways his aversion to self-murder: “Think not 
[. . .] That ever Brutus will go bound to Rome.  Hebears too great a mind” (5.1.110-1).  
Brutus,  though he claims to be “armed so strong in ho esty” (4.3.67), refuses to be tried 
for the murder of Caesar.   
 Rash actions—the product of extremities in complexion, environment, and fear—
bring both Cassius and Brutus to the ultimate violence of self-murder.  In the climate of 
failure and misgiving that follows the faction’s exil , self-annihilation offers one sure 
way to “abridge[. . . a person’s] time of fearing death” (3.1.104-5).  Suicide ensures that a 
person’s end, at least, in his own hands at the timof his own choosing.  After Brutus and 
Cassius lose the war—partially as a result of further mistakes instigated by fear—they 
both attempt to regain honor by taking their own lives on the battlefield.  Both meet with 
some success: Brutus calls Cassius the "last of allthe Romans" and Titinius sees him as 
“brave” (5.3.80) while the Antony and Octavius label Brutus “noble” (5.5.69) and 
“honourabl[e]” (5.5.80) respectively. But this "glory by [the] losing day" (5.5.36) is 
inherently problematic—reputations are essentially mutable, reflecting the interpretation 
of the person remembering the suicides.  Despite Brutus' insistence that the faction was 
honorable and did Caesar "justice" (4.3.19), his enemies can and will rewrite the suicides 
as they see fit. 
 Cassius sees evil signs and portents all around them, clearly believing he and his 




  [R]avens, crows and kites 
 Fly o’er our heads and downward look on us 
 As we were sickly prey: their shadows seem 
 A canopy most fatal, under which  
 Our army lies, ready to give up the ghost.  (V.i.84-8) 
Cassius, who has worked others to dangers, now turns hat imaginative malignancy on 
himself. He likens himself to Pompey (5.1.74) just before the battle, an ominous 
association since Pompey was defeated by Caesar.  In spite of his half-hearted rally 
before Messala—“I am fresh of spirit and resolved to meet all perils very constantly” 
(5.1.90-1)—Cassius has already convinced himself that his “life is run his compass” 
(5.3.25).65  Even before he misconstrues Titinius’ fate during the scouting mission, the 
“great observer” convinces himself that his death is imminent.  “Mistrust of good 
success” (5.3.66) serves as his final prompt to take his own life: “Cassius from bondage 
will deliver Cassius” (1.3.90). 
 Brutus, confronted with the body of his friend, remains stubbornly stoic.  Afraid 
that Cassius' funeral may discomfit the camp—and perhaps himself—he banishes the 
body to an island near Philippi (5.3.104-6).  Still, Brutus' melancholic disposition asserts 
itself after the loss of the next battle: 
 Now is that noble vessel full of grief, 
 That runs over even at the eyes.  (5.5.13-4) 
The stress of losing so many friends, imminent capture, and seeing the seemingly 
portentous "ghost of Caesar" (5.517), moves Brutus to believe his "hour is come" 




"Night [that] hangs upon [his] eyes" (5.5.41).  Passions cloud the "eyes of his minde," 
leaving his reason subject to one motion: [He] willhave glory" (5.5.36).  Even as Brutus 
claimed Caesar's life as the debt for ambition, he himself pays the debt for the murder of 
"great Julius" (4.2.19) by running onto his own sword.  Antony, recovering a measure of 
his good humor after winning the final battle, posthumously re-establishes Brutus' 
"noble" intentions, explaining that his membership in the faction was not malicious: 
 He only, in a general honest thought 
 And common good to all, made one of them.  (5.5.72.3) 
With the deaths of the conspirators and the conclusion of the battle, fear seems to be, at 
least temporarily, subsumed into the "glories of [that] happy day" (5.5.82) for the victors.  
History will prove this restoration of balance a frgile one. 
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and “offer[s] them his throat to cut” (1.2.264-5). 
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“Eaten Up with Passion”: Deliberate Contagion and the Failure of Reason in Othello 
 
Lovers and Madmen have such seething brains . . .  ~ Shakespeare,  A Midsummer Night's Dream 
 
 Fear, the contagious motivational force that underpins violence in Julius Caesar, 
also works its destructive wiles in Shakespeare's Othello as its subspecies jealousy.1  Iago 
takes on Cassius' role of seducer, manipulating the Moor to serve his own ends.  
Desdemona, like Caesar, trusts her murderer, seeming surprised that death arrives at his 
hands.  Othello, like Brutus, is "move[d]" to act against his "lover" by ill words loosely 
based on facts.  But in Othello, the "sacrifice" (5.2.65) meant to serve "Justice" (5.2.17)  
is proved to be unwarranted.  Although Shakespeare's mbiguity towards truth and 
motive is evident in both plays, Brutus clearly hassome legitimate reservations about 
Caesar's power; Othello's fears, on the other hand, are based on suspicion and weak 
circumstantial evidence. 
 Taken from a purely rational standpoint, Othello's actions seem unbelievable.  In 
his exploration of love in Shakespeare's works, Marcus Norland identifies the Moor's 
transformation as a source of unease for most reades/viewers: "The most horrifying and 
bewildering aspect of Othello is that its main protagonist swerves so very quickly from 
the role of loving husband and turns into a howling murderer."2  If we look at the 
circumstances in the play through the lens of humoral theory, however, a consistent 
pattern of poison, contagion, and humoral imbalance em rges.  Psychological disorders—
including the murderous madness exhibited by Othello—were often attributed to the 
overabundance of certain humors in early modern medical iscourse.3  By tracing the 
innate and external factors that incense the Moor int  an uncontrollable, jealous rage, we 





Give me that man / That is not passion's slave . . .  Shakespeare, Hamlet (3.2.71-2) 
  
 Just as critics have been stymied over the motive for Tarquin's "too timeless 
speed" (44) so have they struggled with the reason for Othello's extremity of jealousy.  In 
his exploration of jealousy in Othello, Marcus Norland surveys the possible motives for 
this destructive emotion as suggested by a wide range of Shakespearean scholars:  
misogyny, anxiety over paternity, the color of Othello's skin ("racial despair"), his 
advanced age, self-loathing, sexual disgust, or the fear of losing Desdemona.  Norland 
concludes that none of these explanations are sufficient: 
 The scary and interesting thing about Shakespearean jealousy, then, is that its 
 deepest mystery cannot be explained away.  We cannot ssign it to the  
 barbaric and unenlightened past, to a pathological insecurity that can be 
 eradicated by equal doses of therapy and social change, or to some hardwired 
 mate-killing module.4 
I would suggest that scholars have been looking in the wrong place for Othello's motive.  
Trying to make sense of the irrationality of Othello's actions through reason simply 
doesn't work.  I believe Shakespeare gives sufficient evidence for us to believe Othello, 
like Tarquin, is ruled by his affections.  He suffers from a humoral imbalance which leads 
him to kill Desdemona, and attempt to kill Cassio, the objects of  his jealous rage.  Like 
Tarquin's attempt to purge lust via rape, the Moor's similar effort to rid himself of  fear by 
way of murder has bleak consequences for both his victims and himself.  Othello's failure 
to utilize "reason to cool [his] raging motions" (1.3.331) is ultimately the source of  the 
tragic events that ensue.  
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 Desdemona, like recent critics, cannot fathom Othello's jealousy.  In fact, she 
initially cannot believe that he is really suffering from that malaise: 
    my noble Moor 
 Is true of mind and made of no such baseness 
 As jealous creatures are 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
            I think the sun where he was born 
 Drew all such humours from him.  (3.4.26-31) 
Here Desdemona explicitly links jealousy with humoral complexion.  Othello's past 
actions and bearing have been such that Desdemona "ne'er saw [jealousy] before" in his 
behavior, nor has any reason to believe he has the natural capacity for that emotion.  
Confident that she has "never gave him cause" (3.4.158) she has no reason to guard her 
own words and actions, which, though innocent, become twisted by Iago's machinations 
so her "virtue [turns] into pitch" (2.3.355).  Like Lucrece, who "touched no unknown 
baits, nor feared no hooks" (103), Desdemona's very irtue makes her unable to deal 
effectively, or affectively, with the unbalanced world she finds in Cyprus. 
 Emilia, however, knows a bit more of the world than her mistress.  In reply to 
Desdemona's bewildered assertion that she has done nothing to "cause" Othello's 
displeasure, Emilia assures her that jealousy doesn't r quire a reason: 
 But jealous souls will not be answered so: 
 They are not ever jealous for the cause, 
 But jealous for they are jealous. It is a monster 
 Begot upon itself, born on itself.  (3.4.159-62) 
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Essentially, Emilia is describing an innate imbalance operating outside of the realm of 
rational cause and effect; jealousy exists unto itself without the necessity of outward 
stimulation, and once it infects someone, it continues to feed itself ad infinitum, with no 
additional nourishment required.  In The Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert Burton finds 
this illogical phenomenon particularly vexing: 
 [There is] some doubt whether this malady may be cur d or no, they think 'tis like 
 the gout, or Switzers, [. . .] those hired soldiers, if once they take possession of a 
 castle,  they can never be got out.5 
Once jealousy has "possessed" Othello, the only way he can rid himself of it is to destroy 
the objects of that passion.  The cure, like Lucrece's sacrificial blood-letting, is the one 
that kills. 
 The cause exists in the realm of the hot humoral body, not cold reason.  And for 
all of Othello's positive qualities, his physical drk complexion speaks to a corresponding 
black humoral one.  Swarthy skin, inherently linked with melancholy, symbolizes one 
aspect of Othello's underlying disposition, a dispositi n that the ease of his devolution 
suggests has been carefully suppressed by habits and m ners, but has been present all 
along.  In Elizabethan England, Othello's skin color w uld naturally been associated with 
"inferiority and wickedness,"6 making Shakespeare's initial portrayal of the Moor as 
"valiant" (1.3.50), "noble" (2.2.1), having a "clear spirit" (3.4.144), "all sufficient" 
(4.1.265), and possessing a "nature / Whom passion could not shake" (4.1.265-6) all the 
more striking.  According to Sara Deats, early modern culture "depicted the [typical] 
Moor as passionate, libidinous, jealous, violent, bestial, treacherous, thieving, and 
pagan."7  Othello, with his constrained temper and care for honor, his denial of an 
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inordinate sexual "appetite" (1.3.263) and attention o Christianity (2.3.166-8), appears to 
renounce both the humoral expectations submitted to him at birth as well as the societal 
one.  But as Iago works his "poison" (3.3.328), the general begins to resemble his race's 
stereotype more and more.8 He himself hints at the inevitability of his fall when he speaks 
of "unshunnable" (3.3.279) destiny which is "fated" (3.3.280) on each man as soon as he 
"quicken[s]" (3.3.281) in the womb.  The "noble" Moor is defeated by the malicious 
suggestions of his ensign and seduced into believing that his fate, both as a cuckold and 
as a "black" (3.3.267) man, has already been determin d. 
 Carol Thomas Neely's work on early modern lovesickness—of which jealousy is 
an extreme type—reveals that the early modern discour es on humoral theory categorizes 
bodies "based on their humoral complexion and their climatic heat," not one or the other.9  
Founded on the idea that environment has a direct impact on a person's humoral makeup, 
and subsequently his emotional and mental qualities, th  relationship between climate 
and complexion was a literal one in Renaissance medical theory; John Huarte, channeling 
Aristotle, explains: 
 those who inhabit a country, either ouer cold, or ouer hot, are fierce and fell in 
 countenance and conditions; [. . .] a good temperature, not only maketh a good 
 grace in the body, but also aideth the wit and abilitie. And as the excesses of heat 
 & cold do hinder nature, that she cannot shape a man in good figure; So (also for 
 the like reason) the harmonie of the soule is turned topsie turuie, and the wit 
 prooueth slow and dull.10 
In this view, Othello, as a Moor, also has the natural tendency to be choleric, the 
complexion associated with people hailing from the hot Mediterranean regions.  The 
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expectation for Moorish men to be prone to "hot-bloodedness and transgressive desire" is 
at once a supported and denied by evidence in the play.11  Othello's potential to be a 
balanced, valued, and civilized member of the Venetia  state despite his inherited 
complexion is proved by his "parts," "title," and "perfect soul" (1.2.31) held so valuable 
by the Signoria of Venice.  The vicious racial epithets Iago uses to characterize him to 
Desdemona's father—"black ram" (1.1.87), "devil" (1.1.90) and "Barbary horse" 
(1.1.110)—bear no resemblance to the man who reports to the Venetian Senate to answer 
the charges of kidnapping brought against him.  So far, the only Moorish stereotype 
Othello has possibly indulged in is thieving; having not asked Brabantio's permission to 
wed Desdemona, the Moor has essentially robbed him of his daughter.  These 
circumstances, including Desdemona's role in wooing Othello and deceiving her father, 
and Othello's reluctance to enter into matrimony in the first place,12 set up the tragic 
dynamic between heterosexual and homosocial love that eventually will "enmesh them 
all" (2.3.357). 
 Othello is of a "constant, loving, noble nature" (2.1.287) and even Iago believes 
he will be a "most dear husband" (2.1.289) if left to his devices.  But Othello is not as 
immune to extreme passion as he would lead everyone to b lieve.  Disturbed from his 
marriage bed by the drunken brawl orchestrated by Iago, we see the first signs of possible 
choler: 
 Now, by heaven, 
 My blood begins my safer guides to rule 
 And passion, having my best judgement collied, 
 Assays to lead the way.  Zounds, if I once stir, 
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 Or do but lift this arm, the best of you 
 Shall sink in my rebuke.  (2.3.200-5) 
Provoked by the lack of judgment demonstrated by his men and their reluctance to 
disclose what began the quarrel, Othello's "blood" begins to overcome his sense of 
reason.  There is also the insinuation that his blood may already be hot as a result of his 
time with Desdemona in bed just prior this disturbance.  Either way, he warns the 
brawlers that if his passion is allowed to "lead," even those loyal may bear the brunt of 
his anger.  Although critics generally gloss rebuke to mean "reprimand" or "check," there 
is the possibility for a more dangerous interpretation—if he becomes "stir[red]" to the 
point his rational being is no longer in control, his "rebuke" will be a physical one.  He 
needs only "lift [his] arm" and even those "best" men will fall under the weight of blows.  
Additionally, his word choice for impaired judgment is critical; to colly something is to 
"blacken," "begrime," or "darken with blows."13  To give into passion's dictates is to 
allow that dark humor, melancholy, the fundamental basis of all fear, jealousy, and self-
destruction, to subvert reason's sovereignty. 
 
Poison and Disease 
The wounds made by a louer are faithfull, but the kisses of him that hateth, dangerous.  
      ~ Castiglione, Book of the Courtier   
 
 Teresa Brennan's transmission of affect theory postulates that emotions can be 
either generated internally by an individual or subsumed into the body from an external 
source.14  Othello's "nature / Whom passion could not shake" (4.1.265-6) is wracked by 
two forces:  innate disease and external poison.  The inherited complexion and societal 
pressures due to his race are but one part of his natural predilection for imbalance;  
embryonic epilepsy and jealousy are both already present in Othello's humoral 
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framework, only needing the right circumstances to manifest themselves.  Externally, 
passionate poison invades the Moor through his ears and eyes, "loving[ly]" applied by 
Iago, his "honest" ancient.15  These two factors work together to bring the general to ruin.  
The noxious "medicine" (4.1.45) introduced into Othello's system provokes both jealousy 
and epilepsy from their dormancy.  Iago deliberately "work[s]" (1.3.390) this emotional 
contagion into the Moor's subconscious, employing a more sophisticated version of the 
direct humoral contagion heaped on Lucrece by Tarquin.  There are hints that Iago 
himself is inflamed with jealousy—he refers to the "poisonous mineral" that "gnaw[s]" 
his "inwards" (2.1.295) and even tells Othello that e tends towards jealousy (3.3.150)—
and one way to relieve his own discomfort is to destroy the man he sees as an obstacle to 
his desires.  So, like Tarquin who must purge his imbalance by loading Lucrece with his 
lust, Iago works to rid himself of his hatred and jealousy by transferring them to Othello.  
His "revenge" (2.1.292) begins as soon as he ruptures Othello's balance of "right feeling 
and right thinking."16  When the general's right thinking begins to degrade, his emotional 
state decays as well, leaving him subject to the "gr en-eyed monster" (3.3.168) of 
jealousy. 
 Despite Desdemona's claim that Othello has not the innate "humour" (3.4.31) of 
jealousy, there is evidence to the contrary.  A confirmed bachelor until his late marriage 
to Desdemona, Othello has spent is life among the "Pride, pomp and circumstance of 
glorious war" (3.3.357), rejecting the "light-winged toys / Of feathered Cupid" (1.3.269-
70).  Now that he is "fast married" (1.2.11), the general's freedom is put into 
"circumscription" (1.2.27), not by Desdemona's loving rule but by the fear that he cannot 
control her "appetites" (3.3.274).  Even before Iago first hints at Desdemona's possible 
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"revolt" (3.3.191), Othello experiences conflict betw en his life as a soldier and that of a 
devoted husband.  Desdemona's tenacious suit to restore Cassio to his former position is 
met with a mixture of annoyance and indulgence by the Moor who finally, after granting 
Cassio's reinstatement, ask his wife the favor of "T  leave [him] but a little to [himself]" 
(3.3.85).  On one level, this is a simple request for her to leave the room so he can 
concentrate on business pertaining to the governance of Cyprus;  a more insidious 
suggestion is that the "Excellent wretch" (3.3.90), as he calls her, is subsuming too much 
of his masculine power, a condition the Moor is distinctly uncomfortable with and which 
prompts him to ask for some distance.  Significantly, the moment she "leave[s]" him is 
the same moment that Iago begins his seduction. 
 Othello instinctively fears that love has the ability to corrupt his "estimation" 
(1.3.275) among his peers, likening his potential fall to "housewives mak[ing] a skillet of 
[his] helm" (1.3.273).  His identity heretofore has been based on his prowess in the male-
dominated world of warfare and Desdemona's feminine influence threatens to undermine 
that identity.  Iago and Cassio refer to the possibility that Othello is pawning his honor 
for Desdemona's affection when they agree that the "general's wife / is now the general" 
(2.3.309-10), the "great captain's captain" (2.1.74).  This, coupled with the fact that 
Othello publicly admits Desdemona initiated their rlationship (1.3.163-9) and supports 
her speech in the public forum (1.3.261), strongly suggests the Moor is initially one of the 
"fondlings" Robert Burton refers to below.  Although this is not jealousy per se, it is one 
of the main causes of that humoral imbalance according to Burton, who believes that a 




 We have many such fondlings that are their wives' packhorses and slaves, to carry 
 her muff, dog, and fan, let her wear the breeches, lay out, spend, and do what she 
 will, go and come whither, when she will, they give consent.  [. . . .]  [M]any 
 brave and worthy men have trespassed in this kind,[. . .] and many noble  
 senators and soldiers have lost their honour, in be g uxorii, so sottishly overruled 
 by their wives.17 
The inordinate affection these "sottish" gentlemen feel for their wives cause their humors 
to swing from one extreme to the other.  First they  internalize the cold, feminine humors 
of their women, softening and weakening their masculine qualities; then, when the fear of 
emasculation overcomes the effeminate humors their bodies are harboring, an 
overabundance of melancholy and choler takes over, driving them  towards the extremity 
of jealousy.  Othello, for example,  is essentially unmanned when he admits he "will deny 
[Desdemona] nothing" (3.3.76, 3.3.83), a phrase he rep ats twice at the crucial turn  in 
the center of the play (only 195 lines later, Othello is convinced that she has "abused" 
(3.3.271) him and commits himself to "loath[ing] her" (3.3.272) instead of  loving her.)  
The Moor's subsequent boast that "All my fond love thus do I blow to heaven" (3.3.448) 
symbolizes the rejection of his former role of indulging husband, where "fond" has the 
deprecatory meaning of  "doting," a weak, effeminate characteristic.18  By rejecting the 
loving, sanguine humors that he inherits from Desdemona and replacing them with "black 
vengeance" (3.3.450) and "tyrannous hate" (3.3.452), Othello seems to embrace Thomas 
Wright's suggestion that humoral balance can be achieved by stirring up the humors most 
opposite to one's natural inclinations.  Unfortunately, this theoretical cure transforms 
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Othello into a stereotypical Moor rather than his incarnation as the "noble and valiant 
general" (2.2.311-2).19 
 The other factor pointing to a predisposition to jealousy is the readiness with 
which Othello entertains Iago's tactical suggestion.  Were the Moor as impervious to 
jealousy as his wife and friends initially think, Iago's poison would be ineffectual.  
Without a natural inclination, reason would easily dismiss all of the circumstantial 
evidence and uncover the flaws in the rumor about Desdemona's infidelity.  For example, 
when exactly did she have time to commit "the act of shame / A thousand times" 
(5.2.209-10) with Cassio when they have only just arrived, on separate ships,  in Cyprus?  
Othello's extremity of love for Desdemona makes himvulnerable to the fear of losing 
that love.  Iago's disparaging observes that: 
 [Othello's] soul is so enfettered to her love, 
 That she may make, unmake, do what she list, 
 Even as her appetite shall play the god 
 With his weak function   (2.3.339-43) 
It is this love, already a part of the Moor's humoral makeup, that provide the opening for 
jealousy, the fear of  losing the beloved .  Although he discounts the emotion when Iago 
first cautions him against the "green-eyed monster" (3.3.168), Othello's natural 
inclination towards absolutes necessitates his swing from love to jealousy when doubt 
enters his mind; this aspect of his complexion is be t summarized by his boast to Iago 
after their first foray into the topic of cheating wives:  "on the proof there is no more but 
this: Away at once with love or jealousy!" (3.3.194-5). 
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 Humorally compromised by the feminizing power of intemperate love, the Moor 
himself alludes to his worries about the unsustainable nature of his epic love for 
Desdemona:  
   If it were now to die    
 'Twere now to be most happy, for I fear 
  My soul hath her content so absolute 
 That not another comfort like to this 
 Succeeds in unknown fate.    (2.1.187-91) 
Othello believes things can only get worse.  His happiness is so complete at that moment, 
that it physically causes him discomfort:  "It stops me here, it is too much joy." (2.1.194-
5)  Although this is sometimes glossed as the Moor being choked up, the words 
"stop[ped]" in his throat, I believe he is pointing to his heart; his humors are so 
overwrought with love then that his heart literally stops with the excessiveness of his joy.  
Desdemona is taken aback by this excess, chiding her husband that their "loves and 
comforts should increase / Even as [their] days do grow" (2.1.192-3).  Iago, on the other 
hand, rejoices at this excess.  He counts on the fact th t this love-sick Othello can easily 
be "work[ed]" into a jealous Othello; the extravagance of the general's feelings for his 
wife predisposes him to extremities of other emotions, most especially fear of losing that 
love.   As Arthur Kirsch points out: 
 Iago's words, in [the first] exchange, literally emanate from Othello.  Iago is 
 certainly the aggressor, but Othello is clearly ready to respond, and it is he who 
 actively makes the association between the words Iago repeats and the threatening 
 thoughts behind them.20  
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In the first part of his seduction of the general, I go does not  say  anything explicitly 
derogatory about Cassio or Desdemona; he lets Othello's imagination concoct the 
possibility of betrayal from vague generalities and the ancient's impassioned warning 
against jealousy (3.3.168-72).    All the humoral elements are present; all Iago needs to 
do is find the tools to excite the general into a feverish passion opposite the loving one he 
already indulges in.  From the success of his first foray, the ancient can infer that the 
general already contains the seeds of jealousy.  Fate hands Iago the implements he needs 
to provoke a "jealousy so strong / That judgment canot cure" (2.1.299-300) in the form 
of a gullible lieutenant, a lost handkerchief, and several unaware accomplices. 
 Othello's other native disease is epilepsy.  We see one fit within the play and Iago 
alludes to another, but there is no indication from anyone that the Moor has suffered from 
an attack prior to this fateful visit to Cyprus.  In Galenic terms, epilepsy is the result of 
two possible conditions: demonic possession or hereditary disease.21  Despite the 
references to witchcraft and the demonic within the play, there is no evidence that any of 
it is to be taken literally.  Iago, often likened to the Vice figure and called "devil" 
(5.2.284, 5.2.298) at the tragic conclusion of his plot, is still just a Machiavellian 
manipulator, not a supernatural being, so he cannot be the direct cause of Othello's 
malady through sorcery.22  Instead, like Othello's inherent potential for exc ss choler and 
melancholy, his epileptic weakness lies dormant until ex ernal environmental factors 
aggravate it into exposure.  Just as Julius Caesar suffers from an attack after being 
provoked by the plebeians' jeers (Julius Caesar, 1.2.253), Othello's emotional stamina is 
taxed to the extreme by Iago's description of Cassio having sex with Desdemona (4.1.32-
43).  Stephanie Moss suggests that the "events in and around Othello's 'epileptic' episode" 
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also reinforce his "social and cultural isolation";  he is further and further estranged from 
the Venetian world he adopted as his own as his ration l control and his language begin 
to fail.23  One of the many symptoms of epilepsy recognized by Renaissance doctors was 
the failure or degradation of language; Othello's jealous ramblings containing fragmented 
sentences ("Pish! Noses, ears, and lips" (4.1.42), "blood, blood, blood" (3.3.454) and 
"Goats and monkeys!" (4.1.263), for example) can be seen as further indications of his 
underlying epileptic condition as well as the tangential erosion of his reason. 
 On Othello's diseased canvas, Iago fulfills his potential to conceive a masterpiece 
of destruction.  Choosing his poisons well, the ancie t "ensnare[s]" Othello "body and 
soul" (5.2.299).  The brilliance of Iago lies in his opportunistic application of unrelated 
and unplanned events to his cause; his ability to adapt unplotted events to his design 
makes him all the more convincing.    Knowing that if he can "practi[ce] upon his peace 
and quiet / Even to madness" (2.1.308-9), then Othello will, at the very least, lose his 
position, and Iago will have a measure of revenge, and a modicum of relief for his own 
jealous imbalance.  He begins with innuendo and then works up to visual evidence.  By 
feeding Othello only little hints of something "monst[rous]" (3.3.110) and refusing to 
reveal the details of his thoughts, Iago riles up the passion that he displayed after Cassio's 
drunken brawl (2.3.200-9).  Shakespeare signals his emotional agitation in both places 
with a curse: "Zounds!" (2.3.203, 3.3.158).24  Robert C. Evans cites Iago's clever caution 
as one means of his success:  "Ironically, it is Iago's very hesitancy and reticence—not 
any blatant  incitement to anger or obvious flattery—that finally push Othello over the 
edge and plunge him into his famous epileptic fit."25  And as Christopher Pye asserts, 
"the drama is as preoccupied with the perils of the devouring ear (see 1.3.149–50) as it is 
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with the perils of the gaze."26  By subordinating Othellos' eyes and ears to his malignant 
reasoning, Iago infects the Moor with hate under th guise of love. 
 Iago's first line of attack is through the ear.  Initially Othello seems immune, 
scoffing at the innuendos Iago puts forth under the auspices of looking out for the 
general's well being: 
 Exchange me for a goat, 
 When I shall turn the business of my soul 
 To such exsufflicate and blown surmises, 
 Matching thy inference.   (3.3.183-6) 
Echoing the measured response offered by the Duke of V nice when he himself was 
accused of witchcraft, Othello's reason actively resists reading anything untoward in 
Desdemona's actions with Cassio.27  Inherently understanding the power of stories,28 
Othello needs proof before he doubts Desdemona’s troth: 
 Nor from mine own weak merits will I draw 
 The smallest fear or doubt of her revolt, 
 For she had eyes and chose me. No, Iago, 
 I'll see before I doubt, when I doubt, prove, 
 And on the proof, there is no more but this: 
 Away at once with love or jealousy!  (3.3.190-5) 
But Iago subtly unbalances him by using the ear’s ability to receive language and convert 
it into images for Othello to "see" in his mind's eye.  And the grotesque and lewd images 
he describes to his general are so potent they have Othello foaming and spitting in his 
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fury, unable to see anything except what his ears hve shown him through the medium of 
imagination.   
 Shakespeare deliberately plays on the Renaissance commonplace that hearing is 
the purest of the senses, less likely to be hindered by sin or polluted by the distractions of 
the world.29   Unfortunately, as Vives points out, that is not a guarantee that all auditory 
input is healthful: 
 Suffer not suche as be skoffers, smell feastes, folysshe and fylthye talkers, triflers, 
 bybbers, fylthye and shameles lurkers, bealy guttes, and suche other, apte either 
 by their wordes or deedes, to cause lewede laughter [. . . .] Kepe not onely thy 
 mouthe from foule and impudente communication, but also thine eares being as 
 a man shuld say, windowes of the mynde, remembryng euer that olde sayinge 
 of the Apostle, Naughty communication ofte tymes corrupteth good maners.30 
For Othello, the ear is a bodily opening weakly fortressed against the potential poisons of 
the world.  He never witnesses his ancient's cruel or crude speech since Iago carefully 
disguises his true feelings and diction behind "shows f service" (1.1.51), so he feels no 
reason to guard his ears from his "honest" ensign.  This is a grave mistake, because the 
auditory poison insidiously offered to Othello by Iago is as real in the Renaissance 
understanding of the humors as the actual poisoned se left in Lucrece's body by 
Tarquin; the Moor's unity of body, spirit, and reason are all affected by the "pestilence" 
his ancient liberally "pour[s]" "into his ear" (2.3.351). 31  Just as images can 
fundamentally alter the body's humoral balance as they enter the body through the eyes, 
so can sounds and their corresponding ideas directly affect the humoral body through the 
ear.  Bruce R. Smith, an expert on Renaissance acousti s, stresses that "[f] or early 
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modern men and women, hearing was a whole body experi nc ."32    Smith explains the 
mechanics behind this bodily fluctuation: 
 The sixteenth century inherited a model of hearing that derived ultimately from 
 Aristotle's De Anima, expanded and worked out in detail to accord with the 
 medical writings of Galen and to incorporate recent anatomical investigations.  
 According to this model, oscillations of air impinge on the eardrum, which 
 transmits the impulses to the spiritus, the aerated fluid that courses through the 
 entire body and communicates among all its parts.  Spiritus then conveys the 
 impulses to common sense, where they are fused with other sensations of the 
 external event (such as vision) and are thence conveyed to the imagination or 
 "phantasy."  Imagination converts the sensations into a species (or internal 
 image), which spiritus then disburses through the entire body.33  
In a well-balanced individual, the "species" transmitted by the imagination is equal to, or 
at least relatively close to, reality.  When Othello possesses a "clear spirit" (3.4.144), his 
"common sense," otherwise described as reason, works seamlessly with the imagination 
to produce rational analysis and distribution of information to all his "valiant parts" 
(1.3.254).  When "wrought" (5.2.343) with jealousy, the general's "phantasy" churns out 
twisted versions of what he sees and hears. 
 Iago's campaign to drive Othello into "madness" (2.1.309) relies heavily on the 
imagination's ability to supply images and infer ideas when the mind only receives hazy 
information.  Eyes are not necessary for visual input—ears can serve that function when 
partnered with the imagination.  John T. Wall points to this in “Shakespeare’s Aural Art: 
The Metaphor of the Ear in Othello” and cites Lear’s admonition to the blinded 
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Gloucester, “A man may see how this world goes with no eyes.  Look with thine ears” 
(4.6.146-7).34  Iago recognizes that the power of suggestion can produce "morbid 
affections and seizures of mind"35: 
 Dangerous conceits are in their natures poisons 
 Which at the first are scarce found to distaste 
 But with a little art upon the blood 
 Burn like the mines of sulphur.        (3.3.328-32) 
With patience and persistent innuendo, Iago arouses Othello's suspicions despite the 
Moor's insistence that he will "see before [he] doubt[s]" (3.3.193).   Then, with a 
combination of cunning and chance, the ancient's suggestions slowly get reinforced with 
visual "proof": Cassio's hasty departure from Desdemona, his possession of the 
handkerchief, Desdemona's continued suit on behalf of Cassio, and Cassio's defamation 
of Bianca which Othello misconstrues as pertaining to Desdemona.  The "eyes of the 
minde,"36 under the influence of both corporal eyes and ears (Vives' "windowes of the 
mynde"), become corrupted by Iago's "pestilence" (2.3.351).   
 
The Failure of Right Thinking 
For oft the eye mistakes, the brain being troubled. ~Shakespeare, Venus & Adonis (1085) 
 
 Iago deliberately infects Othello with his malicious poison; this is no accidental 
transmission of affect.  His effectiveness relies on his ability to convince those around 
him that he is "honest" and that the tender emotions he conveys—love, duty, concern, 
friendship—are true.  An expert flatterer, or "parasite," Iago successfully conveys 
emotion to Othello by means of degree, rather than content.  The ancient couches his 
great "hate" in "shows of service" (1.1.51), "trimm[ing]" (1.1.49) his malice to look like 
"love."37  Iago's feigned love appears fervently true because he injects it with the violence 
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of the hatred he actually feels.  And because the Moor is "of a free and open nature" 
(1.3.398), he believes that Iago is "honest" because he "seem[s]" so (1.3.399).  Rob 
Wilson observes that "[i]ronically, the Moor's very 'free and open' psyche allows Iago to 
enter in, to mediate, to infect his unintegrated subconscious with specular imaginings 
about the infidelity of all women and his own."38  Likening the general to an "ass" that 
can "tenderly be led by th'nose" (2.1.400-1), the ancient "abuse[s] Othello's ear" (1.3.394) 
with lies couched in shows of concern and love.  A favorite subject matter of early 
modern conduct manuals, flatterers like Iago could be considered a "plague of great ones" 
(3.3.277);  Thomas Newton relays a warning (1569) that Othello could have found 
useful: 
 [T]he festuringe Canker of feigned flaterie [is the] most contagious. Nothing is 
 sopestiferous to Princes and maiestrats as to listen and geue eare to the fauning 
 flatterie of Cosening claubackes, and the ranke rable of pieuish parasites, whose 
 nature (hunting after lucre and Bellichere) is vnder the countrefect visure of their 
 sugred spech and diabolical dissimulacion to feede the humour of those, whom it 
 hath pleased god and  good fortune to decorat with orldly dignitie and temporal 
 regiment, aboue the commune sort of other people. Th  hurt that therof ariseth, is 
 by infinite examples more apparaunt  then that it needeth here to be declared.39 
Characterized as a sore ("canker"), Iago's type of flattery is considered the "most 
contagious."  Deliberately "feed[ing]" Othello's humoral imbalance with his "diabolical 
dissimulacion," Iago first uses Othello's "eare" to deprive him of right thinking, and then 
reinforces his poison with sights that inflame the general's jealousy even further. 
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 Othello's senses undermine his faculty of reason.  As Sergei Lobanov-Rostovsky 
contends in his work on early modern anatomies of the eye, the "act of visual perception" 
is intrinsically linked to conceptions of the self.40  Unfortunately, both sight and hearing 
are subject to external environmental and humoral influences that can corrupt them, and 
in turn, impair the rational faculty.  John Dolman, in his translation of Cicero (1561), 
makes the connection between diseased sight and hearing and the failure of the mind to 
perceive reality: 
 For nowe trulye, se not so much as those thinges whyche we se with our bodelye 
 eyes, neyther is there any sense in our bodye. But (as not onelye the naturall 
 Philosophers, but also the Phisicians do saye, who haue seene the same opened 
 and disclosed) certayne wayes and holes there be, bound frome the inner vaute of 
 oure minde, to our eyes, eares, and nosethrilles. And for this cause sometyme it 
 hapneth, that we are so blynded, eyther wyth some sadde thought, or vehemente 
 disease, that oure eyes and eares beynge both hole and open, yet we can neyther 
 heare nor see. So that we may well perceyue, that it is oure mynde, that seeth and 
 heareth, and not those partes, whiche are but the cas mentes of the same. Without 
 the whyche, neuerthelesse, the minde it selfe can perceyue nothinge, vnlesse it be 
 earnestlye bent thereon.41 
Bruce Smith reinforces the key point with his observation that "[r]eason ought to direct 
the passions, but the passions have a friendlier working relationship with the senses."42  
Similarly, Robert Burton despairs that "[p]erturbations and passions which trouble the 
phantasy, though they dwell between the confines of sense and reason, yet they rather 
follow sense than reason, because they are drowned in corporeal organs of sense."43  
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When Othello's senses enter into league with his emotionally-fired "phantasy," he loses 
the steady, rational control that has underpinned his reputation as a "noble" leader in the 
past.  The fatal turn occurs for Othello when he begins to see both himself and 
Desdemona through Iago's corrupt eyes.  The first sting to penetrate Othello's mental 
armor is based on a fact—"She did deceive her father" (3.3.209) to marry him.   
 Carol Hansen identifies Desdemona's deception of her ather as the root of 
Othello's distrust.  Suggesting that misogyny unites Othello, Iago, and Brabantio in a 
"masculine code," Hansen believes Desdemona's very dedication to Othello's love 
appears as a mark against her.44  Iago pitches the circumstances as a fault on her part, 
rather than a boon for Othello: 
 She that, so young, could give out such a seeming, 
 To seal her father's eyes up close as oak- 
 He thought 'twas witchcraft (3.3.211-4) 
This merely reinforces the warning issued by Brabantio when he takes his final leave of 
his daughter and Othello: 
 Look to her, Moor, if thou hast eyes to see: 
 She has deceived her father, and may thee.  (1.3.293-4) 
By forcing Othello to doubt his own vision of Desdemona's virtue, Iago subtly inserts his 
own version of events into the Moor's passion-clouded eyes.  He drives the first dagger of 
suspicion home with the "loving" warning, "Look to y ur wife, observe her well with 
Cassio; / Wear your eye thus, not jealous nor secure" (3.3.200-1).  But Iago is asking the 
Moor for the impossible: he wants him to exist in a st te of uncertainty, something that 
Othello inherently resists because of the fundamental absolutism underlying his 
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character.  He must be either "jealous" or "secure."  Consequently, Othello's vision 
becomes clouded by the acerbated humors stirred up by these innuendos offered by the 
ancient.  Everything he sees and hears with his corporal, outward senses is necessarily 
corrupted because the humors that transfer that inpu to his brain are already 
compromised with jealousy.  All the additional details bout his wife's supposed perfidy 
get filtered through the diseased portals of Othello's senses, adding to the downward 
spiral of his rational faculties.  His zealous desir  to "see" (3.3.193, 3.3.368, and 3.3.447) 
the truth of Desdemona's faith is doomed because his disordered eyes are incapable of 
seeing anything but guilt and his ears only hear the condemnatory suggestions offered by 
Iago, even when the ancient himself entertains counterarguments.45 
 Despite his initial resistance to the contagion, Othello's imagination, his 
"phantasy," starts to turn the "facts" around in his mind; suddenly insecure about 
Desdemona's motives for picking him to be her husband, he hones in on the other idea 
first initiated by her father: by choosing him, Desd mona "err[ed] / Against all rules of 
nature" (1.3.101-2).  Echoing this insidious thought—wondering "how nature, erring 
from itself" (3.3.242) might not be tempted to retun to its like—Othello is firmly caught 
in Iago's aural trap.  Arthur Kirsch explains that "O hello eventually internalizes Iago's 
maleficent sexual vision and sees himself with Iago's eyes, rather than Desdemona's."46  
The Moor's ability to see is soon muddied with his own budding feelings of inadequacy 
and his trust of Iago's "honest" judgment: 
 This fellow's of exceeding honesty 
 And knows all qualities, with a learned spirit, 
 Of human dealings. If I do prove her haggard, 
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 Though that her jesses were my dear heart-strings, 
 I'd whistle her off and let her down the wind 
 To pray at fortune. Haply for I am black 
 And have not those soft parts of conversation 
 That chamberers have, or for I am declined 
 Into the vale of years—yet that's not much  
 She's gone, I am abused, and my relief 
 Must be to loathe her.  (3.3.262-72) 
Iago, feeding the fire of the proto-jealousy, confesses that it is his "fear" that Desdemona, 
no longer finding Othello novel.  "Her will, recoiling to her better judgement" (3.3.240) 
will seek someone "Of her own clime, complexion anddegree" (3.3.234).  Othello, 
suddenly insecure about his complexion, his age, and his rhetorical skills, rapidly comes 
to the conclusion that Desdemona has cuckolded him.47  Iago uses Othello's power of 
imagination against him.  Keith Oatley identifies the correspondence between the Moor's 
self-destructive imagination and Iago's improvisation: “The theatrical model that Iago 
stages works for Othello because its themes resonate with the damaging themes that he 
has already internalized.”48  The general's only relief is to fall back into the familiar 
masculine realm of war where he can "loathe" his wife as the enemy of his manhood. 
 Eric Levy contends that emotions are needed as much as reason in the 
administration of the humoral body; "the fundamental danger posed to reason [. . .] is that 
it might lose sovereignty over motion."49  When Othello digests Iago's contagious 
conceits, his mind starts to lose control over the passions that he has so successfully 
managed in the past.  As Keith Oatley suggests, Iago uses his own emotive power to 
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create "a simulated world to transform Othello's perception, and ultimately his sense of 
himself."50  This influx of foreign emotion, disguised as "love," stems from the hatred 
Iago has for the Moor.  The motive for that malevolnce is not clear—again Shakespeare 
complicates with persistent ambiguity—but the degre of emotion is not feigned.51  As 
Robert Cockcroft points out, in order for Iago to spread his emotional poison effectively, 
he must make Othello think he is seeing and feeling the same things: 
 Where pathos is concerned, Quintillian (like Cicero) insists tha  to move others 
 we must first be moved ourselves.  To do this the persuader must employ the 
 phantasiai or visiones through which ‘things absent are presented to our 
 imagination with such extreme vividness that they s em actually to be before our 
 very eyes,’ a faculty familiar to everyone in the form of daydreaming.  Quintillian 
 shows how a pleader would stir up horror, pity anddetestation through a detailed 
 mental recreation of events on which the mind would dwell in turn, moving itself 
 to feel those emotions so acutely that every aspect of voice, expression, gesture 
 and attitude would impel the audience to share them.52 
This is exactly how Iago operates; creating a false empathy based on his "shows of 
service" (1.1.51), he weaves a deadly tapestry of distorted images that inflame the Moor's 
senses and unbalance his humors.  The unsolicited affects Othello receives from his 
ancient are so effective that Iago, over the course of only one scene (3.3),  turns the 
indulgent Othello who will "deny [Desdemona] nothing" (3.3.83) into a man of hate who 
takes a sacred vow to "ne'er ebb to humble love" (3.3.461) again.  Iago efficiently 
"dashe[s] [Othello's] spirits" (3.3.218) with his innuendos, emphasizing the Moor's 
agitated state by referring to him as "moved" (3.3.221 and 3.3.228) twice during the first 
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segment of the seduction, a claim that the general d nies initially (3.3.219) and then 
reluctantly admits when he qualifies that he is "not much moved" (3.3.228).  Here 
Othello is "moved" by Iago's counterfeit love into a corresponding commitment to the 
ancient, even claiming that he is "bound to [him] for ever" (3.3.217), a circumstance he 
will come to regret mightily.  To fulfill that commitment, the Moor must embrace 
jealousy and repeal his devotion to Desdemona; he cannot be "bound" to them both.53 
 Failure of language signals reason's corruption.  Othello, when he takes on Iago's 
filthy language of lewdness and decay, devolves into the beast that Iago labels him from 
the beginning, at points only able to howl for, "blood, blood, blood!" (3.3.454).  By 
stealing Othello's epic language and replacing it with his own sordid speech, Iago 
"engender[s]" (1.3.402) within the Moor a "monstrous birth" (1.3.403) of decayed 
language.  Melanie H. Ross links Othello's adoption of Iago's linguistic style to a parody 
of the humanistic practice of rhetorical imitation: 
 Rhetorical imitation, the primary method of rhetorical study in Shakespeare's day, 
 entails  taking in words from one another until, in the ideal Erasmian version, they 
 merge into one's own words and self to emerge as something new and original 
 yet deeply stamped and impressed by the source of imitation.  The resulting 
 creation is imbued with the spirit of both self and other, a mixture and 
 synthesis of both.54 
The Moor's capacity for jealousy and violence, heretofore kept under rigid control by his 
"tranquil mind" (3.3.351), emerges from the synthesis of his words and Iago's ideas.  This 
fusion necessarily destroys the original Moor, replacing him with an Iago-ized replica so 
changed that Desdemona exclaims, "My lord is not my lord, nor should I know him / 
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Were he in favour as in humour altered (3.4.125-6).  In her exploration of rhetorical 
subjectivity, Lynn Enterline states that what a person says, either about themselves or 
others, reflects "a speaker's idea of what counts as 'worthy' or 'unworthy,' [which] will 
carry with it all the culturally inflected baggage of gender, sexuality, and generation that 
defines the speaker's social position." 55  Iago, with his diseased, misogynistic, lewd 
discourse conveys a disgust and hatred for everyone that he encounters, though he 
disguises it when it is politic.  Guarding one's voice becomes necessary for the 
preservation of one's own "parts," "title," and "soul" (1.2.31);  in Othello's case, the 
moment he begins to adopt Iago's brand of rhetoric is the moment he becomes firmly 
ensnared in Iago's web of emotional pestilence. 
 Gayle Greene also links Othello's preoccupation with absolutes to the failure of 
his language and, eventually, his reason: 
 We hear [. . .] in words like 'never', 'all', 'forever', a tendency to absolutes which 
 points to an inability to tolerate ambiguity or uncertainty, a failure of irony.56   
Unable to discern truth and reality from lies and fantasy, the Moor quickly goes mad.  His 
need for stasis and verisimilitude is imbedded in the significant if-then statements he is 
wont to throw out; for example: 
 Excellent wretch! perdition catch my soul 
 But I do love thee!  and when I love the not 
 Chaos is come again.  (3.3.90-2) 
or 
 And on the proof there is no more but this: 
 Away at once love or jealousy!  (3.3.194-5)57 
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For Othello, life is based on a series of opposing dichotomies, good and evil, light and 
dark, love and hate; Arthur Kirsch notes that even as the Moor slides into humoral 
agitation and eventual madness, "the absolutism chara terizes him throughout."58  Iago's 
strategy works precisely because Othello cannot linger in doubt.   
 A man of action who scoffs at the mutability of the moon (3.3.181), Othello must 
be "resolved" (3.3.183) to purge the doubt Iago's gssip has instigated.  Experientially, 
doubt itself, the root of all fearful jealousy, is the emotion that jars the Moor from his 
solid rational foundation.  Humorally "chang[ing] with [Iago's] poison" (3.3.328), and 
merged with him in rhetorical similitude, Othello chooses the familiarity of the male 
bond over the anxiety of the marriage pact.  Othello renounces both his "occupation" 
(3.3.360) and "fond love" (3.3.448), trading them both for "black vengeance" (3.3.450) 
on the shaky evidence relayed to him by Iago.  He even acknowledges the possibility that 
Iago is "slander[ing]" Desdemona to "torture" him (3.3.371), yet he still thinks Iago 
"honest."  The Moor's decision to murder his wife ends up being based on the "shows" 
(1.1.51) of love orchestrated by his deceitful ancie t: 
 I think thou dost [love me]; 
 And, for I know thou'rt full of love and honesty, 
 And weigh'st thy words before thou givest them breath, 
 Therefore these stops of thine fright me the more: 
 For such things in a false disloyal knave 
 Are tricks of custom, but in a man that's just 
 They are close delations, working from the heart 
 That passion cannot rule.  (3.3.120-7) 
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As Patricia Parker asserts, "'dilation' is a particularly pronounced form of elaboration, 
traditionally referring to a visual format—show me ore—but also conveyed through the 
augmentation of narrative description."59 Othello's confidence that Iago cannot feign the 
artful hesitations and coyly constructed details of Desdemona's supposed infidelity is 
sorely misplaced.  The Moor ignores Iago's warnings of his own "jealous" (3.3.150) 
nature and disregards the ancient's hint that he should "take no notice" of his "imperfect [. 
. . ] conceits" (3.3.152-3).  Othello even accuses him of "conspir[ing] against [his] friend" 
(3.3.154) when Iago pretends to shy away from disclosing all the dilatory details; the 
Moor's active prying makes him complicit in his own u doing.   
Corporal Contamination 
O beware, my lord, of jealousy! 
It is the green-eyed monster, which doth mock 
The meat it feeds on.   
 ~ Shakespeare, Othello (3.3.167-9) 
 
 In early modern humoral theory, the body, mind, and spirit are all subject to 
humoral excitement and contagion; all of the system are integrated.  Passions are 
significant forces within the microcosm of the indivi ual, helping to regulate a person's 
response to internal and external stimuli.  Thomas Wright, author of The Passions of the 
Mind in General (1604), reminds us: 
 [W]hen these affections are stirring in our minds they alter the humours of our 
 bodies, causing some passion or alteration in them.60 
When Othello accuses Iago of "ensnar[ing his] soul and body" (5.2.299) he is speaking 
quite literally.  Certainly Othello's last actions—murdering his wife and then committing 
suicide—would qualify as blots against his soul in the Christian paradigm of the 
Renaissance, but I believe this line is meant to convey the depth of emotion that Iago 
thrusts upon the Moor.  Affect leads to action, so Othello is implicitly moving the blame 
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for the tragic events from himself onto Iago, the instigator of his "extreme" (5.2.344) 
jealousy.61  Though Othello tells his captors that he is "an ho ourable murderer" 
(5.2.291) who acted only "in honour" (5.2.292), all signs leading up to the murder point 
to a man mad with passion; despite the external prom ts, ultimately the Moor is still 
responsible for his actions, both legally and spiritually.  Even with his prevarication, 
Othello recognizes this when he imagines Desdemona greeting him on Judgment Day: 
"This look of thine will hurl my soul from heaven / And fiends will snatch at it" (5.2.272-
3). 
 Jealousy, a type of "ire," or anger, "tyrannizeth and consumeth both body and 
mind," according to Wright.62  Soon after Iago's affective poison begins to spread through 
Othello's imagination, his body begins to exhibit evid nce of his affliction.  During his 
first encounter with Desdemona after Iago's warnings of her infidelity, the Moor 
complains of a headache characterized as a "pain upo  [his] forehead" (3.3.288), and 
speaks so softly and hesitantly to Desdemona that she knows immediately that he is 
unwell (3.3.287).  Although many critics commonly refer to his claim as a fear of the 
horns of cuckoldry, there is no reason to believe that his head does not actually hurt.63  
Considering the emotional and mental stress he is suddenly under and his subsequent 
epileptic seizure, a headache would be a logical physical symptom of his unbalanced 
humoral condition.  His "salt and sullen rheum" (3.4.51) in the next scene can also be 
read as a pretense to get Desdemona to produce his handkerchief.  But an overflow of 
bodily humors—especially "salt" and "rheum" which are ssociated with phlegm, the 
humor ruled by the brain—also explicitly relates to humoral imbalance.  Basically, 
Othello's mind is so overcome with the plethora of mental humors stirred up by Iago's 
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emotional contagion, his body is trying to purge some of the excess through his eyes and 
nose. 
 As Iago's malevolent "medicine" (4.1.45) spreads through Othello's mind and 
body, other symptoms appear, getting progressively worse as his condition deteriorates.     
"[E]aten up with passion"  (3.3.394), he begins to appear less and less in control of both 
his words and actions.  As his "strange unquietness" (3.4.134) gives way to "savage 
madness" (4.1.55), Iago celebrates that there is nothing Othello can do to escape the 
passion that has him in thrall: 
 Look where he comes.  Not poppy nor mandragora 
 Nor all the drowsy syrups of the world 
 Shall ever medicine thee to that sweet sleep 
 Which thou owedst yesterday. (3.3.333-6) 
In one sense, the ancient is correct:  Othello cannot be cured of his excess choler and 
melancholy by simple pharmaceutical concoctions.  His only possible cure is to have 
"ocular proof" of his wife's faithfulness so his faculty of reason can reassert its dominion 
over his passions.  And even that might not slake the one humoral imbalance that Robert 
Burton thinks may be incurable.64  Once jealousy takes root in Othello's imagination, his 
mind creates "cause[s]", even where there are none.  As Emilia says, "It is a monster / 
Begot upon itself, born on itself  (3.4.159-62).65 
 Othello, "overwhelmed with grief" (4.1.77), exhibits uncharacteristic and 
decidedly unmanly behavior, at least according to the masculine standards attributed to 
the time period.  Iago chides him about his seizure, a "passion most unsuiting such a 
man" (4.1.78), even as he continues his subtle goading.  Since Iago's goal has been to 
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unman Othello since the beginning, his progressive weakness is met with the ancient's 
secret delight.  Not so, Lodovico, who witnesses Othello's unleashed rage when he strike 
Desdemona in public:  "Are his wits safe? is he not light of brain?" (4.1.269) queries the 
astonished Venetian.  From the height of rage, Othello fluctuates into despair.  His brain's 
extreme unbalance, mostly reflected in his behavior, also manifests itself in a medically 
recognizable way: crying.  Tears, referred to as the "brain's thinnest excrement" by 
Timothy Bright,66 were understood in early modern medical texts as "being eliminated by 
the compression of the brain through open channels of the body being provided for this 
purpose."67  As Desdemona continues to deny that she has played him false, the Moor 
starts weeping (4.2.43-4), an action seen as a "sympto  of melancholy" as well as an 
"outlet for passions."68  In Othello's case, both seem applicable.  The extremi ies of his 
emotion have to find a physical outlet if he is to prevent another epileptic seizure and 
move towards a resolution to his imbalance, and, as a man consumed with jealousy, 
Othello is in the throes of what Robert Burton refes to as an extremity of "love-
melancholy."69 
 Desdemona, still unable to believe Othello is jealous and explaining away his 
strange behavior as a product of matters of state, observes other physical manifestations 
of her husband's humoral distress: 
 Alas, why gnaw you so your nether lip? 
 Some bloody passion shakes your very frame (5.2.43) 
and 
 And yet I fear you; for you are fatal then 
 When your eyes roll so    (5.2.37-8) 
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Like Tarquin consumed by his "rage of lust," Othello is overcome physically, mentally, 
and emotionally by jealousy, a "A wound that so infects the soul and heart, / As all our 
sense and reason it doth master."70  With all three of his internal systems—emotional, 
physical, and mental—under seige, the Moor must take action to "relie[ve]" (3.3.271) the 
"bloody passion" that consumes him.  Though he calms down from his initial desire to 
"tear her all to pieces" (3.3.434), Othello's corrupted sense of justice requires that he 
"sacrifice" (5.2.65) his wife lest she "betray more m n" (5.2.6).   
Imaginary Crimes and Hasty Judgment 
Imagination.  This is the dominant part of man, this mistress of error and of falsity, and still more 
treacherous since it is not always so;  for it would be an infallible rule of truth if it were an infallible rule 
of lies.  But, being most often false, it gives no mark of its quality, marking the true and the false with 
the same character.   
          ~ Blaise Pascal,  Pensées 
 
 Othello, unable to control his seething humors, allows the poison-induced passion 
to operate as “a tragic or fatal force” driving him to kill his wife and order his friend's 
murder.71  His darkened vision, infected by the Iago's relayd images, can no longer 
distinguish between truth and lies, crippling his power to reason.72  Othello's decisive 
move towards action is based, like all the "proofs" (3.3.444) against Desdemona, on 
Iago's verbal poison and his carefully orchestrated spectacles.73  Othello declares that he 
"[does] see 'tis true" (3.3.447) that Desdemona is f lse after his ancient professes to have 
observed "Cassio wip[ing] his beard" (3.3.442) with the handkerchief the general gifted 
his wife.  The provoking image —ripe with the sexual innuendo of Cassio's masculinity 
ruffling Desdemona's virtue—pushes the Moor over th edge.  Already having dismissed 
the need for "ocular proof," Othello accepts the proffered circumstantial evidence as fact.  
He accepts Iago's paradigm of acceptable evidence: 
 If imputation and strong circumstances 
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 Which lead directly to the door of truth 
 Will give you satisfaction, you may have't.  (3.3.409-11) 
Katherine Eisaman Maus, in her look at the correspondence between English criminal 
prosecution in the early modern period and Othello's initial demand for ocular proof, 
explains that the difficulty of obtaining evidence for crimes of a sexual nature led to the 
acceptance of strong circumstantial evidence as acceptable proof.74  She identifies 
Desdemona's assertion that she has not abused the Moor "either in discourse of thought or 
actual deed" (4.2.155) as a recognition that she can be condemned for both physical 
crimes (actual adultery) and "thought-crimes," a category usually reserved for "treason or 
witchcraft."75  Othello, taking on the role of co-accuser, judge, and executioner, is 
deluded into thinking he has sufficient evidence to xecute the death penalty and that the 
law is on his side. 
 Othello uses Desdemona's naturally sanguine complexion—the embodiment of 
youth, happiness, optimism, and love—as one point of condemnation: 
 Hot, hot, and moist: this hand of yours requires 
 A sequester from liberty, fasting and prayer, 
 Much castigation, exercise devout; 
 For here's a young and sweating devil, here, 
 That commonly rebels.  (3.4.39-43) 
Unsure of her husband's cryptic words, Desdemona blithely answers that it is her hot and 
moist nature that enabled her to give him her heart.  Dwelling on the humoral and 
physical signs of his wife's passionate nature, the Moor is further incensed by 
Desdemona's subsequent, unwise pursuit of having Cassio reinstated.  Thinking only to 
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steer the conversation away from the missing handkerchief, Desdemona inadvertently 
compounds the evidence against her.  Othello's "mind isgives" (3.4.91) at what he sees 
as the confirmations of his wife's duplicity:  biologic evidence in her complexion, 
physical evidence in the missing "napkin" (3.3.291), and verbal evidence from her pleas 
on Cassio's behalf; her guilt becomes a "foregone cclusion" (3.3.430).  Under the 
hypnotizing affect supplied by his ancient, Othello's imagination becomes murderous: 
 If there be cords, or knives, 
 Poison, or fire, or suffocating streams, 
 I'll not endure it. Would I were satisfied!  (3.3.391-3) 
Ultimately, he links his satisfaction with her death, unaware that his rage's fulfillment 
will bring about his own destruction. 
 Whatever the evidence or lack thereof, Othello's act of "honourable murder" 
(5.2.291) is fundamentally based on his feelings of jealousy and inadequacy.  The Moor's 
mind, reputed to be "clear" (3.4.144), "tranquil" (3.3.351), and "true" (3.4.27), merely 
needs the right poison to "misgive" (3.4.91).  Like his friend Cassio who cannot hold his 
wine, Othello cannot curb his fear of being betrayed.  Once his palate is w[h]etted, the 
general is unable to contain his jealous intoxication.  Seeing marriage's curse as the 
inability for men to control their wive's "appetites" (3.3.274), the Moor has a greater 
concern for how he is perceived as a result of her infidelity rather than the infidelity 
itself.76  He tells Iago that he would have been "happy" if all the men of the camp had had 
her as long as he "had nothing known" (3.3.348-50);  but now that he does "know" she 
has been untrue, the consequences include the loss of his "occupation" (3.3.360), 
implying that her infidelity strips him of his personal and professional honor.  At the 
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moment he truly decides to murder her, requesting that Iago provide him with some 
poison (an office the ancient excels at, unbeknownst to Othello), he cries out "Cuckold 
me!" (4.1.196) in astonishment, quickly followed by "With mine officer!" (4.1.198).  The 
fear of losing Desdemona becomes conflated with the fear of losing his manhood.  This 
dual fear is the cause for the general's drastic justice, not the puritanical prevention of 
future whoring that he alludes to the night of the murder. 
 Othello's first violent motions against Desdemona a d Cassio do not refer to 
justice or sacrifice—he employs the language of "black vengeance" (3.3.450) and 
"tyrannous hate" (3.3.452), full of "bloody thoughts" (3.3.460), even raging that he will 
"chop her into messes" (4.1.196).  His mind is completely undone by hate contracted 
from Iago under the guise of love.  The Moor's language, a reflection of his rational mind, 
shows signs of decay, moving from an epic elegance to misogynistic abuse, stilted 
images, animal-like roaring.  Elizabeth Stiller explains the early modern medical basis for 
Othello's complete transformation: 
 From a medical perspective, love-sickness [of which jealousy was the most 
 extreme form] was understood to be a malign humoral imbalance that arose when 
 an image (presumably of the beloved) led to a malfunctioning of the would-be 
 lover's brain.  Visual images came into the body in the sensus communis, ited in 
 the normally warm and moist first ventricle of the brain.  Sense perceptions would 
 normally then be transferred to the central ventricle, the hottest part of the brain, 
 which was the site of reason and imagination, while the last ventricle, cool and 
 dry, provided a place in which ideas and sense perce tions could be collected and 
 stored for later use.  In those who suffered from l ve-melancholy, though, these 
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 transfers between the ventricles did not happen; instead, the "estimative faculty" 
 of the second ventricle seemed to focus intently and persistently on the image of 
 the beloved, drawing the heat and moisture from the ot er parts of the brain and 
 body.  When the body responded to a visual image in this manner, it caused 
 profound and dangerous changes in the humoral balance nd physical 
 complexion.77 
In Othello's case, the "fond love" (3.3.448) he has for Desdemona at the beginning of the 
play paves the way for his subsequent imbalance; the image of Desdemona's virtuous 
perfection preoccupies the central ventricle of his brain, beginning the overheating 
process.  Iago's emotional poison changes Othello's initial "dot[ing]" (2.1.205) image of 
Desdemona into an obsessive portrait of betrayal.  The more he thinks about the 
possibilities of her "stolen hours of lust" (3.3.341), the hotter his brain burns.  Unable to 
recognize his own dangerous medical condition, the Moor believes his only "relief" 
(3.3.271) is to "loathe her" (3.3.272), a form of hatred that only excites his humoral 
system to an even higher pitch, rather than offering him the outlet that he desires.  Like a 
perpetual engine, the general's jealousy circulated through his humorally unbalanced 
body, feeding wave after wave of the destructive emotion driving him towards murder.78 
 Othello's rational faculties are so affected by his inordinate passion that his 
motives for killing Desdemona are no longer clear, ven to himself:  
 It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul, 
 Let me not name it to you, you chaste stars! 
 It is the cause. Yet I'll not shed her blood; 
 Nor scar that whiter skin of hers than snow, 
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 And smooth as monumental alabaster. 
 Yet she must die, else she'll betray more men.  (5.2.1-6) 
Othello, the jealous husband, is transformed into Othello, the protector of his fellow men.  
Overcome by warring emotions as he gazes at his sleeping wife, the Moor begins to cry 
again: 
    I must weep, 
 But they are cruel tears.  This sorrow's heavenly, 
 It strikes where it doth love. (5.2.20-22) 
According to Marjory E. Lange, "[i]n order for weeping to occur, the heart must be 
moved.  Fear and sorrow contract the heart, whose vapors rise to the brain, which also 
contracts, producing tears,"79 demonstrating Othello's conflict between the original love 
he had for his wife and the jealous fear that drives him towards murder.  For just a 
moment, he is "almost persuade[d]" (5.2.16) that Desdemona should live, but jealousy 
infecting his brain cannot be sufficiently purged by a few tears. 
 Constructing the annihilation of his wife as a necessary, even religious, sacrifice 
(5.2.65), Othello's plan is marred by Desdemona's refusal to confess her "sins" (5.2.40).  
Full of "heavenly" sorrow, likened by E. A. J. Honigmann to the sorrow God feels when 
he must chastise a sinning human, the general sets about the execution.80  Following 
"merciful" (5.2.86) Christian protocol, he makes sure Desdemona has a chance to 
unburden her soul before her "mouth is stopped" (5.2.71).  Her counter-arguments, based 
on reason and truth, only enrage him, turning his heart to "stone" (5.2.63)81, preventing 
any further internal debate about whether he should "put out the light" (5.2.7) or not.  
Nothing can now "remove or choke the strong conception" (5.2.55) thrust onto the Moor 
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by his deceitful ancient, no matter how hard his wife "strive[s]" (5.2.80) to plead her 
innocence.  Without foresight or remorse, crying "Down, strumpet!" (5.2.78), Othello 
throttles Desdemona on their wedding sheets.   
 Immediately undermining his claim that the "cause" i  one of sacrificial love, the 
Moor is disgusted when he finds out that Cassio has survived the attempt on his life: 
    Not Cassio killed? 
 Then murder is out of tune, and sweet revenge 
 Grows harsh.   (5.2.113-5) 
Othello quickly learns that his "great revenge" (5.2.74) is nothing but an unforgivable, 
unconscionable mistake.  Arthur Kirsch believes that "[Othello's] eventual destruction of 
[Desdemona] is itself an irremissable, suicidal act.  He has loved her as his own flesh, 
and when he destroys her, he destroys the basis of h wn existence."82  As Iago's base 
plot unfolds, the Moor regains enough of his senses to realize that he has committed a 
grave error, wrongly murdering his "heavenly true" (5.2.133) wife and, in doing so, 
"damned [himself] beneath all depth in hell" (5.2.135).  He can no longer rely on his 
"perfect soul" for guidance, his "title" is revoked and given to Cassio (5.2.329-30), and 
his "parts" (1.2.31) are forever tainted by the "monstrous act" (5.2.186) that cannot be 
undone.  Othello is, in fact, polluted by the sin he has committed, both "body and soul" 
(5.2.299).  The holistic relationship between all of the aspects of the humoral body—
mental, emotional, and spiritual—necessitate this cro s contamination. 
 Ironically, Othello's acknowledgement of his disead state seems to return a 
modicum of clarity to his sense of sight.  Gazing o Desdemona's dead body after Iago's 
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plot is revealed, the Moor suddenly "sees" the truth of her fidelity and his "slave[ry]" 
(5.2.274) to corruption: 
 Now: how dost thou look now? O ill-starr'd wench, 
 Pale as thy smock. 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
             Cold, cold, my girl, 
 Even like thy chastity. O cursed, cursed slave! 
 Whip me, ye devils, 
 From the possession of this heavenly sight! 
 Blow me about in winds, roast me in sulphur, 
 Wash me in steep-down gulfs of liquid fire!  (5.2.270-1, 273-8) 
Her pallor, coldness, and "snow" white skin (5.2.4) can now be read as signs of her 
enduring "chastity," physical evidence of her purity that Othello could not recognize in 
his inflamed state.  His own actions, in light of her innocence, appear "horrible and grim" 
(5.2.201) and make him nothing more than a "cursed slave" who was unable to regulate 
his passions.  Unable to wait for the punishment that he imagines awaits at the hands of 
the "devils," the Moor develops a plan for self-punishment. 
 Bereft of the very thing he was insistent on protecting—"honour"—the Othello 
mirrors the split identity experienced by Lucrece aft r her rape; he answers Lodovico's 
summons with "he that was Othello" (5.2.281), recognizing that the murder rewrites his 
entire identity. 83  He is no longer the "noble and valiant general" (2.2.1-2), just as 
Lucrece is no longer the "chaste wife" in the aftermath of her forced league with Tarquin.  
Othello develops a redemptive strategy similar to Lucrece's: believing "'tis happiness to 
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die" (5.2.287), Othello sets the stage for his suicide, hoping to rewrite his "honour" 
(5.2.292) in blood.  He seems to come to the same conclusion as Lucrece that: 
 'Tis honour to deprive dishonoured life; 
 The one will live, the other being dead. 
 So of shame's ashes shall my fame be bred, 
      For in my death I murder shameful scorn; 
      My shame so dead, mine honour is new born.  (Lucrece, 1186-90) 
The Moor concludes that there may be one way to expunge the black contagion which 
has separated "valiant" Othello from his "perfect soul" (1.2.31)—kill the part of himself 
that "traduced" (5.2.352) the natural order of love (5.2.42). 
 Setting the stage of his judicial self-murder, Othello begins by reminding the 
company that he has "done the state some service" (5.2.337), drawing attention to his past 
greatness in the hopes that they will couch his dishonorable story in the context of his 
previous virtues.  He regains his pre-jealousy storytelling ability, asking the Venetians to 
speak: 
 Of one that loved not wisely but too well; 
 Of one not easily jealous, but being wrought 
 Perplex'd in the extreme; of one whose hand, 
 Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away 
 Richer than all his tribe; of one whose subdued eyes, 
 Albeit unused to the melting mood, 
 Drop tears as fast as the Arabian trees 
 Their medicinal gum.   (5.2.342-9) 
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The Moor's attempt to preserve the trappings of his "occupation" is at once self-
delusional and accurate: the jealousy he experiences is " xtreme," a product of both 
inherent tendencies and the evil machinations of a trusted fellow soldier, but it is hard to 
stomach his claim that he loved "too well" or that e was "not easily jealous."  His 
description of Desdemona as a "pearl" of great worth potentially backfires since it plays 
into the misogynistic language introduced by Iago who labels her a "land carrack" 
(1.2.50) at the beginning of the play, turning his w fe into a commodity instead of a 
living, loving human being.  The metaphor meant to emphasize his mistaken carelessness 
merely reinforces the disconnect between Othello's emotional understanding of events 
and his rational one: he has irrevocably silenced th  woman who loves him enough to 
forgive him her own murder, not lost a bauble.  Last, he outright lies about the humoral 
overflow from his brain—"the melting mood" has been plaguing him from his first foray 
into jealousy.  The "medicinal" tears he weeps here at his own death give further 
evidence of his continued imbalance.  His sorrow cannot be mitigated by tears alone, so a 
thorough blood-letting is in order. 
 Like Lucrece, Othello carefully constructs the spectacle of his suicide for 
maximum effect.  As his speech gathers force, the general again refers back to the deeds 
that have won him fame and admiration in the past: 
 Set you down this; 
 And say besides, that in Aleppo once, 
 Where a malignant and a turban'd Turk 
 Beat a Venetian and traduced the state, 
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 I took by the throat the circumcised dog, 
 And smote him, thus.  (5.2.349-54) 
Whereas Lucrece reestablishes her chastity by setting an example for all future wives to 
follow, Othello attempts to reinvigorate his honor by following his own historic example.  
Split into the "noble" soldier who has protected the interests of Venice and the 
"malignant" "dog" that murdered his wife, the Moor exacts the same mortal justice he 
required for Desdemona.  Through heroic suicide, Othello seems to regain a modicum of 
his honor, leaving Iago to face retribution for the"tragic loading of [the] bed"  (5.2.361).  
The humoral turbulence traced in the play points to the real "cause" of Othello's 
murderous rage but refuses to completely exonerate him from responsibility for his tragic 
actions.   If the Moor's premonition of hell is any i dication, further payment for his 
black deed will be exacted in the afterlife. 
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“O Bloody Period!”: Conclusions about Tragedy and the Transmission of Affect 
 
 In the previous pages, I argue that emotions, embodied as humors in the 
Renaissance medical theory current in Shakespeare’s day, transcend bodily 
boundaries, influencing the actions of the main protag nists in each of these tragic 
stories.  With these explorations of the way humoral influences exert varying levels of 
control over the behavior and actions of the characte s in the texts, I hope to have 
brought yet another subtle layer of analysis to the critical discussion of each, not to 
replace other critical approaches.  I have examined each work with an eye to what 
other primary sources from the period say about humors, emotions, and the 
consequences of humoral imbalance, in an effort to capture the historical context in 
which Shakespeare wrote and thought.  In the end, I believe this dissertation adds to 
the already rich discourse of current early modern studies dedicated to the body by 
drawing attention to the humoral exchange between both individuals themselves and 
individuals and the environment as a whole. 
 In both Shakespeare’s and his contemporaries’ works, humoral balance is 
dependent on emotional balance and vice versa; one cannot exist without the other 
because of the humorally imbedded nature of the passion  themselves.  In each of the 
works examined here, an overabundance of a particular emotion causes the humoral 
imbalance that sets violent purges in motion.  So, in a very concrete way, emotion 
leads to action.  In both Julius Caesar and Othello, the primary emotion is fear.  Fear 
of what Caesar may do and fear of losing reputation and power in the wake of "new 
honours" (1.2.133) bestowed on Caesar motivate the murderous actions of both 
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Brutus and Cassius.  For Othello, jealousy is both the fear of losing the beloved to 
another and the insidious terror that the person whom you trust may betray you.  Even 
for Iago, one could argue that he suffers from jealousy: he alludes to both losing his 
position of power within Othello's regiment and Emilia's loyalty even as he admits to 
Othello that he is plagued with jealousy (3.3.150).  Envy, another melancholic excess, 
may seem a better fit for Iago, and it certainly describes one aspect of Tarquin's "rash 
false heat" (48).  Based on the fear that one's posessions or attributes are not good 
enough, "envy of so rich a thing" (39) is one aspect of Tarquin's mad dash to rape 
Lucrece.  However, in this last text, pure "lust" (156) eclipses fear as the motivational 
force for the Prince, the initial recipient of emotional contagion.  Lucrece, who 
receives the “load of lust” (734) from Tarquin, is al o motivated by a form of fear.  
Like Cassio who laments his lost reputation, that "immortal part of [himself]" 
(2.3.259-60), Lucrece fears that her reputation as a chaste wife is irrevocably 
damaged by her rape.  Her decision to sacrifice herself to prove that her mind remains 
"untainted" (1710) hinges on this fear as well as grief over what has befallen her. 
 In all three texts, humoral imbalance is a result of contamination via bodily 
openings, especially eyes and ears.  Tarquin is aurally and ocularly ravished by 
Lucrece’s beauty; Brutus is “moved” (1.2.166) by Cassius’ oratory skills and Antony 
makes the most of the “len[t]” ears of his “countrymen” (3.2.74); and Othello is 
overwhelmed by the poison Iago "pour[s]" "into his ear" (2.3.351) even as he 
searches for “ocular proof” (3.3.363) of his wife’s infidelity.  In the Renaissance, both 
senses were considered particularly vulnerable to ou side influences because a person 
cannot easily fortress eyes or ears against sensory input.  The role of the eye is 
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especially important in Lucrece, where there is evidence of the early modern 
extramission theory of vision, an explanation of sight where the eye actually emits 
ocular rays that can influence the actions and humors of another person.  In Othello, 
this idea manifests itself at the end of the play where Lodovico claims that the 
tragically loaded bed “poisons sight” (5.2.362), alluding to agency on the part of the 
tragic “object” (5.2.362) which shares the room with him.  Intentionality is not 
necessary for either a person or an object to influe ce the humors of the people 
through ocular and aural sensory input.  In each of t e works examined here, the 
sensory input creates a humoral plethora that requis purgation, a purification that 
has tragic consequences. 
 Imagination, also referred to as phantasy, plays a significant role in exciting a 
humoral imbalance in the protagonists in each text. In Renaissance medical theory, 
the brain is divided into three ventricles: the first ventricle that processes all of the 
sensory input from the physical body, the central ventricle which is the seat of both 
the imagination and reason, and the cool and dry last ventricle where ideas and sense 
perceptions are stored in memory.  The early modern imagination’s function—quite 
different from our post-Romantic notions—is to help translate sensory input to 
common sense, or reason, and then move the results into memory and back again as 
needed; it is also seen as the force that communicates mental results to the rest of the 
body.  Although phantasy is supposed to be subject to rational control, emotional 
agitation and humoral imbalance can cause it to take control of common sense.  In 
each text under consideration, imagination is hijacked by the unbalanced humors of 
the protagonists, leading to the failure of reason and to tragic action.  For Tarquin, the 
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imagined "froth of fleeting joy" (212) he will obtain by raping Lucrece eclipses all 
else, most especially the rational arguments that would prevent his sexual indulgence.  
Brutus, in comparison, seems much more restrained than Tarquin and appears to be 
using rational argument to make his case against Caesar; however, his desire to "kill 
[Caesar] in the shell" (2.1.34) relies almost exclusively on the fear of what "may" 
(2.1.17, 2.1.27, 2.1.28) happen, and Brutus' preoccupation with the future is clearly 
symptomatic of an overactive imagination.  He never does produce concrete evidence 
against Caesar, merely alluding to Caesar's "ambition" (3.2.28) as the foundation for 
the assassination.  Last, Othello's rapid deterioration is a result of a faulty 
imagination.  All of the "proof" (3.3.194) produced by Iago to prove Desdemona's 
infidelity only rings true in Othello's phantasy.  His seething brain misreads the 
sensory input brought in by his eyes and ears and corrupted imagination creates an 
alternative reality where Iago is Othello's best friend and Desdemona is foul. 
 Additionally, a human instigator exists in each work, a person whose aural or 
visual input incites a humoral plethora in another agent.  In the case of Iago, the 
inflammatory stimuli are intentional.  He plants seeds of doubt in the Moor’s ear, 
playing on his fear of losing Desdemona in an effort t  drive him “even to madness” 
(2.1.309).  In Julius Caesar, Cassius serves as an Iago-like figure; he does 
intentionally “move” Brutus to join the faction with his well-placed derogatory 
comments about Caesar and by playing on Brutus’ exiting fears of Caesar’s possible 
tyranny, but there are other external factors at work as well.  I argue that the heavens 
and the environment also offer an incentive for Brutus and the rest of the faction to 
act even as they send a warning to Caesar about the murderous conspiracy against 
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him.  In Lucrece, the instigator is none other than the heroine’s husband, who 
inadvertently rouses Tarquin’s vicious lust.  Whether intentional or not, in each case a 
humoral imbalance is created and the resulting actions wreak tragic consequences on 
both the agents and their loved ones, particularly their wives. 
 The way contamination affects the individual is alo dependent on his or her 
natural temperament.  Complexion, or the natural humoral tendencies of an 
individual, plays a significant role in how agents act when exposed to emotional 
contagion in each of the texts under consideration.  But rather than being a reductive 
force that makes Shakespeare’s characters simple stereotypes, here complexions 
inform and complicate the actions of the characters.  Tarquin is choleric, easily 
inflamed with anger, an anger that manifests itself as an overwhelming desire to 
physically possess his friend Collatine’s wife, even if it destroys her.  Brutus, the 
classic scholastic melancholic, retreats from the world, unable to eat or sleep until he 
reaches the conclusion that Caesar’s death is the only thing that will solve his, and the 
republic’s, problems.  Othello, burdened with both extreme love for his wife (a type 
of melancholy) and the choleric humors supposedly inherent in those from a hot 
climate, loses his well-documented balance soon after Iago begins his campaign of 
reverse psychology.  All of these characters react in ways that align with their 
humoral tendencies, but Shakespeare is careful not to overtly blame the humors as the 
only cause.  In each case, free will offers them the ability to overcome the influence 
of the humors but their rational faculties lack thestrength to regulate the ultimately 
overwhelming emotions they experience. 
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 Physical evidence of humoral plethora occurs in each work, although the visual 
proof of that condition is most dramatic in The Rape of Lucrece.  When Lucrece 
conducts her prescribed bloodletting, "some of her blood still pure and red remained, / 
and some looked black, and that false Tarquin stained" (1742-3).  The corrupted 
blood is black like the uncontrollable lust, the "glow[ing]" "coal" (47) that the Prince 
contains in his own plethoric state prior to the rape.  Lucrece's contamination is not 
metaphorical.  The pollution is real and evident in the separate streams of her post-
mortem blood.  Concrete humoral evidence is scarcer in Julius Caesar and relies 
more heavily on behaviors than on physical evidence.  P rhaps the clearest diagnosis 
of humoral overabundance comes from Portia, who tells Brutus that he has "some 
sick offense within [his] mind" (2.1.267), an "effect of humour" (2.1.249) which 
prevents him from eating, sleeping, and talking with o hers.  Brutus himself discusses 
his internal war twice in the text, alluding to the struggle between his love for Caesar 
as a person and his need to destroy him in the name of "the general good" (1.2.85).  In 
Othello, the Moor exhibits several physical symptoms of his humoral imbalance 
including tears on several occasions, a "salt and sullen rheum" (3.4.51) and what Iago 
refers to as epileptic seizures.  I argue that the epilepsy is an inherent condition that 
only manifests itself as the extremity of humoral imbalance overtakes Othello, but the 
tears and the "rheum" are both specific symptoms of the emotional disease inflicted 
on him by his ancient.  In early modern science, tears and other manifestations of 
phlegm signaled an unhealthy compression of the brain where the leaking fluids were 





 Just as medical treatises of the time recommended bloodletting to cure cases of 
physical plethora, a form of bloodletting is required in each text to restore the main 
agents to humoral balance.  Tarquin may, at least tmporarily, purge his excess by 
raping Lucrece, expelling his overabundant blood in the form of semen, and Lucrece 
inherits his load of lust which requires her to “let forth” her own “defilèd blood” 
(1029) through suicide.  Similarly, Othello thinks to eliminate his jealous rage—a 
symptom of extreme love-melancholy—by sacrificing his polluted wife.  His relief is 
short-lived, the “horrible and grim” “act” (5.2.201) he attempts to disguise as an 
“honourable murder” (5.2.291) creates a new plethora of grief in light of her 
innocence.  Othello then follows in Lucrece’s footsteps in an effort to restore his 
reputation, letting forth his traitorous “Turk” (5.2.351) blood in a bid to return at least 
a modicum of his former “valiant” (2.2.2) reputation.  Brutus plays physician to 
Caesar, lecturing the faction that they are to be “purgers” (2.1.179) because Caesar 
“must bleed” (2.1.170) for his ambition.  To Brutus, Caesar represents a plethora in 
the state of Rome itself and his bleeding will restore the republic to its proper 
motions.  The turbulent heavens signal the imbalance i  the state of Rome and order 
can only be restored through the “sacrifice” (2.1.165) of Caesar.  Even if his initial 
diagnosis is correct, the bloody mutilation of Caesar’s corpse and the ensuing 
revelation of that “bloody sight” (3.2.198) to the commoners, creates a new plethora 
that can only be assuaged by the death of Brutus and the conspirators. 
 Humoral influences, sometimes described as overwhelming forces beyond the 
protagonist’s command, ultimately do not control the fate of the tragic agent, and 
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Shakespeare is very careful not to ascribe absolute control to the humors.  Rather, just 
as a physical illness may hamper some people from co pleting a task while others 
laboring under the same debilitating condition go on to finish, humoral imbalance 
represents an impediment to success that may be overcome; in tragedy, the 
protagonist is unwilling or unable to successfully regulate his or her emotions and 
hence humoral imbalance.  The very nature of the Gal nic humoral system 
emphasizes the porosity of the body and the readiness with which it can take in both 
curative and noxious forces from the outside world.  In other words, the tragic figures 
suffering from plethora can cure themselves if they recognize their illness and 
embrace the means to wellness.  For both Tarquin and Lucrece, their illnesses are 
clearly recognized, but a killing cure is adopted rather than a healthful one.  In Julius 
Caesar, Brutus is an incompetent physician, misdiagnosing the trouble in Rome and 
his own humoral motivations.  Likewise, Othello misidentifies the source of pathosis 
and excises the wrong “lover” from his life.  The existence of emotional and humoral 
contagion does not negate free will, nor does it allow the protagonists of these 
tragedies to abdicate responsibility for their actions.  Rather, as we observe these 
depictions of humoral imbalance and the resulting behavioral influence, we can gain a 
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